

PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ARTISANAL DIAMOND DEVELOPMENT II (PRADD II)

FINAL REPORT
2013-2018



PHOTO BY SANDRA COBURN

DECEMBER 2018

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development by Tetra Tech.

Prepared by Tetra Tech for the United States Agency for International Development, USAID Contract No. AID-OAA-I-12-00032/AID/OAA-TO-13-00045, under the Strengthening Tenure and Resource Rights (STARR) Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC).

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Cover Photo: A new generation in the artisanal and small-scale mining community of Forona, near Séguéla, Côte d'Ivoire in December 2017. Photo by Sandra Coburn of The Cloudburst Group.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AFD	<i>Agence Française de Développement</i>
AFOR	<i>Agence Foncière Rurale (Rural Land Agency)</i>
ASDM	<i>Artisanal and Small-scale Diamond Mining</i>
ASM	<i>Artisanal and Small-scale Mining</i>
BECDOR	<i>Bureau d'Evaluation et de Contrôle de Diamant et d'Or</i>
BAF	<i>Brigade Anti-Fraude</i>
BNE	<i>Bureau National d'Expertise</i>
CBO	<i>Community-Based Organization</i>
CDH	<i>Le Centre pour le dialogue humanitaire</i>
CECIDE	<i>Centre du commerce international pour le développement</i>
CGFR	<i>Comité de Gestion du Foncier</i>
CGISM	<i>Centre de Gestion des Informations Géo-Scientifiques et des Statistiques Minières</i>
CIONG-CA	<i>Conseil Inter-ONG en Centrafrique</i>
CLD	<i>Village-level Development Committee</i>
CLRA	<i>Comités Locaux de Paix et de Réconciliation</i>
CONADOG	<i>Confédération nationale des diamantaires et orpailleurs de Guinée</i>
COR	<i>Contracting Officer's Representative</i>
CSO	<i>Civil Society Organization</i>
CUA	<i>Club Union Africaine (Ivoirian NGO and PRADD II subcontractor)</i>
CVGFR	<i>Rural Land Management Village Committee</i>
DCHA	<i>Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance</i>
DFR	
DGMG	<i>Direction Générale des Mines et de la Géologie (Mining Directorate)</i>
DNM	<i>Direction nationale des mines</i>
DRC	<i>Democratic Republic of the Congo</i>
EITI	<i>Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative</i>
EMMP	<i>Environmental Mitigation and Monitoring Plan</i>
ePORT	<i>electronic Program Observation Reporting and Tracking</i>
ERC	<i>Evaluation, Research, and Communication Project</i>
EU	<i>European Union</i>
FOCDI	<i>Friends of Côte d'Ivoire Group</i>
GIA	<i>Gemological Institute of America</i>
GIS	<i>Geographic Information System(s)</i>
GIZ	<i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</i>
GOG	<i>Government of Guinea</i>
GPS	<i>Global Positioning System</i>
GRPIE	<i>Groupement de Recherche et d'action pour les Industries Extractives</i>
IcSP	<i>Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace</i>


IQC	Indefinite Quantity Contract
IT	Information Technology
KAP	Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices
KP	Kimberley Process
KPCS	Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
KPPS	Kimberley Process Permanent Secretariat
LSM	Large-Scale Mining
LTPR	Land Tenure and Property Rights
MINUSCA	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MMEH	<i>Ministère des Mines, Energie, et Hydraulique</i> (Central African Republic)
MMG	Ministry of Mines and Geology (Guinea)
MRU	Mano River Union
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MOV	Means of Verification
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
ODK	Open Data Kit
OECD	Organization for Economic and Cooperative Development
OIPR	<i>Office ivoirien des parcs et réserves</i> (Ivoirian national park service)
OSIWA	Open Society Initiative for West Africa
PMP	Performance Monitoring Plan
QGIS	A Free and Open Source Geographic Information System
PNRO	National Gold Plan (Côte d'Ivoire)
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PRADD II	Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond Development II
PRRGp	Property Rights and Resource Governance Program
PSKP	Permanent Secretariat of the Kimberley Process
PSSD	Simplified Village Development Plan
RLRS	National Service for Rural Land Resources
RRA	Rapid Rural Appraisal
SPMP	<i>Service des Pierres et Métaux Précieux</i> (Côte d'Ivoire)
SODEMI	<i>Société pour le Développement Minier</i> (Mining company in Côte d'Ivoire)
SOW	Scope of Work
STA/M	Senior Technical Advisor/Manager
STARR	Strengthening Tenure and Resource Rights
TOR	Terms of Reference
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UK	United Kingdom
UNADOR	<i>Union nationale des diamantaires et orpailleurs</i>
UN	United Nations

USAF	<i>Unité Spéciale Anti-Fraude</i>
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USGS	United States Geological Survey
WA BiCC	West Africa Biodiversity and Climate Change
WDDF	Washington Declaration Diagnostic Framework

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Between 2013 and 2018, Tetra Tech implemented the Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond Development Project II (PRADD II), under Contract No. AID-OAA-I-12-00032/AID/OAA-TO-13-00045, under the Strengthening Tenure and Resource Rights (STARR) Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC) and under the auspices of the USAID Land Tenure and Resource Management Office. USAID and the European Union (EU) jointly funded PRADD II in Côte d'Ivoire under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) managed by the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments.¹ The PRADD II project also received funding for its work in the Central African Republic from the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) and the USAID/Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Mission. This final report, covering the period from September 2013 to September 2018, summarizes activities carried out in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, the Central African Republic as well as its and Regional Support to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). The following graphic summarizes key figures related to project accomplishments.

CÔTE D'IVOIRE



PRADD II helped bring Côte d'Ivoire into compliance with the KPCS for the first time in the country's history. This led to the lifting of the decade-long United Nation (UN) diamond embargo in 2014. Despite diminished political will following the embargo's lifting and the presence of dysfunctional government institutions, the chain of custody remained operational, with 66% of exports legally registered at the mine level, likely the highest proportion for artisanal and small-scale diamond (ASM) producers among Kimberley Process countries. Progress was aided by close collaboration with local diplomats in the Friends of Côte d'Ivoire Group (FOCDI), coordinated by the EU. The co-funding by the EU for Côte d'Ivoire was unique and helped foster donor coordination and synergies. Over the course of five years, 17 mining

¹ The European Union Phase I funding contract no. IFS-RRM/2013/331-479 was completed on September 30, 2016. Phase II EU funding under contract no. EU 2015-367-922 provides support to PRADD II through September 2018.


cooperatives were registered and strengthened, government services were trained and equipped delivering over 3,000 worker cards, communication campaigns led to basic KPCS knowledge among diggers increasing from 28% to 61%, among other achievements. The results reflected the paradox of governance in Côte d'Ivoire, where on the one hand the country benefits from high technical and financial capacities, but on the other hand corruption stifling bureaucracy and politics hold the country back from its full potential. Regarding the KPCS chain of custody, the jury is still out on whether it will grow or collapse.

Thanks to PRADD II, communities will be more resilient. The project strengthened and promoted a unique village cooperative model whereby 12% of revenues are used for local development while state and customary land owners co-manage the resource. The model aligns with the project's theory of change, which emphasizes how clear and formal property rights leads to greater investment, better environmental management, and reduced conflict. PRADD II not only designed land tenure activities that were community-driven but also integrated these into the nation's legal and institutional systems. The project supported the boundary demarcation of 15 villages, completing 64 out of 66 boundary segments. The lessons learned from the 20 resolved conflicts and the 2 unresolved ones were leveraged to contribute to the national rural land policy and the technical program for the new rural land agency. Innovative pilot efforts like the cashew farm mapping exercise helped inspire policy-makers to think about low-cost rights clarification organized through agricultural cooperatives. Indeed, a key conclusion from the project's land activities was that the prioritization of secondary rights clarification over titling and boundary demarcation is needed. While titling and boundary demarcation is highly political and less needed among community members, secondary rights clarification constitutes a more pressing need for users faced with mounting land pressures. The project's rich land use planning activities brought these changes to the fore. Through 10 village plans, a rural township plan, and years of social dialogue, communities were empowered to understand their development trajectories and embrace the future.

PRADD II also invested in a panoply of economic support activities aimed at diversifying livelihoods, building trust for a robust chain of custody, and improving conditions for miners. The project supported over 30 SMARTER mining techniques demonstration sites, developed an app for diamond valuation training and thanks to equipment and innovations like semi-mechanized washing and the hand auger, witnessed cooperatives self-financing for the first time, indicating progress towards the achievement of higher earnings. Meanwhile nearly 1,000 households, with 91% women beneficiaries, received technical, material and organizational support for farming, producing nearly 89 tons of food crops, rehabilitating over 15 hectares of mined out land in the process and earning tens of thousands of dollars. With this income, they invested in community infrastructure and achieved greater participation in decision-making. Other activities included support to three dozen beekeepers who produced two tons of honey, support for 50 aquaculture ponds and a dozen chicken farms. The project developed value chains around its activities for greater sustainability, through training and material support to entrepreneurs, including one who produced chicken feed and another who ran a mining equipment rental company. Overall, the project's beneficiary households, representing 9% of all intervention area households, earned 73% more than non-beneficiaries.

With its team of 23 dedicated staff, PRADD II Côte d'Ivoire worked tirelessly with local partners to achieve results. Over 55% of its activity budget was spent through local subcontractors, helping build sustainability. Indeed, while the project remains concerned about the government's capacity to manage the challenges ahead, PRADD II is optimistic that its communities have the tools to adapt and thrive.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC



The PRADD II project in the Central African Republic had a relatively short life. Project activities were started up in January, 2016 through a participatory work planning exercise with the Ministry of Mines and Geology. By the close of the project in September, 2018 the small five-person project team had achieved a remarkable set of results.

Through the Component I of the project oriented around reestablishing the Kimberley Process Certification after the devastating crisis of 2013-2015, the project achieved its intents by helping the country lift the diamond embargo and re-launch the legitimate export-oriented trade in diamonds. Working closely with the Kimberley Process authorities and through the National Kimberley Process Monitoring Committee, the presence of the state in the Compliant Zones was significantly increased. The regional mining authorities started up work again thanks to the encouragement of both the Ministry of Mines and the PRADD II project. In effect, PRADD II played an instrumental part in helping the authorities learn about

how the diamond economy had evolved during the crisis and the challenges it confronted due to the massive illegal exports of diamonds through neighboring countries.

The structural problems that have long haunted the diamond mining sector in the Central African Republic continue unabated and indeed are reinforced thanks to the uncertain institutional climate in the southwest part of the country. While state presence has returned to much of the southwest through the reestablishment of regional diamond mining offices, these offices are severely understaffed and underequipped. The renewed presence of the state has only deepened the extractive tendencies of government officials who use the law and regulations to extract personal benefits from various elements of the value chain. Predation by government agents undermines trust by community members in the state. Racketeering is well documented, yet there are no mechanisms for illegal extraction to be addressed in any systematic way.

The Component II of the PRADD II CAR program was designed to foster peace and social cohesion in diamond mining areas. Without this condition, the Kimberley Process could decertify the Compliant Zones, and thus, place into question the country's lifting of the embargo on diamond exports. The

central achievement of PRADD II was the creation of an institutional linkage with the Ministry of Humanitarian Action and National Reconciliation. With little interest expressed initially by the Ministry of Mines and Geology in peacebuilding and social cohesion, PRADD II found an institutional home. Inroads with the ministry were created with the intent to help address the 600 or so recommendations for how to address the root causes of the 2013-2015 crisis in the Central African Republic.


Through the field work carried out by the PRADD II project, the staff came to view the root causes of the conflict in the Central African Republic as a resource crisis catalyzed by competing interests struggling to gain access to surface and sub-surface resources. The PRADD II technical team concluded that new resource tenure rules, both in the statutory and customary tenure realm, need to be devised to regulate access to these resources by also define new inter-ethnic and religious relations. In effect, the clarification of resource tenure rules is one that requires institutions to define new rules of access, use, and enforcement of natural resources.

Over the two years of PRADD II, a two-phased approach emerged to support one of the key ideals of the Bangui Forum – the creation of “Pacts Locales” or local conventions designed to address the causes of conflicts at the local level. PRADD II worked hand in hand with the Ministry of Humanitarian Action and National Reconciliation to develop the concept of Local Pacts – a strategy that meshed well with the ministry’s strategy to address conflict in urban and rural areas and then, put in place Local Pacts (Local Conventions) in Berberati as a pilot initiative.

The three community dialogues leading to the signature of Local Pacts expressed many issues faced throughout the southwest part of the country. Themes guiding the negotiation of the Local Pacts focused on the poor governance of natural resources and forestry royalties, the theft of cattle by armed non-conventional forces (Anti-Balaka have apparently stolen 168 cattle but also military and local authorities), the need to return to consensual agreements to encourage the return of refugees and livestock raisers... Community leaders all signed conventions to try to put into place arrangements to live in peace and harmony and respect of social, cultural, and religious differences.

The question now is whether the authority vested in the Peace and Reconciliation committees will empower these community members to resolve some of the lingering conflicts pitting communities and ethnic groups one against the other. While the Local Pacts call for the state to play a role as an honest broker, it is not yet clear whether the state bureaucracy, one characterized largely by short-term opportunism, can indeed work with local communities to enforce honestly agreements and sanctions. At the time of the closure of the PRADD II project, it was too early to know whether local conflicts were being addressed by this new institutional structure.

GUINEA



The PRADD II Guinea program was launched successfully in September, 2013. The project advanced very rapidly in putting into place the major components of the project. Support was provided to the Kimberley Process Secretariat to reform the collection of diamond production and commercialization data, the regional Ministry of Mines and Geology (MMG) office in Forécariah was refurbished, income diversification activities were started in the diamond mining areas of Forécariah, and SMARTER bench terracing mining started – all at a time when Ebola was ravaging the area. Despite the Ebola crisis, PRADD II kept its offices opened and carried out activities in the field.

At the outset of the PRADD II Guinea project, in-depth participatory diagnostics were carried out in Banankoro and Forécariah before deciding on a definitive project site. The participatory diagnostics revealed that long-established customary land tenure regimes, especially in Forécariah, were surprisingly robust. Contrary to initial expectations, all the alluvial plains in Forécariah were

at the time held under customary regimes that appeared strong and dynamic. Initially, PRADD II feared that speculative land pressures linked to the expected construction of a port in Forécariah might lead to large-scale land acquisitions. The studies instead showed that the Ministry of Mines and Geology was a source of major tensions in the diamond mining communities because of its insistence that diamond mining claims be allocated, for a fee, without evidence that diamond deposits were under the ground.

At the start of the PRADD II Guinea project, the MMG showed more interest in receiving donor assistance for preparation of projections of diamond production yields, issuance of mining licenses, and reporting production statistics than in strengthening surface rights of customary landowners. Most officials from the ministry were reluctant to discuss clarification and security of surface rights, even though both the Mining Code and the Land Code protect customary surface rights holders. Therefore, the alternate option for PRADD II was to address the tenure issues through the new National Service for Rural Land Resources (RLRS) of the Ministry of Agriculture to support securing surface rights for customary landowners. At the time, the national service was preparing to launch a series of activities to promote land tenure formalization and security in the rural area and to improve the legal and policy

framework of rural land tenure. The project worked to design most of its sub-activities for this component to strengthen the RLRS and support clarifying and securing customary land tenure rights.

The PRADD II project made it possible to measure the Government of Guinea's (GOG) commitment to support a process of land tenure security in rural areas. To the surprise of the PRADD II team and USAID, many ministerial entities were interested in starting a land tenure reform dialogue yet lacked the knowledge base to develop a policy reform roadmap. Through a series of mini-training programs, PRADD II Guinea built up considerable momentum toward building support for new policy measures to support landowners' rights in rural areas. Putting in place the foundations of good governance was expected to generate internal reforms of the legal and institutional framework of the land sector, especially in ASDM areas.

Tetra Tech received a "Notice of Partial Termination for Convenience" from USAID Washington on April 22, 2016 requesting that the PRADD II Guinea program stop all project activities immediately and prepare for full closure of the program by May 31, 2016. The reason for the premature closure was a reduction in funding for PRADD II and was not linked with project performance. USAID decided to concentrate remaining resources on maintaining PRADD Côte d'Ivoire (which is co-funded by the EU) at sufficient levels of funding. The PRADD II team worked quickly and diligently to ensure a smooth a closure. Per agreement with the USAID Contracting Officer, some key deliverables were completed by the end of May including boundary demarcation for the Forest Reserve of Kounounkan and presentation of a map with geographical coordinates to the Ministry of Environment and Forests. Additionally, PRADD completed an app for use on etablets phones which would have allowed for rapid transmission of diamond production data and other statistics from diamond mining sites to the data base at the Ministry of Mines and Geology. Unfortunately, this app was never installed because of lack of interest by the Director General of Mines.

GENERAL AND REGIONAL SUPPORT TO THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS

The PRADD II contract foresaw a “regional” component that would consist of general support to the KP. The early PRADD II involvement in the MRU regional approach fit under this regional umbrella. In addition, support for further refining and implementing the Washington Declaration Diagnostic Framework (WDDF) as part of Kimberley Process gatherings was another activity. Finally, the Côte d'Ivoire Country Director participated in the 2015 diagnostic in the Central African Republic which led to the KP Operational Framework and partial suspension lifting. However, the reality was that the PRADD II budget was insufficient for significant investment in this area. Originally this line was meant to finance targeted technical assistance to other KP Participants. However, after the USAID core budget cuts led to the closure of the Guinea, the regional component's activities were for all practical purposes eliminated, especially when the EU funded GIZ to take the lead on the MRU regional approach.

CROSSCUTTING ACTIVITIES

The PRADD II project built various partnerships with private sector and non-governmental actors throughout the course of the project. Some partnerships flourished, others did not. Most of the partnerships noted below were wholly supported by independent external funding. On some occasions, PRADD II provided in-country travel costs, but the partner supported personnel.

- **Gemology Institute of America (GIA):** PRADD II Côte d'Ivoire successfully organized a training conducted by the GIA for diamond valuers and other key actors in 2014. The training was a key part of building capacity but also momentum around the post-embargo transition strategy. Unfortunately, a leadership change at the GIA led to less interest to pursue this partnership.
- **Brilliant Earth:** Several initiatives were launched to promote conflict-free diamond exports to the jewelry sector through collaboration with Brilliant Earth. Despite good intentions by both PRADD II and Brilliant Earth, no exports occurred primarily because of cost considerations.
- **International Peace Information Service (IPIS):** The Belgian-based non-governmental research institute worked closely with PRADD II in the Central African Republic to provide training to civil society in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and other elements of the artisanal mining gold and diamond economy.
- **Engineers without Borders:** Support was provided to the PRADD II Côte d'Ivoire program to advise on how to create software to assess the quality of diamonds. The association also carried out a study of the water system in Tortiya – a key requirement to generate funds from the government of Côte d'Ivoire.
- **Spark:** The PRADD II Côte d'Ivoire developed a fruitful institutional affiliation with the Dutch Spark non-governmental organization to set up the youth entrepreneurship program.

The PRADD II program supported during the first years an Impact Evaluation process carried out by the USAID Evaluation, Research and Communication (ERC) project. The impact evaluation research and analysis was never completed because of the premature closing of PRADD II. Fortunately, enough initial baseline research was carried out to generate a paper for the World Bank Land and Poverty Conference. The paper described the prevalence and strength of the customary tenure systems and options for formalization of the diamond mining sector.

The PRADD II program in Côte d'Ivoire carried out its own modified impact evaluation in order to judge the efficacy of its various activities and adjust annual programming. This is reported out in the Côte d'Ivoire chapter.

The PRADD II country teams developed their own draft strategies and checklists for gender integration and advanced on their own accord. Regular reporting was carried out for the Girls Count Act that addresses, “support programs and key ministries, including programs and ministries relating to interior, youth, and education, to help increase property rights, social security, home ownership, land tenure security, inheritance rights, access to education, and economic and entrepreneurial opportunities, particularly for women and girls” (HR 2100, April 29, 2015).

The PRADD II program integrated gender and social inclusion into all components of the project. A Gender Specialist was hired at the outset of the project to provide technical assistance to the Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire programs. In the end, PRADD II found it most useful to train up its own staff to provide the consistent in-country advocacy needed to ensure consideration of these issues in all project activities. The Côte d'Ivoire program designed and implemented a Gender Strategy document which was used to assess whether and how every project activity contributed to gender inclusion and empowerment. This manual was then used by the Guinea program.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SUSTAINABILITY

While lessons learned and recommendations are discussed in detail below for each project activity, the following broad remarks are for key stakeholders with an interest in the project's sustainability.

USAID, EU, AND STATE DEPARTMENT

The collaboration between USAID and the EU in Côte d'Ivoire was unique and offered a model for donor collaboration that should be replicated. Moreover, the synergies between the technical and diplomatic levels, as exemplified by the “Friends of Côte d'Ivoire” diplomatic platform was a model to follow, especially since sensitive issues like mining and land governance require approaches that are jointly technical and political in nature. Donors continue supporting Côte d'Ivoire to maintain positive pressure on the government that ensures the right political conditions for the sustainability of the KPCS chain of custody. The wrong conditions will imperil the last five years of investments made by the international community and Ivorian stakeholders.

GOVERNMENT OF CÔTE D'IVOIRE

The Government of Côte d'Ivoire has enviable technical and human capacity, as well as a unique and innovative history in ASM governance. Together, these capacities create the potential of leadership in the region and worldwide. Unfortunately, technicians are not always given the resources or the freedom to move forward, and political infighting around budgets and personalities paralyze progress. The government should continue to support its technicians to strengthen the chain of custody and learn the positive lessons from diamonds to apply to gold. In land governance, the government should also capitalize on PRADD II experiences to include robust land clarification activities as part of the new agency's portfolio.

GOVERNMENT OF GUINEA

The commitment of the Ministry of Mines and Geology and the Kimberley Process Secretariat to reforms in the artisanal mining sector remains questionable. PRADD II invested heavily in equipping the regional mining office in Forécariah with new facilities and equipment. Focal Points were trained in new data collection techniques. A data base center was set up within the Director General of Mines. Diamond mining communities were organized into associations capable of receiving technical assistance and financing for diversification away from dependence on diamond mining. Despite all of these interventions, the project was constantly faced by the ministry's aggressive and constant demands for more materials, supplies, and higher per diem rates. Even though PRADD II was required to close down

early due to funding constraints, it worked hard to assure the maintenance of a digitized data center at the Ministry of Mines and Geology. Unfortunately, this center was dismantled at the time of an office renovation in Conakry, and despite initiatives by PRADD II to rebuild the data center, the department never came through on several key engagements. To this day, the digital data center is not functional. This sad experience symbolizes the contradictory situation PRADD II faced. On one hand, at the local scale of diamond mining communities, results were palpable. But, within the ministerial hierarchy, commitment to the vision of the Kimberley Process, and PRADD II appeared minimal.

The land administration institutions of Guinea have tremendous shortcomings, especially because of the lack of skilled and energetic staff to address the short and medium policy reforms much needed to avert a major national land tenure crisis. Building the capacity of these entities through various formats of training sessions, coordination and communication, and creation of an enabling environment to foster policy reforms was seen as a key contribution of USAID technical assistance before the project closed in Guinea prematurely.

If USAID or other donors ever enter into this land tenure domain again, the PRADD II team encourages the GOG to review relevant mandates to reduce overlaps in ministerial roles; rejuvenate the ministerial units in charge of the land sector with better trained staff; implement existing provisions of the existing Land Code and Mining Code, but draft supporting regulatory decrees; and at the same time draft a new Rural Land Code and supporting regulations. These are no small tasks. Perhaps the most important recommendation is to work with universities in Guinea to design new curricula in land tenure and resource governance, for without a new generation of young, dynamic, and engaged leaders, land tenure policy reforms will be stymied and rest upon a legacy of early Guinean socialist regimes.

GOVERNMENT OF CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

The PRADD II project was launched just after the three-year crisis from 2013-2015 in which the capital city of Bangui was overrun by the Seleka rebel forces. At the time of start-up, the country was at its knees. Massacres had occurred throughout the country; the signs of much loss of life and property were still evident in Bangui. The PRADD II team of consultants was faced with the massive challenge of working with stakeholders severely traumatized by the crisis. Building renewed confidence, energy, and enthusiasm took time and much skill from the dedicated staff – most of whom were former PRADD I employees.

The question of how to create the Journey to Self-Reliance remains unanswered for the Central African Republic. The recurrent costs of maintaining the Kimberley Process Certification requirements, as expressed in part through the Operational Framework, remain extremely high for a country that is financially bankrupt. Radically new forms of organization of the artisanal diamond mining economy are needed at a time when massive fraudulent exports of diamonds and gold continues unabated. Perhaps a tipping point has been reached where the forces of illegal exports are stronger than the incentives for compliance to complex international certification frameworks. The Central African Republic does not yet have a conflict free diamond export system, though it is likely that the Compliant Zones are indeed largely free of racketeering that supports the purchase of arms and ammunition for rebel movements. While the current administration and the leadership of the Ministry of Mines and Geology appear committed to fundamental reforms, and indeed this is a window of opportunity, the relative peace and stability in Bangui and the southwestern part of the country is not assured. For this reason, USAID contributions to building a conflict free diamond economy will be fraught with considerable uncertainties in the years to come in this fragile, conflict ridden country of tremendous mineral, oil, and timber wealth.

KIMBERLEY PROCESS

The Kimberley Process's (KP) role in Côte d'Ivoire was a success story in that the KPCS framework and positive pressure from participants allowed for the development of a robust chain of custody after more than a decade of suspension. However, the KP was less effective after the embargo lifted and attention on Côte d'Ivoire waned. The KP lost an opportunity to continue to exert influence on Côte d'Ivoire and avoid many of the problems currently plaguing the system. In the future, the KP should remain engaged and proactive, setting clearing expectations both before and after suspensions.

By the end of the PRADD II project, the senior staff became quite discouraged by the high recurrent costs of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. A vicious cycle has set in whereby poor countries, like the Central African Republic, cannot pay for the costs of gathering, analyzing production and commercialization data. In other countries, like Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, the governments can most likely afford the recurrent costs of adherence to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, but unfortunately, state authorities may not possess the political will to support the compliance regime. For this reason, a new set of incentives needs to be put in place, a new compliance regime that affords local diamond mining communities the opportunities to monitor and benefit themselves from tracking the flow of diamonds, and gold, out of their territories. Lessons learned from PRADD II in Côte d'Ivoire may spell out new avenues in the years to come.

1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The USAID Property Rights and Artisanal Diamond Development Project (PRADD II) supported governments to implement mining best practices in Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea, and promoted good governance of the mining sector at the international level through the Kimberley Process (KP), the international mechanism that aims to prevent rough diamonds that fuel conflict from entering the international supply chain. The program—a \$19 million five-year joint USAID/European Union (EU) initiative—is a follow-on project to PRADD I, USAID's former flagship mining project implemented from 2007–2013 across the Central African Republic, Guinea, and Liberia. PRADD II also received funding from the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), and the USAID/Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Mission to support new activities in the Central African Republic—contributing to compliance with the KPCS, but especially to peacebuilding and social cohesion in diamond mining communities in KPCS-compliant zones.

The objective of PRADD II was to increase the number of alluvial diamonds entering the formal chain of custody, while improving the benefits accruing to diamond mining communities. Artisanal miners labor under archaic and difficult working conditions and live in extreme poverty, often receiving less than 5% of the retail price of the stones they extract. Poverty prevents miners from acquiring the licenses required to operate within the law, the equipment necessary to increase their gains, and the assets needed to diversify their livelihoods. Not surprisingly, miners often become incentivized to quickly mine, sell, and move on to new sites. These practices have devastating economic and environmental consequences, impact export revenues negatively, and prevent compliance with the KP.



1.1 THE PRADD II APPROACH

Drawing upon the fields of property rights, economic development, governance, and behavioral change, PRADD II based its approach on the premise that secure property rights create positive incentives for miners to be good stewards of land and resources. When artisanal miners' rights to prospect and dig for diamonds are formal and secure, they are more likely to sell through legal channels, enabling the government to track the origin of diamonds and prevent them from fueling conflict. Clarification and formalization of mining claims also helps to clarify the rules governing access, use, and transfer of rights. This is appealing not only to the owners of the land, but also to prospective investors.

PRADD II further strengthened the diamond value chain by designing alternative systems of financing, equipment, and marketing for the benefit of diggers, miners, intermediaries, and exporters. The project introduced complementary livelihoods, including the conversion of exhausted mining sites into agricultural units. The project specifically targeted women and influenced them to uptake these livelihoods as a means of mitigating the environmental damages of artisanal mining while providing diversified income and food security.

At the policy level, PRADD II supported governments to improve diamond mining legislation and regulations. In 2013, the project produced the Washington Declaration Diagnostic Framework (WDDF), which helps diamond-producing states translate international best mining practices into action. The Framework was endorsed by the Kimberley Process in November 2013. Finally, PRADD II combines local, national, and international communication tools to mobilize civil society groups and change the behavior of artisanal miners and decision makers regarding the trade of rough diamonds. PRADD II's goal is to use behavior change communication approaches to alter the way miners view diamond trade and production—from a source of conflict to a powerful tool for development that will improve national economies as well as the livelihoods of miners and their communities.

Figure I: Map of communities and activities in Séguéla project site (Source: PRADD II)





Figure 2: Map of communities and activities in Tortiya project site (Source: PRADD II)



2.0 CÔTE D'IVOIRE

2.1 ACTIVITY I: PROPERTY RIGHTS CLARIFICATION AND FORMALIZATION

Summary of Technical Approach

PRADD II land activities focused on village boundary demarcation, land use planning, and participation in the development of national rural land policies. These activities stemmed from the PRADD II theory of change, which posits that clarified and formalized surface and sub-surface rights lead to less conflict, more investment, and better environmental management. In choosing its sub-activities, PRADD II first sought to fully unpack this theory of change in the Ivorian context. This was done through baseline studies like the *Land and Conflict Assessment*, which aimed at better understanding the customary and legal systems for land and resource management with an emphasis on the environment, conflict, and the political economy of land. Over the course of the project this knowledge was deepened through the land use planning process with a half-dozen studies documenting the nuanced ways in which communities and the government are adapting to changes in land use and demand. With this contextual information the project designed and adapted activities that considered both customary practices and national laws and institutions. Indeed, one of the key lessons from PRADD I in the Central African Republic was insufficient integration of land policy into the national legal framework, leading to difficulties with sustainability. In Côte d'Ivoire, PRADD II sought to ensure that all activities fit within national laws and institutions, notably the 1998 Rural Land Tenure Law. However, given the PRADD II emphasis on customary practices and community-driven property rights clarification, many of PRADD II land activities were a hybrid between the government's more top-down framework and the more grassroots approach promoted by the project and its local partners. To succeed PRADD II often needed to educate government officials on the benefits and techniques of more bottom-up approaches to land certification, mineral management, and land use planning. This in turn paved the way for another aspect of the project's technical approach that entailed designing activities in such a way that they contributed to national policy-making. These activities involved a substantial amount of networking at a national level with government and institutional partners, the production of policy papers and lessons learned documents, and the organization of study tours and conferences. While PRADD II was geographically and thematically limited to diamond zones, it succeeded in bringing field voices to the capital and influencing national policy on land as a whole, such as directly contributing to the rural land policy adopted in 2016 and the technical approach of the World Bank as it prepared a major investment in land certification that began in 2018. Therefore, as with other activities, PRADD II took full advantage of its unique position and bridged communities, the national government, and international donors.

Conclusions and Lessons Learned

PRADD II support for village boundary demarcation had mixed results. On the one hand, over a dozen major inter-village conflicts were resolved including some like Natiemboro which dated from before independence, and the vast majority of boundary segments finalized, creating the conditions for peaceable relations between villages as land pressure increases in the coming decades. Communities that succeeded also reported being more at ease with respect to the future as for them demarcation reinforced their control over their territory now recognized by the government. In addition, given that the project was supporting the official process, the activity was fully legitimated by the government and fit well within national priorities. The boundary demarcation exercise also helped PRADD II garner credibility and productive working relationships with national land tenure stakeholders, which facilitated the project's contributions to the national policy framework. On the other hand, it was disappointing yet unsurprising that the two unresolved disputes were about control of the kimberlitic diamond deposits. Given that PRADD II supported boundary demarcation to reduce such resource-based conflicts, it was

unfortunate to not have completed the process for the two main diamond mining villages of Bobi and Diarabana. In addition, while villages completing demarcation reported increased confidence about the future, others felt that the process not only opened up wounds but put salt on them. This feedback illustrated the high stakes and risks associated with demarcation, and how firm boundary demarcation weakens the advantages of more flexible customary practices.

Among the many lessons learned documented in the final wrap-up workshops and videos, available on the project's YouTube channel and the DEC, several stand out. First, it was clear that village demarcation is a highly political process, and that the government's technocratic model is ill-adapted to this fact. PRADD II succeeded in most villages by complementing the official process with sustained engagement by field agents with communities and by national staff with village elites in Abidjan. The government was either too risk-averse to create these spaces of dialogue for fear of stirring the pot or they over-reached by imposing decisions that were rejected by communities. While government officials and land surveyors have developed an ability to deal with these political dimensions, the procedure itself proved to be too technocratic and the actors were ill-prepared to pursue these dialogues. As a result, a key lesson from PRADD II was that demarcation should not be the first step in land clarification and formalization, as it is in the government's policy, but rather a final step – and an optional one in some cases. Instead, other tools like land certification, land use planning, and mapping may have a greater impact and may be easier to utilize. That said, the project stayed away from supporting land certification under the 1998 Rural Land Tenure Law because of misgivings about the cost and the technical viability of established legal procedures, which shared similar technical flaws as the demarcation regulation. Instead PRADD II designed a pilot carried out in Tortiya with a cashew plantation that involved mapping and supporting agricultural authorities in delivering documents that served as “pre-certificates.” This activity demonstrated how starting with clarifying secondary land usage rights is the best entry point for land clarification and formalization, and thus may have more utility for farmers.

However, while it is easy to say in hindsight that secondary rights clarification should have been prioritized, during the project PRADD II had very little ability to focus on secondary rights clarification given that the government's policy was opposed to formalizing contracts before certification, and opposed to certification before village boundary demarcation. In contrast, the lack of a detailed land use planning law was an advantage for the project with the second major land activity, the support of strategic development plans. PRADD II had more liberty to design an approach that was a hybrid between top-down and bottom-up. In Tortiya, the project aligned itself more closely with a top-down approach, with a methodology used by many townships in the country that included innovations like zoning and integrated land tenure dynamics into the planning process as opposed to producing a list of infrastructure priorities. In Séguéla, PRADD II had even more liberty and spent many months designing, adapting, and re-designing appropriate methodologies. The challenge in Séguéla was balancing this organic approach to planning with a structured one, and the project struggled at points to maintain direction. In the end, the iterative process that proved successful included several key pillars: (1) participatory research and social dialogue to arrive at co-understanding about the ecological, economic and land tenure dynamics in communities; (2) social dialogue using testimonial films focusing on the identification and improvement of existing access and ownership rules related to land; and (3) the production of simplified development plans endorsed by state authorities that focused on materializing those rules in zoning decisions and local institutions.

While time will tell whether success will be sustained, PRADD II found that its approach of continued social dialogue and engagement was laborious but highly successful in that by the end of the project communities had developed a real awareness of their land challenges and a commitment to preventing future problems. For example, in Forona, the plan included a zone that would be reserved for subsistence agriculture, and, in Kationron, after the adoption of their plan, they refused an outside investor that attempted to expropriate over 100 hectares for an industrial farm. This was heartening to

see, especially considering the myriad challenges deriving from reduced amounts of diamonds, new conflicts around cashews, and climate change. Indeed, the project ended with hope that villages can sustain these decisions going forward. In many ways the land use planning methodology aligned with the project's theory of change. In contrast, PRADD II is less sanguine about the government's ability to deal with the significant challenges ahead. While the project had some success in convincing authorities that land policy should be developed based on a deep understanding of community needs, and not just a theoretical vision made in Abidjan, and that a linear Cartesian view of land formalization is not adapted to local practices, in the end the prospects of meaningful change are slim. Domineering attitudes toward rural communities and stifling bureaucracies are key hurdles, and unfortunately the new land agency is, at a fundamental level, continuing the same arguably failed approach applied since the 1990s, even with its new resources and political will.

Sustainability and Follow-on Recommendations

PRADD II generated significant knowledge throughout the life of the project documented in studies and other documents. However, the project had very little time to fully communicate and document this knowledge for the broader practitioner and academic communities. A notable exception was the World Bank's Land and Poverty Conference presentations, but these were often done under enormous time constraints and amidst pressing demands of day-to-day project management. Documents and videos have been posted in relevant repositories, but future projects might consider partnerships with researchers or think tanks to ensure up-take of this information. Thanks to the project, the knowledge generated can potentially be used for multiple doctorates, but unfortunately a plethora of information was not captured in a way that can be effectively utilized by future researchers and practitioners. Many strands of inquiry begun by the project—such as the momentous changes in tenure in northern Côte d'Ivoire due to the cashew boom, and the political economy of current land tenure policy by the government—need further research. There are therefore opportunities for follow-up research and documentation building on what the project began.

With respect to sustainability of specific activities, PRADD II believes that the boundary demarcation achieved under the project is highly sustainable given complete appropriation by the state and thanks to the project's grassroots approach by communities as well. Other land donors might consider continuing the dialogue around the remaining disputes as breakthroughs could still happen. With respect to land use planning, PRADD II believes that the changes in attitudes from the process are durable, but in both communities, the project did not have enough time to assist in the implementation of the plans. This is a threat to sustainability, as while it is a success to have zoned a community ecological reserve, continued outside support may be necessary to consolidate recognition by the state. In retrospect, PRADD II should have started with land use planning earlier, perhaps instead of village demarcation, and there is therefore a need for a follow-up assessment in these communities regarding their decisions to determine if and how the increased awareness of land use planning will translate into long-term change.

Finally, with respect to land tenure formalization, the pilot exercise in Tortiya with cashew plantation mapping was successful and should be scaled up. The certificates (*attestation de plantation*) offer a balance between an official document endorsed by the government and a document demanded by and accessible to farmers. In addition, the approach of land clarification and formalization (especially secondary rights) through agricultural cooperatives is something that could easily be scaled up across West Africa given the dominance of cash crops and relatively well-organized commodity markets. Finally, these documents offer a non-threatening way—because they focus on farms and treat land rights indirectly—to clarify land tenure with less risk of political complications that arise with activities that focus on primary ownership and zero-sum games like boundary demarcation. Rural Land Management Village Committees (CVGFRs) should also be given more responsibility in managing these secondary rights. PRADD II made headway in making stakeholders aware of these low-hanging fruits to clarify and formalize land rights in a cost-effective and demand-driven fashion, raising hopes of follow-up in the coming years.

2.1.1 SUB-ACTIVITY 1: LAND RIGHTS CLARIFICATION AND FORMALIZATION IN DIAMOND MINING AREAS



Photo by Y. Meite

Figure 3: Placement of physical boundary markers between two villages in Tortiya in 2016. PRADD II completed 64 of 66 boundary segments targeted for demarcation, resolving a dozen conflicts.

Rationale for Approach and Activities: When PRADD II was designed the first activity was village boundary demarcation. This was seen as a way to conduct an activity fully integrated into national laws and procedures. PRADD II carried out this process for 15 villages that involved following a highly complex procedure for 66 boundary segments. The project partnered with non-government organization (NGO) *Club Union Africaine* (CUA), which had experience in implementation of the 1998 land law, and subcontracted land surveying firm CETIF for the technical operation. PRADD II considered venturing into land certification but the cost was prohibitive and it did not meet PRADD II objectives with respect to sustainability given the flaws in the law. For example, the obligation to convert land certificates into land titles within 3 years is a major disincentive to get certificates. As such PRADD II identified other ways to

formalize property rights including rental agreements between agricultural groups supported by the project and land owners, as well as the pilot cashew mapping identification exercise in Tortiya. Finally, as noted above, PRADD II sought to document and communicate lessons learned to national stakeholders, and there were many opportunities to do so given the significant donor engagement on land that occurred throughout the life of the project.

Activities, Accomplishments, and Lessons Learned under Sub-Activity 1

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Train and sensitize authorities and communities on village boundary demarcation procedures	PRADD II trained key administrative actors on the complex procedures for boundary demarcation. For many, this was their first exposure to the 1998 land law and associated regulations. The trainings were conducted by the national government authorities with project support. In addition, PRADD II developed illustrated placards for use in communities. Subcontractor CUA spent over 18 months with field agents discussing the process with different segments of the population of each village. The placards were then transferred to the government for future use by the new Rural Land Agency (AFOR).	Without PRADD II support, the <i>sous-préfets</i> and agricultural agents would not have known how to implement their own regulation. This lesson mirrored other interventions showing how much implementing the 1998 law has been donor-driven. This changed slightly by the end of the project with the new AFOR agency, though it depends on the EU and World Bank. PRADD II also learned that the government views sensitization as a one-way top-down transmission of information to communities, rather than a grassroots process of dialogue that leads to adhesion to a government program.
Establish and build capacity of Village and Sub-Prefecture	None of PRADD II communities had CVGFRs or CGFRs, so the project with subcontractor CUA helped	Often real decision-makers like land chiefs were not designated by communities to be part of CVGFRs,

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Land Management Committees (CVGFR and Comité de Gestion du Foncier Rural (CGFR))	establish these entities necessary for boundary demarcation and land certification. The project ensured minimum standards of gender and ethnic representation, even though not foreseen by the regulations. In total 39 CVGFRs were established, including in villages bordering those targeted for demarcation.	making them less effective. Villages may not have fully grasped their purpose. In addition, CVGFRs can play a positive role after demarcation in conflict management and registering transactions. However, this is not foreseen by current legislation, which limits their role to endorsing limits.
Conduct participatory diagnostics and studies in support of land rights clarification and formalization	PRADD II completed a key baseline study in the <i>Land and conflict diagnostic</i> as well as specific studies like the legal study on the former SAREMCI mining zone in Tortiya. These studies helped the project understand dynamics but also obtain buy-in for technical approaches. For example, the SAREMCI study succeeded in convincing Tortiya actors that their land was legally no longer a mining zone but rather rural land. This in turn led to buy-in for village demarcation.	In hindsight the early diagnostics were relatively superficial compared to the knowledge developed by the end of the project. In addition, some suppositions made early on proved false later, such as the Tagbana-Senoufo conflict in Tortiya, which was exaggerated in early diagnostics. In retrospect, PRADD II may have spent more time doing in-depth rapid rural appraisals (RRAs) earlier, as the RRAs conducted in 2016 as part of land use planning greatly deepened understanding.
Support village boundary demarcation operation in 15 villages	The technical surveying and physical demarcation operation began in late 2015 and was completed by mid-2016. Of 66 segments, 64 were completed. The surveying operation led to the identification of conflicts and negotiation of limits. It involved a detailed process of collecting the settlement history, clearing brush with machetes, placing physical markers, opening a public comment period, closing the comment period and transmitting final results to government agencies. Of 15 villages targeted for demarcation, 11 were completed by the end of the project.	Until the technical operation actually began, villages had a fuzzy understanding of the process, despite over a year of awareness-raising and training. Such training must be viewed as continuous and not as step number one. In retrospect it would have been better to start the technical operation earlier. PRADD II also learned the value of using satellite images for boundary negotiation, as they proved vital in resolving many of the conflicts. Finally, PRADD II learned the importance of involving Abidjan-based village elites as they are key spoilers that must be involved early on.
Develop and implement conflict management strategy	For the first two years, PRADD II had a dedicated staff member to deal with conflicts, and a conflict management strategy. The strategy included establishing conflict “focal points” in each village to record and monitor various land-based disputes. This approach was abandoned at the end	Due to the political nature of the conflicts encountered by the project during demarcation, a dedicated field position related to conflict was not necessary. Conflict management was better as a crosscutting thematic. If PRADD II had ventured into supporting the resolution of

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
	<p>of the first EU contract in 2015. Instead, conflict management became a cross-cutting activity. Due to the political nature of most conflicts, field office managers played a key role in advancing negotiations, as well as the new Land Activities Manager hired in 2016. The project documented 20 major resource-based conflicts resolved thanks to project support.</p>	<p>day-to-day conflicts like crop devastation by cattle, the approach of focal points and a dedicated conflict manager may have made more sense. However, PRADD II determined it could not do both demarcation and cattle-farmer conflict management as both demanded too much time of staff and villagers. Instead the project focused on demarcation.</p>
<p>Map cashew plantation as Pre-Certification Pilot Activity</p>	<p>As it became clear that budget and government policy would not make supporting land certification possible, PRADD II thought of other ways to pilot land clarification and formalization. The project designed a pilot in Tortiya to demonstrate how tablet-based technologies, simple demand-driven processes focused on cash crop cooperatives, and the clarification of secondary rights, could be a relatively easy and useful way to clarify rights. The PRADD II pilot in early 2018 led to the issuance of 111 certificates at a cost of around \$127 per farmer, much less than the thousands of dollars per farmer needed for a land certificate.</p>	<p>The government resisted PRADD II plans to help formalize contracts between farmers and land owners, and even passed a decree making it illegal to contract without land certificates. PRADD II found a work-around with the farm certificate delivered by agricultural authorities, but with added tenure aspects like a map and terms of rent. This meant that it could be a type of “pre-certificate,” since having already mapped and resolved conflicts will greatly reduce the price of land certificates or titles. Moreover, the approach showed the efficacy and sustainability of formalization via agricultural cooperatives.</p>
<p>Conduct social dialogue and awareness-raising on Rural Land Law and certification</p>	<p>PRADD II sought to train and promote awareness on the 1998 Rural Land Law. Early in the project this was seen as a potential step before subsidizing land certification. However, when the government did not reform the cost or procedures, the project abandoned this idea and instead sought to capture community perceptions on the law and land tenure and share these with national stakeholders. This was integrated into the contract with NGO Indigo who filmed social dialogue sessions and produced short films capturing these perspectives. The films were shown at national venues including to the AFOR agency, bringing valuable field perspectives to Abidjan. They are</p>	<p>During the project, it became clear that the government did not intend to fundamentally change the 1998 law which means that it will likely remain dependent on donors and likely impossible to implement. There are some positive steps such as more awareness that land formalization must be on a spectrum adapted to local realities. The new World Bank program in particular includes a whole pillar on “clarification,” an innovation in the Ivorian context which has only focused on certification and demarcation. The key lesson is that communities have strong demand for land-related documents, but reform is needed for a workable</p>

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
	available on the YouTube Channel.	framework especially for secondary rights.
Formalize land rights for PRADD II livelihoods activities	In its livelihoods activities, PRADD II created a type of rental agreement through Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) signed by the groups and the land chiefs. This was a way to secure tenure and contributed to incentivizing women's groups to rehabilitate land in Tortiya, and in Séguéla led to a women's group in Diarabana successfully averting expropriation by using the agreement to defend their land from an outsider.	The key lesson is that formalizing rental agreements are a key incentive to environmental rehabilitation, investment, and securing tenure. The focus on primary rights certification in land programming misses this reality. Moreover, starting with secondary rights clarification is a more appropriate entry point that can make subsequent certification and titling more effective and less conflictual.

2.1.2 SUB-ACTIVITY 2: SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT AND LAND USE PLANNING IN DIAMOND MINING AREAS

Rationale for Approach and Activities: Land use planning fits well with the PRADD II theory of change as participatory decision-making about how land is attributed for particular economic uses can improve conflict, ecological and economic outcomes. As there was no specific land use planning law or framework in Côte d'Ivoire, the project used the existing mechanism of the strategic development plan (PSD). For PRADD II it was important that the process be community-driven but equally important that the resulting plans were recognized and enforced by the government. As such the project's approach adapted the development planning framework at the level of the village (for Séguéla) and the township (for Tortiya) to include more emphasis on zoning and on land tenure dynamics, all while preserving the more "classic" aspects of identifying priority infrastructure. PRADD II theoretically drew from the Namati "Community Land Protection" approach, notably its focus on community "rules" for land use and attribution, as well as the "Land Charter" approach used elsewhere in West Africa like Burkina Faso and Senegal, insofar as the PRADD II development plans were also community agreements on how to use and manage their spaces. Finally, PRADD II integrated the technical approach of its NGO partner Indigo, which used videos as part of public conversations aimed at identifying the underlying sociological dynamics at play. Most importantly, Indigo facilitated discussion that communities themselves to obtain a greater awareness regarding the root causes of their challenges, their own endogenous tools, and solutions for addressing them.



Figure 4: A land use planning session in a community using satellite images as a discussion and zoning tool. PRADD II led to community decisions to protect and organize land use in their communities.

Activities, Accomplishments, and Lessons Learned under Sub-Activity 2

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Conduct participatory diagnostics in	The starting point for land use planning was a series of RRA-style studies in both Séguéla and Tortiya.	In retrospect PRADD II could have conducted these diagnostics earlier in the project as they were very

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Séguéla and Tortiya	PRADD II trained government and academic participants in RRA techniques and then carried out the studies with them. The studies corresponded to a step in the government's official planning guide, but the methodology was more analytical than the typical village monograph. The resulting diagnostics helped the PRADD II and Indigo facilitators better understand the communities, and for the communities, helped spark the reflection that led to the key planning decisions later on.	useful. Unfortunately, the demarcation process took up much time during the first few years. Moreover, the studies would arguably not have been as in-depth earlier in the project as the teams would not have already had several years of exposure to the communities. The key lesson is the value and importance of investing in these types of RRAs, and the value in conducting them <i>both</i> at the beginning of an intervention and at a mid-way point.
Support Strategic Development Plan for Tortiya Township	PRADD II contracted with NGO <i>Université des Collectivités</i> , which had supported decentralized townships and regional councils, to develop plans. The project benefited from senior Ivoirian planning experts to produce a high-quality baseline diagnostic and plan, all while integrating PRADD II innovations such as participatory zoning, which the classic methodology does not include.	Côte d'Ivoire drafted a land use planning law, but it was not adopted. The existence of a methodology but not a law was a key advantage as it allowed the project to adapt and simplify the process. For example, the project opted to not create a two-tiered development committee structure, which would have been more expensive and less sustainable.
Support Village Development Committee for plan implementation	The project helped establish the township and village-level development committees (CLDs) and financed their capacity development by government trainers from the Ministry of Interior. In Tortiya the committee has become dynamic and is actively raising funds for plan implementation. It has also created a space to reduce the historic conflict around the lack of a village chief for Tortiya, allowing the diverse community to focus less on ethnic differences and more on shared goals.	PRADD II was skeptical at points that the classic development plan would be useful, but for township authorities, having a plan was essential and useful. The plan has allowed the township to raise funds and increase its profile, showing the importance of integrating grassroots planning with the state's framework even if bureaucratic. Another lesson is the ways in which focusing on economic interests and development can alleviate political conflicts such as the inter-ethnic dispute over Tortiya's land chiefdom.
Develop adapted planning methodology for Séguéla	In Séguéla, the lack of a township meant that the logical unit of planning was either the village or the region. PRADD II held training and discussion workshops with authorities to settle on the village as	Adapting the methodology to Séguéla took a long time because of the need to gain buy-in from local government officials who did not understand the value of grassroots planning approaches. In addition,

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
	the planning unit. The project then conducted internal trainings and reflections to adopt a methodology that integrated Indigo's social dialogue, the Namati-inspired identification of "rules," and the Ivoirian development planning framework.	there was a long capacity-building process among the PRADD II team and partners. Given that the process only started in 2016 amidst a flurry of other activities, this meant that the final steps in the process were rushed.
Develop Simplified Strategic Development Plans for Séguéla villages	PRADD II completed simplified development plans (PSSDs) for 10 villages in Séguéla. The plans were individualized to each village and included detailed decisions on tenure and zoning decisions. Communities took the process very seriously and participation was robust throughout. The plans were reviewed and endorsed by authorities, leading to greater security for communities as the risk of state expropriation is reduced with official validation of the plans. The only downside was that the finalization of the plans was rushed due to delays in starting and the end of the project in 2018. This did not decrease the quality of the plans but did leave no time for follow-up on implementation.	The project observed a sea change in attitudes from communities during the process. Thanks to satellite maps and land-cover change analysis, communities came to better understand their development trajectories, such as the loss of forest, growth of cashew and cacao, and depleted diamond deposits. This led to key decisions like limiting cashew expansion and imposing new conditions for access. The key lesson is that a participatory and evidence-based planning process can lead to a complete shift in the ways in which the future is taken into account by communities in development decisions, the very definition of <i>sustainable</i> development.

2.1.3 SUB-ACTIVITY 3: SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL RURAL LAND POLICY



Rationale for Approach and Activities: PRADD II has always had a “pilot” approach insofar as unlike a major development investment the project’s scale and scope gave it liberty to experiment and innovate. The value of such experiments is that the lessons learned can be taken up by other projects, but only if the project actively seeks to document and communicate its findings. As such PRADD II devoted resources to networking and obtaining a seat at the table focused on national and donor policy discussions. Given that the project was among the few with in-depth field experience implementing the 1998 land law, PRADD II contributions were often appreciated and taken seriously. In addition, the project’s role at the interstices of communities and governments afforded a unique opportunity to facilitate communication and knowledge-sharing. In countries like Côte d’Ivoire where there is a yawning cultural and

institutional gap between the national government and communities, PRADD II saw an opportunity to advocate for and convey community voices to national decision-makers. This motivated many of the project's activities and contributed to its accomplishments.

Activities, Accomplishments, and Lessons Learned under Sub-Activity 3

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Participate in consultations leading to National Rural Land Policy, Rural Land Agency, and World Bank Project	PRADD II contributed technical observations to the national rural land policy and legislation creating the rural land agency AFOR. The project focused on lessons such as the need for flexible approaches that emphasize social tools for tenure clarification beyond bureaucratic processes for titling. The World Bank's new investment endorsed such contributions with the inclusion of clarification as part of its "four-in-one" technical approach.	As in PRADD I elsewhere, the project's position and its close coordination with diplomats was leveraged to play a policy role that was greater than its size. To do so the project produced analytical products appropriate for donors and national policy-makers, as well as actively sought out networking opportunities and built relationships.
Advocate and communicate for land management appropriate for rural user needs	In addition to contributing to legislation, the project participated in the ALERTE Foncière platform of Ivoirian civil society organizations (CSOs). The project networked with other NGOs and actors and produced technical documents such as a lessons learned briefing based on project activities. PRADD II talking points were developed and used to influence a variety of forums.	To be effective at advocacy, it is necessary to develop focused and clear talking points, and to maximize opportunities to convey these talking points. In addition, it is much more effective if national actors carry forward talking points. PRADD II would therefore often find ways to convey its talking points through the voices of its beneficiaries or partners.
Develop documentary film and forum with national stakeholders on lessons learned from land activities	PRADD II produced three films used to convey community voices on land tenure security, land use planning, and boundary demarcation. The films and associated panels formed part of the project's final lessons learned forum in 2018, which was timed with the launch of the World Bank support to AFOR.	The project found that the same style of testimonial based documentary films produced by partner Indigo for community dialogue were equally effective for national dialogue. By capturing talking points and issues in community voices, the arguments become more vivid and credible.

2.2 ACTIVITY 2: STRENGTHENING KPCS COMPLIANCE AND ASM GOVERNANCE

Summary of Technical Approach

PRADD II began when Côte d'Ivoire was still non-compliant with the KPCS and a UN embargo was still in effect. The technical assistance provided under PRADD I from March to September 2013 had made a KP Review Mission possible. As PRADD II began, the process moved forward with provisional KPCS compliance attained in November 2013 and the lifting of the UN embargo in April 2014. The PRADD II technical approach was designed to assure continuity in technical assistance, notably in the design and

implementation of the post-embargo transition strategy, endorsed by the KP and UN Security Council resolution lifting the embargo, and then through a work plan designed in collaboration with the KP Permanent Secretariat (KPPS). This work plan aimed at preparing for the March 2015 follow-up KP review visit and the general consolidation of the legal chain of custody.

The technical approach was multi-faceted. First, PRADD II took a systems approach to national laws and regulations regarding the KPCS, meaning that assistance focused on the development of functioning institutions. To be functioning, the institutions required clear roles and responsibilities, clear and realistic rules, and sufficient resources and capacity for implementing them. This approach was followed when developing the KPCS system: PRADD II facilitated dialogue among key stakeholders about what type of system would work best, taking into account the KPCS norms and local history and realities, and then proceeded to adapt laws and regulations based on the vision for this system. This approach was innovative compared to the structure-driven legalist francophone context, where generally laws are first written by specialists and then institutions are created with the responsibility of implementing them without input from users, often leading to dysfunctional systems.

Since systems are dynamic, PRADD II knew that certain adjustments would be necessary. Therefore, PRADD II continued to create the spaces and processes needed to effectively conduct the assessment of the KPCS system while continually updating relevant regulations. These spaces were often multi-stakeholder technical forums, another key component of the PRADD II technical approach. While multi-stakeholder (or, in KP jargon, “tripartite”) consultations are common strategies, the project emphasized the need for regular dialogue among *technical* actors around *technical* issues. Meeting for information-exchange and relationship-building is important, but the latter goals are best achieved when the forums are structured around technical questions. The project organized workshops on specific law enforcement challenges, or statistics, in addition to general local stakeholder meetings. These forums were essential since government agencies often operate in silos and private sector actors often operate in the shadows. The forums were therefore a key component of building trust and communication.

Another pillar of the PRADD II technical approach was fostering coordination between the political and technical levels. The project was uniquely positioned with access to diplomats through the FOCDI, started by the United States and coordinated by the EU. The FOCDI was called upon a half dozen times to resolve political issues blocking technical progress. Often these blockages were existential for the KPCS system, like the Minister’s decision not to authorize buying house applicants consisting of existing buyers, which led to a one-year delay in the restarting of exports. Within the government PRADD II also fostered political and technical coordination through advocacy.

Finally, the PRADD II technical approach included capacity-building of various actors such as training workshops and material support for agencies and private sector actors essential to the chain of custody. However, the project was lucky that the Ivorian government already has sufficient capacity to manage its ASM sector quite well; what it lacks is often poor leadership and proper institutional functioning. Hence many capacity-building measures such as training workshops on statistics or provision of material support to *Société pour le Développement Minier* (SODEMI) were less about filling a knowledge gap and more about creating activities to foster trust and forward momentum. As such PRADD II worked as much as possible as a catalyst.

Conclusions and Lessons Learned

A key conclusion is that in Côte d’Ivoire, when political will is aligned with technical capacity, progress is quick and impressive. The rapid establishment of the KPCS system in 2013 was testament of this fact. However, the divergent priorities of the Mining Minister during much of the project created obstacle upon obstacle. It is not an exaggeration to say that, without constant PRADD II technical and material support, as well as interventions from the FOCDI, the KPCS system would have crumbled. The fragile nature of the KPCS system was discouraging for technicians with good will, from mining engineers to

the KP Permanent Secretary. Preventing the collapse of the chain of custody on several occasions was both a major accomplishment of PRADD II and its biggest failure, given that despite PRADD II's best intentions, the KPCS system by the end of the project was not self-sustaining. Indeed, while the project can be proud of having the highest rate of diamond exports captured at the mine-site level of any ASM diamond producer, the system remains very fragile and the government's commitment weak.

Nothing illustrated this paradox more than the role of SODEMI, the parastatal that is mandated to organize ASM miners in village-based cooperatives inside of its research permit areas in Séguéla and from 2015 in Tortiya also. PRADD II has been one of the biggest boosters of the model, which since 1986 ingeniously creates a co-management arrangement between indigenous land owners and the government that allows benefit-sharing, effective law enforcement, and local development. The success of the Ivoirian system in capturing most of its production in the legal chain of custody is due to this model that incentivizes local communities and formalizes existing resource tenure practices. However, SODEMI and the government did not help at all in solidifying the system. The government as part of its privatization policy gutted SODEMI's financial resources, and afterwards getting a modest budget for the diamond work took nearly two years of advocacy including an ambassador demarche. Moreover, a political schism between the SODEMI board director and general manager plagued the company throughout the project, paralyzing operations. SODEMI's maladroitness decision to forcibly close an active mining site in 2016 led to a complete loss of trust with actors in the field and a brief boycott of the project, which was blamed for working behind the scenes, a perception made worse by a donor field visit the day before the military dispersed miners. Senior leadership also harbored suspicion that PRADD II hid ill intentions and the project staff was prevented from even visiting mining sites without extensive permissions until 2015, two years after the start of the project. The result is that, while Côte d'Ivoire has perhaps one of the best ASM management systems in the world, the government has spent the last five years weakening it to the point where its future viability is far from certain.

With respect to ASM policy more generally, PRADD II sought to capitalize on the experiences from diamonds by educating Ivoirian stakeholders on its own history in a bid to adapt that model to gold, which in many ways poses a graver risk for Côte d'Ivoire's political and economic future than diamonds ever have. This is due to gold's scale and the complete impunity of smuggling, including smuggling by armed elements who are close to or even part of the current government. The web of interests and the politics around ASM were so difficult to navigate that it took two and a half years for PRADD II to organize a simple experience-sharing forum on lessons learned from the SODEMI model. Fortunately, when it did organize the forum in early 2017, PRADD II saw progress on the technical level in understanding the reasons for the ASM gold policy failure and ideas for improving it, learning from diamonds. This has made PRADD II cautiously optimistic about the ASM policy framework, especially as other donors and actors have taken a strong interest in it, and political pressure is mounting from diplomats, especially from European countries. However, the main lesson from the PRADD II mining governance activities is that, perhaps unsurprisingly, the difficulties and issues reflect the general political and institutional challenges in the country, and until there is strong political engagement to clean up the sector—notwithstanding the strong technical capacity of the government—it will be difficult to support reform in any meaningful way.

Sustainability and Follow-on Recommendations

The sustainability of the KPCS system is not a given but it is not hopeless either. On the positive side, villages in Séguéla have fully appropriated the system, since it was built on familiar practices that began in 1986, and provides strong financial incentives to participate (12% of revenue taken for local development). PRADD II focused on strengthening the capacity of cooperatives through trainings and channeling its legal education campaigns through them. This led to greater appropriation of the KPCS system as evidenced by miner knowledge, attitudes, and practices (KAP) survey results which progressed from year to year. Moreover, the government's technicians in charge of KPCS matters are

dedicated and competent. As noted above, the challenges have been political and institutional. With the departure of an unhelpful minister at the end of the project, there is an opportunity for renewed engagement and progress, and other partners—especially diplomats under the FOCDI umbrella—can and should continue to support the right technical players. With favorable conditions, the system in Côte d'Ivoire is highly resilient and needs little outside help; in the current bad political climate, it is on the verge of collapse.

In terms of technical priorities for follow-on activities and sustainability, the case of Tortiya needs particular attention as despite PRADD II efforts this zone has not been brought fully into the KPCS chain of custody. Doing so will not take much effort if the right resources are in place, notably with SODEMI and the KP Permanent Secretary, so any future limited interventions should focus on Tortiya. In addition, one of the vulnerabilities of the system remains the low production levels in Séguéla, given that the KPCS system, built around a few buying houses consolidating all production for export, is designed for high production levels. If production remains low the government will have to consider key reforms, such as lowering the licensing costs for buying houses or even allowing collectors to export stones. This would prevent several million dollars of diamonds annually from being smuggled, which is what current low production levels are worth.

Finally, with the new EU conflict minerals legislation and the increasing interest in doing something on ASM gold in Côte d'Ivoire and West Africa generally, there would be a strong benefit from taking advantage of the PRADD II materials—like the video documentary—to promote the adaptation of the SODEMI model to gold. This would allow the best practices and the bad practices from diamonds to inform decision-makers with gold. There is a window of opportunity in Côte d'Ivoire at the end of the PRADD II project to help the government rewrite its ASM policy as the national gold plan (PNRO) undergoes revision and the new mining minister seeks to make his mark. More generally, the KP and other key international actors like the Organization for Economic and Cooperative Development (OECD) and World Bank should continue what PRADD II has sought to foster in terms of cross-mineral learning and a regional approach to ASM management.

2.2.1 SUB-ACTIVITY I: BUILD CAPACITY AND PROVIDE TECHNICAL SUPPORT FOR IMPROVED ASM MANAGEMENT AND KPCS IMPLEMENTATION

Rationale for Approach and Activities: For activities aimed at strengthening the KPCS system, the point of departure was the post-embargo transition strategy which outlined key priorities such as the establishment of buying houses. This created a continuity between the targeted technical assistance under PRADD I and the beginning of PRADD II. At a broad level, the project's activities aimed at creating sustainability in the KPCS system. Strategies to do so included confidence-building measures such as regular multi-stakeholder forums and technical assistance. For example, while providing trainings and valuation equipment to miners helped increase productivity and profits, it also had the strategic objective of showing communities and miners that working within the KPCS framework was in their best interests. Similarly, the support that PRADD II provided to SODEMI for a campaign to identify new alluvial deposits for miners aimed at helping miners economically, but strategically also aimed at fostering trust between SODEMI and the mining communities. In addition, PRADD



Figure 6: A public diamond sales session in 2015 organized by a village diamond cooperative. The Ivorian system of village co-management contributed to over 66% of exports being registered at the mine.

Photo by T. Delor

II sought to build capacity of key actors, but it sought above all to create the processes so that any improvements were incorporated into standard operating procedures. For example, when PRADD II uncovered fraud in the supply chain after analyzing government statistics for a quarterly report, it did not denounce the fraud publicly. Rather, PRADD II worked with relevant actors to show them how to conduct the analysis to uncover such problems, and then encouraged corrective actions, but stayed behind the scenes so that the people and institutions in charge of improving the system were center stage.

Activities, Accomplishments, and Lessons Learned under Sub-Activity I

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Technical Assistance for Lifting UN Embargo and Post-Embargo Transition Strategy	The KP Technical Advisor became the Country Director for PRADD II in September 2013, and a new Governance Advisor was recruited to replace him as liaison to the KP Permanent Secretariat. The project continued to help the authorities prepare for the KP Plenary at which partial compliance was obtained, and liaised closely with the diplomats when questions emerged about the concerns of the U.N. Group of Experts. The project helped draft the post-embargo transition strategy, briefed the KP at international meetings, contributed to the new mining code and associated regulations, and advised the government and KP on the establishment of buying houses. Exports resumed in early 2015.	PRADD II was unique as a development project in its access and linkages to diplomats, whether it was in-country with the FOCDI, or at the international level at Kimberley Process meetings. This meant high exposure for PRADD II activities, significant influence on policy issues, and opportunities not found elsewhere to leverage diplomatic intervention to advance technical goals. In a subject area as sensitive as conflict diamonds, the coordination between the political and technical levels under PRADD II was a model of effective governance programming. Without this coordination, the lifting of the embargo and the resumption of exports would not have happened as quickly as they did.
Development and Use of KPCS Training and Awareness-Raising Material	PRADD II financed and offered technical expertise to develop key communication and outreach materials. First, the KP Procedures Guide offered government officials and other actors a complete and practical guide for the KPCS, including all laws and regulations. Second, the project produced placards for behavioral change communication at community and miner levels with intuitive illustrations and field-tested discussion questions. Third, PRADD II produced six educational videos on the KPCS system in both French and Dioula that were part of the educational app and screened in community gatherings.	Given the time required but also the effectiveness of short videos, PRADD II could have produced these earlier in the project and used them in conjunction with the placards. PRADD II also demonstrated empirically the effectiveness of the communication techniques, especially the placards. In KAP surveys there were statistically significant differences in knowledge test scores between those who participated in awareness-raising sessions using the placards and those who did not. This showed the effectiveness of the tools in increasing knowledge about the KPCS and obligations of all actors.

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Technical Assistance for Government Diamond Valuation	In collaboration with the Gemological Institute of America (GIA), PRADD II provided basic valuation training for 10 government officials and cooperative focal points in 2014. Government diamond valuers were furthered trained with assistance from the Belgian government. PRADD II provided the software and subscriptions to the rough price lists (AdTec) recommended by the AWDC trainers. PRADD II also provided IT equipment for the valuers.	Given PRADD II presence at the beginning of setting up the government's diamond valuation service, the project learned more about this important function than in other contexts where these agencies remain a black box as pricing and valuation is a key vulnerability for corrupt practices. However, given sensitivities, PRADD II did not fully assess valuation practices and never witnessed an evaluation.
Capacity-Building in Remote Sensing for ASM Monitoring	The PRADD II GIS Specialist learned the US Geological Survey (USGS) methodology for interpreting satellite images to quantify active mining sites. The Specialist conducted analysis for three years and shared results with the government, resulting in the identification of sites that had gone under the radar. The project then held a workshop with GIS stakeholders to present results and trained them on the techniques with the aim of applying to gold. The techniques were integrated into government priorities for the next phase of the ASM PNRO.	The USGS methodology is effective and can be learned by most GIS Specialists. However, implementing it is expensive because of the time required for classification and ground verification. Moreover, use of the techniques by governments is limited by the cost of acquisition of high-resolution satellite imagery, which was free to PRADD II thanks to its relationship with the USGS. For many contexts, it may not be practical for a full analysis, but targeted analysis could be of use if resources allow.
Mining Worker Awareness-Raising Campaigns	PRADD II completed two miner sensitization campaigns. In the first, villages named two community liaisons who were trained by the Communication Coordinator on the use of "placard" training materials (printed materials on plasticized boards). KAP surveys showed modest gains but poor performance by some. After an internal evaluation, the project switched criteria to select "focal points" that were members of mining cooperatives and who sensitized <i>both</i> on KPCS compliance and improved mining techniques. The 30 focal points were supported by SODEMI and a PRADD II consultant. In 2018 they sensitized 4,117 people, 26% of them women. By project end,	PRADD II adapted its approach mid-term after an internal evaluation. Improvements included combining both mining laws and improved mining techniques as themes, the latter helping build more credibility with miners and hence better results on KPCS. The project also sought to better integrate the focal points into the cooperatives by involving them in selection and supervision. PRADD II faced a choice between focal points who were "locals" and outsiders. While most miners are outsiders, the project settled on locals for more sustainability, since locals are sedentary and have more incentive to improve practices on their land.

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Extension of KPCS Compliance to Tortiya	<p>miners with basic KP knowledge increased from 28% to 61%.</p> <p>The surprise issuance of a permit to SODEMI in 2014 slowed efforts to bring KPCS compliance to Tortiya as pending small-scale permits were nullified. Meanwhile the legal decree giving SODEMI permission to organize ASM on its permits only applied to Séguéla; it took more than a year to convince the minister to sign a new decree. All this took place amidst the SODEMI internal budgetary and leadership crises. Despite the issues, in late 2016 a new decree was signed and in early 2017 a participatory diagnostic led by PRADD II proposed a schema adapting the SODEMI model to Tortiya. This schema was adopted and launched by the end of the project, but was still in early stages with no production yet passing through it.</p>	<p>The extension of KPCS compliance to Tortiya was a major challenge that was only partially overcome. While the framework is now in place, ASM actors have yet to finalize agreements with SODEMI that would allow them to start production. While chances are good that it will begin in 2018, it was unfortunately not completed in the project's lifetime. In retrospect, it may have been preferable <i>not</i> to have SODEMI's oversight but rather individual permits. This would have allowed the testing of SODEMI model principles—like funds for village development controlled by villages—without their dysfunctions. On the other hand, without SODEMI permits would have needed ministerial approval which could take years.</p>
Local Tripartite Consultation and Coordination Platforms	<p>PRADD II facilitated periodic multi-stakeholder workshops in Séguéla and Tortiya by the KP Permanent Secretariat to launch initiatives, adopt new rules, conduct trainings and resolve conflicts. For example, the year-long crisis set off by SODEMI's closure of the <i>Gendarmecamp</i> site was resolved with interventions by the KP Permanent Secretary and large meetings with cooperatives financed by PRADD II. The project also co-financed mining sectoral meetings in Séguéla chaired by the <i>Préfet</i>, a very useful coordination exercise in a context where actors often do not interact.</p>	<p>Often KP platforms are tripartite in form only but do not accomplish much. A part of this is that NGOs only engage when there is funding. PRADD II encouraged NGO involvement but considered that civil society was not just NGOs but also communities represented by village cooperatives. Moreover, multi-stakeholder meetings needed an institutional basis for sustainability, hence creating sectoral meetings chaired by the <i>Préfet</i>, who is supposed to chair such meetings anyway. Finally, multi-stakeholder meetings work best when there is a technical focus.</p>
Capacity Support for Improved Statistical Management	<p>Given that statistics are essential to KP internal controls, PRADD II invested in improving data collection and management. The project supported the creation of a relational database in Microsoft Access, a software already used by the KP statistics manager. The project</p>	<p>PRADD II opted to improve existing Microsoft Access databases rather than design a new one from scratch to increase the chances of sustainability. However, when the manager felt that he should have been paid instead of having a consultant help, he slowed his collaboration,</p>

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
	sought to introduce tablets and ODK for data collection, but its adoption failed due to unresolved and unjustified concerns about data security. PRADD II also identified fraud in the supply chain through simple Excel statistical analyses and trained government officials in how to do so. By the end of the project, the government adopted the practices but full roll-out was cut short when the KP Permanent Secretary was changed in early 2018.	showing the risks of tailoring an approach to one person. When he passed away, a three-person team took over, but sensitivities that resulted from PRADD II discovering fraud from data led to delays. On using tablets, the government was paranoid that they would be used for spying, though that may have been a pretext. In short, statistics are sensitive as they are the heart of transparency and traceability.
Support for Regional Harmonization in Mano River Union	PRADD II supported the Mano River Union (MRU) regional approach spearheaded by the EU, especially in 2014 and 2015. The project financed the Grand Bassam workshop at which the regional action plan was adopted, as well as a follow-up meeting in Abidjan in 2015. When the EU contracted <i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</i> (GIZ) for the regional approach work, PRADD II continued participation but no longer financed or contributed to coordination. Finally, PRADD II successfully harmonized Côte d'Ivoire's export and licensing fees with neighbors as part of the 2014 mining code reform.	A regional approach to KPCS compliance is good but must be precise and technically robust. There are three dimensions of a "regional approach" that are sometimes conflated: experience-sharing activities, coordination on KPCS implementation, and tax harmonization. Successful regional approaches require concrete activities of all three types, such as exchanges among technicians, harmonization of legislation to reduce smuggling and coordinate on law enforcement and issuance of licenses.
Training Law Enforcement	PRADD II financed several trainings early in the project for law enforcement and customs officials on KPCS compliance, and gave all actors official procedures guides. Plans for additional field trainings were postponed because repressive measures by SODEMI in 2016 backfired and led to a crisis in confidence, and a poor environment for repressive law enforcement. The statistics training also targeted law enforcement applications through uncovering data anomalies that could indicate illegal behavior.	Statistical anomalies are underused and simple law enforcement tools to enforce internal controls. Repressive measures in mining sites, like the 2016 SODEMI action against Bobi, can backfire if they take place from a position of weakness and without due process. However, taking no action, which was the case with a mining official who falsified data, also sent a bad signal to mining sector actors. Finding the right balance between repression and tolerance is essential for effective compliance.
Support to SODEMI and	The project provided material and in-kind assistance to government	Côte d'Ivoire is fortunate to have field offices with paper, vehicles, and

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Mining Directorates	partners, including motorcycles and IT equipment for mining departmental directors, printers for miner card deliverance campaigns, and purchasing a generator for the SODEMI camp when they ran out of money and their board director refused to fund it.	other equipment. However, some equipment is always beneficial for building trust and momentum. For example, the photo ID printers were not a sustainable way to deliver cards. However, the free pictures helped revitalize enthusiasm after a year of conflict with SODEMI.



Figure 7: PRADD II organized a West African conference on best practices in ASM in March 2017 to help foster dialogue and experience-sharing on how to manage the sector.

Photo by I. Kanam

2.2.2 SUB-ACTIVITY 2: SUPPORT DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ASM AND KPCS POLICIES

Rationale for Approach and Activities: The key rationale for working on the overall ASM governance framework in Côte d'Ivoire and the region is the simple fact that ASM diamonds are a subset of ASM generally. Therefore, sustaining KPCS compliance and good ASM management practices requires that the overall legal and institutional framework be workable and effectively implemented. The second rationale used to define activities was the WDDF, the KP document which spells out best practices in ASM management and takes a key step toward linking development and effective KPCS compliance. PRADD II used the Washington Declaration as the justification and the framework for much of its work on the ASM policy framework. PRADD II also sought in its activities to catalyze the adoption of best

practices from diamonds, whether it be the WDDF or good models like the SODEMI cooperative system, to apply to gold. This was based on the conviction that ASM gold poses a major threat but that practical solutions can be found by transposing lessons from diamonds. However, as gold was beyond the PRADD II mandate, the final aspect of the project's approach was to maximize collaboration with other actors.

Activities, Accomplishments, and Lessons Learned under Sub-Activity 2

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Technical Assistance for Mining Code and KPCS-related Regulations	The project provided detailed observations and recommendations for the 2014 Mining Code based on the KP procedures guide adopted by local stakeholders in 2013. The 2014 mining law revision afforded a well-timed opportunity to integrate KPCS provisions into national law and implementing regulations. Most recommendations were adopted in the final texts except a recommendation to allow limited ASM in industrial research permits. This would have given a firm legal	The revision of mining laws only takes place about once a decade and this revision was well-timed with the new KPCS measures. Unfortunately, the process was rapid and not supported by a participatory and technically robust mining policy document. Such a process may have enabled a full debate on the question of limited ASM inside industrial research permits. The lack of such a mechanism has contributed to Côte d'Ivoire's dilemma with gold, where

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
	basis for the SODEMI model but was opposed by mining companies who dominated the revision process.	half a million ASM miners have nowhere to mine legally because all zones are covered by research permits. Similarly, the decision to separate artisanal and semi-industrial permits, was not debated and has ended up harming formalization.
Piloting Washington Declaration Diagnostic Framework (WDDF)	PRADD II subcontracted KP CSO and Ivoirian NGO GRPIE to pilot the implementation of the WDDF developed at the end of PRADD I. PRADD II divided the 11 policy areas of the WDDF into 3 thematic areas and worked with GRPIE on a participatory methodology for assessing and scoring ASM policy based on the Washington Declaration criteria. The resulting diagnostic offered a good snapshot of ASM policy in 2014.	The WDDF offers a list of best practices rather than criteria. As such the WDDF exercise helps not just assess ASM but also spark dialogue about good practices. The scoring system, however, was not very helpful as it created some defensiveness and confusion. Instead the WDDF has more utility as a checklist to be used as part of an ASM policymaking process adapted to a country's context.
Facilitation of Policy-Making Process to Improve KPCS Procedures and Regulations	PRADD II sought to institute a process after several years of implementation to improve and revise ASM and KPCS regulations based on experiences. For example, the statistics fraud in Séguéla was a symptom of a legitimate issue: how to register production that escapes the control of cooperatives, a reality in even the best systems. The project supported a thematic reflection group on this and other issues. Conclusions were debated and set for adoption in a workshop which was postponed when the KP Permanent Secretary was changed in early 2018.	Any new system requires a period of implementation and then adjustment. Such was the case with the KPCS system in Côte d'Ivoire. Unfortunately, the crises of the day—like with SODEMI—made conditions difficult for a comprehensive technical review. Moreover, the idea of proposing changes to laws is difficult for many government technicians who are trained to follow the law and not question it. However, PRADD II succeeded in catalyzing such a critical review even though it has yet to lead to legal reform.
Organization of Regional Workshop on ASM-Large-Scale Mining (LSM) Cohabitation and Best Practices	PRADD II conceived of a conference on ASM-LSM cohabitation in 2014 to promote understanding of the SODEMI model as an option for gold and to foster more reflection with LSM actors on how to deal with artisanal miner permit infringement. It took nearly three years for the conference to be organized due to government resistance to any event that could be critical of the PNRO.	A key hypothesis that proved true was that a national government like Côte d'Ivoire would be more likely to accept a critical review of its ASM policy if it could “save face” in a <i>regional</i> conference. The regional conference was a watershed moment in Côte d'Ivoire as it enabled expressions by participants on the failed Ivoirian ASM gold policy but in a constructive and non-

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
	Thanks to collaboration with the OECD, GIZ, the United Kingdom, and others, the March 2017 conference was a success, bringing together 205 participants from 20 countries, and offering a strong substantive discussion on ASM policy.	shaming manner. After the event, technicians began to be more vocal about the problems in gold and the need to learn from diamonds. This led to the workshop organized by GIZ in early 2018 that recommended a full policy review.
Development of Documentary Film on SODEMI Model and Côte d'Ivoire's ASM Diamond Practices	PRADD II produced two versions of a documentary film on SODEMI's cooperative model. The first was screened at the March 2017 regional ASM conference and showcased a positive story from Côte d'Ivoire and fostered reflection on how a co-management approach could work for gold. The revised version took a broader look at half a century of ASM diamonds identifying good and bad practices.	The films offered a great way to highlight the Ivorian experience with diamonds. Given that few actors outside of Côte d'Ivoire know about the model, the film documented the model in the voices of those who have lived it over the last 30 years, including two people who sadly passed away before the end of the project.
Coordination with Mining Governance Partners and Stakeholders	PRADD II maintained collaborative relationships with other organizations involved in mining governance. The project coordinated closely with GIZ on its MRU and GRSE projects. PRADD II also participated in EITI trainings and assessments, the production of a video on mining governance by Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) and helped Canadian NGO IMPACT prepare for the launch of the Just Gold project. Over \$75,000 in co-funding was generated for the regional ASM conference in 2017.	The simplest forms of coordination—getting lunch with key actors—proved to be an invaluable way to identify new ideas and ensure no duplication of effort. Such collaboration was essential to maximize impact and leverage resources, such as for the ASM conference in 2017. However, joint organization of activities bring high transaction costs. The regional conference, while successful, took much effort to not just organize but also to manage coordination between a half-dozen partners.

PRADD II Côte d'Ivoire Statistics on Rough Diamond Production and Exports

Period	Diamonds Produced (Stones)	Diamonds Produced (Carats)	Price per Carat (USD) ²	Diamonds Exported (Carats)	Price Per Carat (USD)	% Production Price of Export Value	% Production of Exports Volume
2013	725	600	\$133.46	0	N/A	N/A	N/A
2014	1320	950	\$83.88	0	N/A	N/A	N/A
2015	24,728	9,250	\$60.06	13,936	\$148.70	40%	64%

² Based on average exchange rates for the reported time period.

2016	34,804	15,796	\$43.80	24,664	\$198.61	22%	64%
2017	13,302	7,361	N/A	10,933	\$191.37	N/A	67%
2018*	1,354	718	N/A	617	\$292.71	N/A	117%
TOTAL	76,233	34,675	\$80.30	50,150	\$207.85	N/A	66%

Table 6 is based on government-provided statistics. Until 2017, the government shared price/carats data from production. Data from 2018 includes only the first quarter, since, due to changes in the KP Permanent Secretary, it was not possible to acquire more data. The overall production to export ratio by carat weight has been consistent at 66%. Total exports during the project were just above 50,000 carats, which is very low compared with previous decades, both legal and illegal, and reflects the low production levels and the problems with the KPCS chain of custody during the project, including the crisis in confidence with SODEMI. At the end of the project, there were 957 registered mining workers, 16 collectors, 174 sub-collectors and 27 mining entities (cooperatives and others), although active actors were probably less. The rising per-carat price at export could reflect selection of higher value stones by buying houses or inconsistencies with valuation methodologies. PRADD II trained the government to also analyze price per carat per cooperative, production per cooperative or license-holder, price per carat per seller, and average stone weight per producer. Anomalies can be indicators of fraud. For example, high average weight per stone indicates that small stones are not being registered, and spikes in production by one actor can indicate laundering, both issues during the project.

2.3 ACTIVITY 3: SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ASDM COMMUNITIES

Summary of Technical Approach

The third component of PRADD II activities is the largest by budget, grouping three areas: technical support to miners and the ASDM supply chain; livelihoods diversification in ASDM communities; and activities focused on biodiversity and the environment. While sustainable economic development in ASDM communities requires the first two components of rights clarification and good practices in mining governance, the third component focused on investments made today rather than the institutions and underlying structures needed for the future. Several features of these activities are of note.

First, with respect to support to miners and the mining supply chain, activities were chosen with a priority for those that advanced the project's primary objective of strengthening the legal chain of custody. Hence while many measures could increase miner productivity and earnings, activities needed to contribute to the legal chain of custody to merit PRADD II investment. For example, the investments in finding new alluvial deposits for miners could lead to more revenue. However, the strategic objective was rather to foster trust between SODEMI and the mining communities, identify deposits for the land use planning, and boost production so that actors did not abandon the KPCS chain of custody, which requires a minimum level of activity to function. Similarly, training in diamond valuation was not intended to increase prices but rather decrease conflict between buyers and sellers over perceived and real abusive pricing that incentivized smuggling. As such the strategic rationale for miner support activities placed the chain of custody as the primary selection criteria, even if there were also secondary benefits.

With respect to livelihoods diversification, PRADD II did not have the budget or mandate to carry out a comprehensive development agenda. Instead, the project balanced a number of criteria in selecting activities, such as the visible impact of the investments to help build trust with the project and the KPCS, the integration of activities with existing diversified livelihoods, the contribution of activities to land rehabilitation, and the economic empowerment of women and marginalized groups. The project also applied a value chain approach where possible to increase impact and sustainability. The

entrepreneurship program was designed for that strategic purpose, mainly, supporting input suppliers and providing market opportunities for other community activities like chicken farming.

Finally, environmental and biodiversity activities were also selected deliberately. When the project received biodiversity earmark funds, the criteria for the use of those funds aligned with earmark requirements of having a specific conservation objective for critically important or endangered species. Such was the case for the baseline studies conducted on riparian forests and the Haut Bandama nature reserve. Another set of activities aimed at promoting greater understanding and integration of ecological considerations stemming from ASDM in the past, present and future. And a final set of activities focused on monitoring and minimizing risks identified in the project's Environmental Mitigation and Monitoring Plan (EMMP) review.

Conclusions and Lessons Learned

PRADD II economic activity investments formed a crucial part of the project's impact and overall success. Indeed, focusing solely on mining good governance or land governance would be untenable in most contexts, including Côte d'Ivoire. Both are abstract and long-term activities rife with political and economic sensitivities. For a new project to effectively tackle such conundrums in the relatively little time that five years affords, visible and positive livelihoods investments are quick and sure ways to build trust and gain buy-in for the tougher aspects. For example, when suspicion over PRADD II motivations for doing boundary demarcation came to a head with the Bobi-Forona boundary dispute and the Bobi-SODEMI dispute over the closed mining site, PRADD II project staff were physically threatened and activities ceased for about a week. If PRADD II had no other positive economic activities, the project may have been forced to shut down entirely. Instead, PRADD II pointed to positive achievements with women's groups to demonstrate benevolent intentions and more importantly, in the six months following the boycott, restored trust and a positive forward momentum through a big push on activities that built the capacity and productivity of miners. Future projects with governance objectives that do not have a significant livelihoods and technical assistance budget will have a tough time succeeding.

In terms of miner support activities, PRADD II had some positive surprises and lessons. The SMARTER mining techniques introduction was far more successful than in Guinea and the Central African Republic due in large part to the inclusion of the hand auger. This was an accident insofar as the auger was brought to Côte d'Ivoire by USGS to use as part of the geological research program for alluvial deposits. However, the augers were left behind and used as part of the SMARTER mining techniques training. The new device created enthusiasm that overcame skepticism about the new terracing approach and convinced practical miners that the techniques would save time and money. The key lesson here is that until miners see their economic interests served they will not adopt new innovations. In addition, sometimes the simplest innovations have the most impact, like the hand auger.

With respect to livelihoods diversification, PRADD II activities directly involved around 1,000 households, which represented 9% of all households in intervention villages, according to the end-line survey and beneficiary counts. This relatively modest figure must be understood in terms of the technical rationale for activities as noted above, but also must consider indirect and potential future impacts of the activities. For example, the strong success of the beekeeping program and the cashew impact study may promote a new commodity chain in Côte d'Ivoire in future years. In addition, the emphasis on women's groups—over 90% of direct livelihoods beneficiaries were women—had other effects than just increasing revenues. For example, in several notable cases tenure security was increased, environmental rehabilitation incentivized and women's participation in male-dominated development decision-making made possible. In these ways the livelihoods portfolio had mixed results and limited reach but must be contextualized in the overall PRADD II conceptual framework, and take into account the indirect impacts of these investments both now and in the future.

On the environmental front PRADD II was unable to follow up on the major baseline studies on riparian forests and the Haut Bandama nature reserve that identified critically important and endangered ecosystems. However, results were integrated into land use planning, and PRADD II catalyzed new awareness and practices with respect to the environment. For example, in initial social dialogue by Indigo a number of communities said that “trees were trees” and that cashew monocultures were the same ecologically as forests. This quickly changed however with dialogue and several strategic plans zoned forest reserves to ensure sufficient rain and water in the future, according to their own new collective understanding of the forests’ value. Finally, PRADD II contributed to knowledge on how negative impacts from ASDM can dissipate with time through natural regeneration and how unique and unexpected ecosystem services emerge in such altered environments.

Sustainability and Follow-on Recommendations

Many of the miner support activities could have benefitted from one more year of implementation. Due to the various political challenges, many of these activities did not really get underway until early 2017. While results were very encouraging especially with the focal points and SMARTER mining techniques, limited follow-up on the deployment of the educational app, for example, would be welcome and useful as a follow-up action by other actors.

With respect to livelihoods investments, based on final evaluations with women’s groups, at least half of them are likely to thrive without project assistance while others may struggle, mainly due to unresolved leadership issues. A key technical challenge is marketing excess agricultural products and that could be a follow-on action. The beekeeping program is also likely to thrive due to its profitability, the two years of training, and the organization of beekeepers in both locations. Further developing the honey supply chain in Côte d’Ivoire and West Africa is a major opportunity to have a large positive impact. Moreover, because of the positive impact on tree pollination demonstrated by PRADD II, such investments could interest agribusiness companies. Other activities started by PRADD II may have sustainability challenges, especially fish farming and some of the entrepreneurs, which will be discussed in more detail below.

Finally, follow-on research and uptake of project-supported biodiversity studies would also be an opportunity for other actors. PRADD II sought to build synergies with the USAID WA BiCC project, for example, but it was not possible to operationalize uptake due to their different priorities and scope. However, further in-depth research on ecological change in diamond mining zones could further develop and consolidate some of PRADD II preliminary findings.

2.3.1 SUB-ACTIVITY I: SUPPORT SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ASDM VALUE CHAIN

Rationale for Approach and Activities: As noted above PRADD II chose activities that would contribute to or be compatible with the project’s primary objective of promoting a sustainable legal chain of custody for diamonds. The project used several approaches to identify these activities. First, PRADD II drew upon the successes and failures from PRADD I, such as equipment rental pools, diamond valuation centers and semi-mechanization of gravel sorting. The project also commissioned a study by its U.S. small business partner Catalyst Resources Development Group to identify potential innovations in the supply chain that the project might pilot. The ensuing workshop in Côte d’Ivoire in early 2015 with local stakeholders led to the identification and endorsement by local actors of certain activities.



Figure 8: The hand auger was a simple but effective innovation that cut costs and risks for finding diamonds, leading to PRADD II supported cooperatives self-financing

Finally, PRADD II designed a consultative process with mining cooperatives to identify their needs and priorities. These were identified in a study by a local consultant on organizational strengthening and then validated in a workshop with all cooperatives and national authorities in 2016. The PRADD II relationship with SODEMI was an unfortunate obstacle in the early years of the project. SODEMI's leadership apparently saw PRADD II as interfering with its mandate rather than helping fulfil it, and it took over a year of negotiation of an MOU and a work plan to break that hurdle. While it took upwards of three years to get all the pieces in place, once buy-in was achieved PRADD II moved very quickly to implement the program of activities outlined below.

Activities, Accomplishments, and Lessons Learned under Sub-Activity I

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Build capacity of village mining cooperatives	PRADD II had a local consultant conduct a diagnostic of the village cooperatives, and another consultant train the cooperatives in better management techniques. The project also integrated into the Indigo social dialogue contract discussions about the cooperative's role and functions, and completed strategic plans for three major cooperatives. Videos produced by Indigo were used as part of this participatory process. In some cases, PRADD II also assisted the registration of cooperatives, such as in Tortiya. Finally, the project gave cooperatives diamond valuation equipment and furniture to improve the conditions of public sales sessions each week.	SODEMI cooperatives are registered as businesses but function more as diamond revenue management committees. The project grappled with this inconsistency, and encouraged the cooperatives to decide for themselves their future direction. Some opted to stay cooperatives legally but to continue to focus only on co-managing diamond mining with SODEMI, as they had done since 1986 when registered as GVCs. Others took advantage of the new legal status and PRADD II technical assistance to organize and invest in diamond mining. The process took time but allowed each community to decide for itself.
Train on and implement SMARTER mining techniques	The project brought a Central African colleague over as a consultant to train the 30 cooperative focal points in SMARTER mining techniques which focus on prospection, stepping-terracing and backfilling. PRADD II then subsidized two sets of demonstration sites: first for the focal points in their respective villages and a second at sites identified by the USGS model and field verification as having potential. In all PRADD II subsidized over 30 sites and documented a dozen sites spontaneously adopted by miners with their own financing arrangements. PRADD II has not observed any spontaneous adoption of improved mining techniques in the	The relative success of SMARTER mining techniques in Côte d'Ivoire was due to several factors. First, the hand auger left by USGS was used for prospection and reduced a barrier as prospection became easier and cheaper. Second, the focal points saw the terracing and backfilling as an opportunity to extract remaining diamonds from poorly mined sites and then convert to agricultural land. In other words, the success was also due to diminishing virgin sites. Third, focal points were locals from land-owning families, so they had more incentive to rehabilitate land using the techniques. These techniques can therefore help in land reclamation

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Provide material support to cooperatives including equipment rental pools	<p>Central African Republic or Guinea, despite trainings in both locations.</p> <p>For those cooperatives with particularly enthusiastic and successful focal points who were investing in sites using SMARTER mining techniques, PRADD II provided mining equipment including manual tools, a motorized tricycle and water pumps. The project worked with the 8 recipient cooperatives to set up a management system adapted to their needs. The equipment was used by members and in the case of the tricycle and water pumps was also rented to others to raise revenue for self-financing new sites and for replacing old tools.</p>	<p>and increase the chances of self-financing.</p> <p>PRADD II waited to establish equipment rental pools until the cooperatives demonstrated real interest through adopting better techniques. As in PRADD I, the project observed how provision of equipment can incentivize, along with better techniques, to self-financing. For projects with the objective of improving miner earnings, financing alternatives from buyers is one of the only ways to do so, as without financing by their buyers, miners have more of a chance to negotiate a higher price in a more competitive market.</p>
Conduct studies and reflection workshops on innovation and alternative supply chains	<p>The 2014 study by CRDG was a key step at building off “direct supply chain” reflections from PRADD I in the Central African Republic. A series of ideas were identified. Unfortunately, the subsequent problems in the KPCS chain of custody made conditions inopportune to test many of these ideas, as the project had to focus on its primary objective of strengthening the chain of custody. However, PRADD II continued reflections notably through scoping studies on using high-resolution imaging for improved traceability and another report on prospects of an online ASM diamond marketplace.</p>	<p>While Côte d'Ivoire was and still is a good testing ground for new innovations, the project was unable to test any new alternative supply chain partnerships because the KPCS supply chain remained rife with challenges. However, by the end of the project a number of new efforts by De Beers, DDI and others show international demand for alternative ASM diamonds, including for the growing ethical fair-trade market. Scoping studies from PRADD II offer ideas and lessons for these ongoing and future initiatives, the main lesson being not to alienate local buyers but to make them allies.</p>
Train on and support participatory geological research	<p>USGS trained SODEMI and government geologists in 2015 on the use of hand augers and subsequently collected transect samples to improve the USGS experimental alluvial deposit model. Funding limitations at USGS made further field collaboration impossible. However, PRADD II used the resulting deposit model to identify potential sites that were tested first by SODEMI geologists and then by cooperative focal points with the</p>	<p>PRADD II succeeded in building a collaborative relationship between SODEMI geologists and communities. Cooperatives have disdained SODEMI's geologists just as much as SODEMI has disdained cooperatives' considerable practical knowledge and experience on diamond prospection. By creating the space to jointly test the USGS sites and identify several new areas for exploitation, increased trust and respect was built by both parties,</p>

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
	second round of SMARTER mining techniques demonstration sites. In all, 408 auger holes and 48 test pits dug.	necessary for a sustainable legal chain of custody.
Train on rough diamond valuation	Besides the GIA training, PRADD II organized in early 2017 a training by a Canadian gemologist for mining cooperative “referees” who assist in public sales sessions, as well as 10 diamond buyers. The training allowed PRADD II to identify and understand local valuation practices for the educational app while also providing useful information and techniques for local actors on how international prices are determined. The project did not have enough time to fully follow up on the training with the referees as the valuation app too longer than expected to complete.	In Côte d’Ivoire’s system of public sales, lying about or manipulating the evaluation of stones is a strategy used not only by unscrupulous buyers but also the cooperatives, leading to conflict. Second, PRADD II found in KAP surveys that contrary to popular belief, diggers know the basics of diamond valuation, except on colored stones. Third, training in diamond valuation has limited impact on earnings, especially for those who are pre-financed by buyers. In addition, more transparent evaluations can push stones outside of the legal chain of custody. Finally, those who wish to help on valuation should focus on fair negotiations and not on fair prices, the definition of which is elusive and perhaps not possible for diamonds.
Develop interactive app and pedagogical videos on valuation and SMARTER techniques	While it took much longer than expected due to non-performance by subcontractor Qelasy, PRADD II completed an educational app for miners and buyers. The app includes 18 educational videos produced by PRADD II in French and Dioula, totaling several hours, on the KP, mining techniques and diamond valuation. The app creates an interface and a quiz for each of the 3 modules, but the videos can also be used alone and are available on the YouTube channel. In addition, the app includes an innovative and interactive component that allows a user to simulate a diamond valuation with visual gauges on quality and value. The gauges are based on real relative price list movements analyzed by the consultant gemologist.	In retrospect PRADD II should have begun production on the educational videos much earlier, as they would have been very useful for trainings and sensitization. The project endeavored to make all the videos available for other projects in the future. PRADD II also had insufficient time to field-test the beta valuation interactive app. The app is based on the principle that having a shared negotiation vocabulary can create a fairer negotiation and thereby increase trust between buyers and sellers. If miners believe their prices are fair, they are more likely to sell via the chain of custody. The valuation app aims at reducing abusive practices by buyers and cooperatives, but also misunderstandings by miners of legitimate quality flaws.
Support semi-mechanization pilot	PRADD II commissioned and imported a customized mobile wash	Mechanized equipment is hard to maintain and calibrate in the harsh

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
and knowledge transfer for local production of mobile wash plants	plant designed by American small business Savana Mining. The wash plant was designed for local conditions and maximum mobility. Unfortunately, there were problems with the design and it malfunctioned. However, thanks to a Séguéla blacksmith, the issues were resolved, and the machine given to a project-supported entrepreneur. PRADD II also commissioned a second machine produced from scratch in Abidjan to foster knowledge transfer. The replication was done with the full support of the American engineer.	conditions of mine sites. For many artisanal miners, the machines may be more trouble than they are worth. Moreover, introducing new technologies brings resistance and skepticism. Many wondered if the machine would “steal” the diamonds or prevent workers from keeping a few diamonds for themselves. Unfortunately, there was not enough time to fully determine if this skepticism was surmountable, nor if the operation and maintenance by an entrepreneur will be sustainable.

2.3.2 SUB-ACTIVITY 2: PROMOTE LIVELIHOOD DIVERSIFICATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN MINING COMMUNITIES

Rationale for Approach and Activities: As described above, a number of criteria were used to select livelihoods activities. First, the project sought activities with a visible impact that would help build trust and buy-in from beneficiaries. Second, PRADD II looked for activities that improved or built upon existing activities, such as agricultural practices. Third, PRADD II looked for opportunities to support women’s livelihoods in particular as part of the project’s gender strategy. In addition, PRADD II sought to build value chains around its activities notably through the entrepreneurship program. Finally, the project designed activities with sustainability in mind by promoting local production of inputs. For example, all hives were produced by local carpenters trained by the project on the proper technique. This reduced barriers to scaling up in future years and enhances sustainability.



Photo by S. Coburn

Figure 9: PRADD II livelihood beneficiaries were 91% women who used secure land rights and technical support to rehabilitate old mining sites and produce nearly 100 tons of food crops.

Table 8: Activities, Accomplishments, and Lessons Learned under Sub-Activity 2

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Support fish farming in mined out sites	The project’s 49 fish farmers built and operated 50 ponds, though not all active at the same time, and in total recorded production of 9,761 fish, with an average weight of around 250 grams. Despite myriad challenges, the project succeeded in training and demonstrating to beneficiaries the stages of building ponds and raising fish. One of the fish farmers was also integrated into the	The fish farms were less successful than in PRADD I in the Central African Republic. The main reason was environmental as Côte d’Ivoire’s climate has variable water availability: either too much or too little depending on the season. The project introduced solar water pumps to help regulate water levels. (Fuel-powered pumps would add too much to operational costs.)

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
	national association of fish farmers, and helps others maintain good practices. The project also monitored water quality and heavy metal contamination in fish and determined that levels were safe.	Second, for fish farming to be profitable it needs at least three ponds per farmer, and that was difficult to achieve. The project expects a hardy few to remain fish farmers but it will not take off as it did under PRADD I in the Central African Republic.
Support beekeeping in cashew orchards	Beekeeping was a new activity in the project's sites but was highly successful. In the first year the 22 beekeepers produced 628 kilos of honey and sold it all immediately after harvest. PRADD II provided all material and technical assistance throughout the season. In the second year PRADD II introduced a matching scheme to promote sustainability, first by designating mentors from the first year for new beekeepers. In addition, the project paid for hives only if the beekeeper made or bought their own using local carpenters trained in hive-building. The 39 beekeepers in the second year produced 1,928 kilos, with more to be harvested later in 2018, and all of which is either sold or earmarked, thanks in part to PRADD II choosing a subcontractor Apinome who also markets honey to supermarkets in Abidjan.	According to wrap-up focus groups, beekeeping was attractive to farmers because it required minimal labor and was profitable. Honey is used not only for food but also for medicinal purposes, and demand locally and in Abidjan is high. Prospects are good for the sustainability of this activity, especially if agribusiness companies decide to invest as a strategy to increase cashew yields or as a livelihoods diversification activity for farmers. PRADD II initiated and co-organized a study on the impact of beekeeping on cashew production. GIZ funded the Ghanaian consultant, PRADD II funded data collection, and results were presented as part of a 2017 conference by the multi-stakeholder ComCashew project. The study showed around 40% increase in raw cashew yields in farms with bees.
Collaborate on entrepreneurship program to promote value chains	PRADD II collaborated with Dutch NGO Spark and its local affiliate to organize a business plan competition for entrepreneurs. Of 250 applicants, 30 were selected based on aptitude and trained in business planning and other skills by Dutch specialists, and a jury consisting of local entrepreneurs and financial experts helped select the best pitches. PRADD II then provided in-kind financing to 10 winning entrepreneurs giving preference to those with ideas that linked in with existing activities. Half of the entrepreneurs financed by the project were making profit by the	A challenge with the PRADD II competition was that selection criteria included the idea of linking value chains to existing activities. This forced some entrepreneurs to choose activities that they were not passionate about. In addition, the subcontract with Spark did not leave enough time for continued assistance during implementation. While PRADD II staff provided this follow-up, it was limited by other obligations and results may have suffered as a result. In retrospect, the project may have been better designed as targeting existing entrepreneurs with support and

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
	end of the project, mainly, the animal feed entrepreneur, cotton seed oil, two equipment rental companies, and the grass cutter farmer.	activities linked to PRADD II chains rather than the “business-in-a-box” model proposed by the Dutch NGO.
Provide technical and material support for women’s agricultural groups	PRADD II provided technical, agricultural and organizational technical assistance to 22 women’s groups. ANADER provided the assistance in the first phase. Following an internal evaluation, several groups were dropped and in Séguéla the project switched subcontractors to NGO ARK. By the end of the project the women’s groups had produced nearly 100 tons of food crops, including 28 tons of manioc, 17 tons of corn and 13 tons of tomatoes. The groups generated over \$50,000 in revenue from crops but also member dues and rental of equipment provided by the project. PRADD II provided 3,472 small tools for the groups plus a dozen larger investments like mills and tricycles for high performers. Groups used the revenue to invest in more productive assets (like bulls) and in village development (such as electrification).	PRADD II saw multiple benefits from focusing on women’s economic livelihoods in mining communities. First, the program built trust with miners and male leaders who appreciated the greater food security and household income. Second, women’s economic empowerment led to social empowerment such as in Kationron where the women’s groups’ income made the electrification of the village possible. The formalization of the groups as cooperatives or associations was also valuable as it opened up the possibility of receiving additional financing, and several did during the project. The savings and loan scheme worked well in Tortiya, but culturally did not work in Séguéla. In addition, women’s groups managed equipment very well, with all but one still in working condition after three years of use.
Support chicken farming program in Seguela	PRADD II supported 12 chicken farmers in Séguéla in 2018 as a livelihoods activity. The farming was successful with 1,130 chickens sold, and farmers investing their profits in more chicks. As with the beekeeping program a cost-sharing approach for inputs helps avoid financing people looking for handouts.	In retrospect, a more comprehensive assessment may have helped identify this and other activities earlier in the project. Challenges in finding a good Livelihoods Coordinator during the first two years was one reason why such opportunities were missed, plus trade-offs with other priorities at the time.

2.3.3 SUB-ACTIVITY 3: PROMOTE BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION

Rationale for Approach and Activities: PRADD II treated environmental aspects as a crosscutting component of field activities. For example, ecological considerations were integrated into the social dialogue and land use planning process, given the impacts from mining but also the need to take into account management of all natural resources and not just extractive ones. Livelihoods activities were designed to maximize the potential for land reclamation, like in PRADD I, and by the end of the project over 15 hectares were rehabilitated by farmers without project financing. Besides reclamation, the project also sought to shed light on particular environmental problems and impacts in diamond mining communities. The biodiversity earmark funds contributed to this but also made possible a series of studies by 12 leading Ivoirian researchers on riparian forests and a national park abutting diamond mining zones in Tortiya. Finally, the project devoted resources for monitoring as part of its EMMP.




Photo by I. Kane

Figure 10: PRADD II worked with leading Ivoirian researchers to study and conduct community dialogue on the value of biodiversity conservation especially riparian forests affected by mining.

Activities, Accomplishments, and Lessons Learned under Sub-Activity 3

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Conduct diagnostics and studies on environmental impacts and regeneration in diamond mining areas	PRADD II worked with a local NGO <i>Jeunes volontaires pour l'environnement</i> to study environmental impacts of diamond mining in Seguela. The study opened a line of inquiry on ways in which post-mining environments regenerate and offer new ecosystem services like natural fish farms during the dry season and watering holes for cattle. The project also commissioned a study by Irish experts under a collaboration with Engineers Without Borders (Netherlands) to study the hydrological impacts of artisanal diamond mining in Tortiya, plus drinking water challenges for the township. The high-quality studies were translated and shared with the township development committee.	The traditional narrative of environmental devastation in diamond mining results in a focus on prevention and land reclamation as remedies. During PRADD II, while prevention through better techniques and land reclamation were successful priorities, the project also nuanced its approach by documenting the ways in which natural regeneration post-mining creates new and valuable ecosystems. In such cases land reclamation may cause environmental harm.
Conduct riparian forest and Haut Bandama baseline ecological studies	PRADD II commissioned a multi-part study led by a consortium of scientists from a think tank to study riparian forests in Séguéla, and collaborated with the park service OIPR and a national university to conduct a similar study for the Haut	The studies offered strong evidence that the ecosystems most affected by diamond mining tend to be riparian forests given that alluvial deposits follow streams and low-lying areas. Increased understanding of ways in which these crucial

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
	Bandama nature reserve near Tortiya. The researchers included a dozen experts focusing on trees, fish life, birds, land mammals, land cover change and ecology. The park service in particular appreciated the contributions as the reserve had been largely unprotected for a decade.	ecosystems in savanna zones are affected and how natural regeneration occurs can help create a complete picture of the environmental impacts of ASDM.
Integrate ecological and biodiversity considerations into land use planning	PRADD II included the environment as one of the four key themes of the participatory diagnostics used in land use planning exercises. In addition, Indigo produced a video and conducted public discussions on the environment, especially riparian forests. This led to greater awareness about the importance of forests and some key decisions such as setting aside community managed forests reserves.	Land use planning can offer an excellent way to foster better understanding by communities of environmental dynamics and empower them to make decisions about how to manage them for the future. When the plans are endorsed by the government, enforcement can be more effective than state parks. PRADD II also noted that communities quickly grasped the value of forests once confronted with negative consequences of their loss.

2.4 ACTIVITY 4: CROSSCUTTING ACTIVITIES

Summary of Technical Approach

Mainstreaming was the key principle of all PRADD II cross-cutting activities. The GIS Coordinator was encouraged and his performance judged by his ability to propose new and innovative ways to use spatial analysis for all activities. Technical staff were told that data collection and data quality was the responsibility of not just the M&E Coordinator but everyone. PRADD II designated one of its field agents to be responsible for making sure everyone was applying the project's gender analysis framework all the time, from weekly staff meetings to community dialogue sessions. And during the project's frequent staff planning retreats, the project's management team made it clear that the operations team was expected and encouraged to contribute to technical planning, just as the technical team was encouraged and expected to understand and assist with procurement and budget management. In this way, a cross-cutting approach was not just about specific activities but was an overall technical and administrative management strategy for the project as a whole, fostering interlinkages and holistic thinking.

Conclusions and Lessons Learned

PRADD II initially had a Communications Coordinator but like the Conflict Management Coordinator this position was dropped several years into the project. The reason was partly due to difficulty in finding a suitable candidate – the project tried four people – but it also a deliberate choice. The position combined branding and outreach communication with supporting grassroots behavioral change communication. It was difficult to find one person with both skillsets, and it made little sense to have the behavioral change expert based in Abidjan far from field implementation. Instead the project empowered the field office managers, who had strong community development experience, to contribute technically to the proximity communication strategy, and hired an outside consultant to offer support for the KP

miner sensitization campaign. The project then integrated institutional communication into the Governance Coordinator's job description. This arrangement worked well for the project, but in hindsight it may have been better to have a full-time branding and outreach specialist, especially for external English-speaking audiences, as the project was not visible enough internationally and the field teams did not have sufficient time to produce as many blogs and other material as ideal.

With respect to monitoring and evaluation, the project had a relatively inexperienced M&E Coordinator which created challenges but allowed her to build capacity and confidence as the project went on. In addition, PRADD II avoided a situation where technical managers felt little ownership over data. The use of the ePORT tablet-based system unfortunately contributed to a sense that field agents would just collect information and send it off to the cloud. After a time PRADD II opted to use ePORT only for some key PMP indicators, and instead insisted that technical coordinators do their own data entry and analysis, which was checked and compiled by the M&E Coordinator. This helped the livelihoods coordinator better understand the challenges in activities like fish farming by having more ownership over the information. Future projects might consider placing M&E under the GIS Coordinator's portfolio, as the basic functions necessary for PMP management require similar skillsets.

With the project's gender dimension, the international and local specialists hired for designing and implementing the gender strategy were of limited utility. It is very difficult to take gender into account without falling into the trap of coming up with a strategy that is full of banalities and generalities. In addition, outside consultants rarely have enough time or capacity to quickly grasp the dynamics in the project's communities. Instead PRADD II found by necessity and choice the need to take more ownership of the gender strategy so that it would not just be left as a box to be ticked but would lead to meaningful results. Fortunately, the Deputy Country Director had strong experience and the ensuing gender analysis toolbox proved very useful in mainstreaming gender considerations.

The project was fortunate to have a skilled GIS Specialist who always had enough work to do, whether it was land use change analysis for land use planning, remote monitoring of ASM sites with satellite imagery or using GIS to choose control and intervention plots for the beekeeping impact study. The use of GIS in creative ways added a strong empirical and visual component to PRADD II work that was helpful in analysis but also helpful in communicating results and issues in an impactful manner, whether for communities or for external stakeholders.

Finally, PRADD II invested considerable resources in internal staff retreats three and sometimes four times each year. These retreats were essential for maintaining staff morale and technical focus across the three project offices. In projects with less moving parts and less external factors that changed work-planning – like political dynamics with the KP Secretariat or dynamic land conflicts – it would not be necessary to meet as often. But because the project's realities and management style was highly adaptive to fast-changing realities, and the program of activities vast and complex, these check-ins were vital.

Sustainability and Follow-on Recommendations

PRADD II generated a significant amount of quantitative data from its M&E activities. While the survey reports summarized and analyzed results, the two household surveys and the three KAP surveys of miners are a wealth of information for researchers. The project has uploaded the raw data to the USAID Development Data Library in case follow-on projects or other researchers find interest and use for further analysis. Similarly, the lessons learned and successes of PRADD II more generally are highly relevant as ASM gains more and more attention from the development community and private industry concerned about conflict minerals. The project is among the few in the world that had the resources and time to pilot, innovate, and understand some key dynamics. While the PRADD II team is doing its best to upload reports to the DEC and participate in international forum to share lessons learned, follow-on communication and research work is needed to fully capitalize on the vast experiences and knowledge generated in the last five years.

2.4.1 SUB-ACTIVITY I: SUPPORT INSTITUTIONAL COMMUNICATION AND KNOWLEDGE DISSEMINATION

Rationale for Approach and Activities: As noted above, after two years of treating communication as a stand-alone component combining national and local outreach, PRADD II adjusted its place in the Third Annual Work Plan to become instead a cross-cutting activity. Local communication was integrated into relevant core activities, whether it was land use planning, miner sensitization campaigns or training in SMARTER mining techniques. The national communication cross-cutting component focused on three broad objectives. First, the activities aimed at implementing the project's branding and marketing plan. Second, the activities aimed at maintaining the flow of information to national institutional stakeholders like government ministries and other projects and donors. Third, the activities aimed at contributing to the project's advocacy and outreach efforts. For example, the project's Facebook page became a key communication outlet to reach elites from PRADD II intervention areas living in Abidjan, and to spark awareness and debate on project themes like land tenure and ASM mining governance among a cross-section of interested Ivoirians, generally younger.

Activities, Accomplishments, and Lessons Learned under Sub-Activity I

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Develop national and local communication strategy	PRADD II completed its national and local communication strategy in 2015. The local strategy was based in part on results from the first household survey which included questions on the best ways to reach various audiences. The document also identified some key messages related to the KP and awareness-raising on the 1998 land law.	PRADD II found that it was more useful to design specific communication strategies for each campaign rather than one overall document. This allowed more in-depth planning of key technical messages and updating them based on results from the KAP surveys and internal evaluations.
Produce newsletters and communication materials	Early in the project PRADD II produced quarterly newsletters that offered magazine-style features about the project's themes, including the links between livelihoods and mining, the process of lifting the embargo and the use of GIS. After about a year, given the time and effort to produce the bulletins, and feedback showing limited readership, the project switched approaches to monthly reports that mirrored the style of weekly updates: what was done, difficulties and next steps. The project also had a monthly internal photo competition amongst staff members to encourage quality photos for use in reports.	PRADD II found that the monthly barebones activities reports were just as effective as the more polished quarterly newsletters. The main purpose of the reports was to inform government and other partners of progress and setbacks. Because of the dynamic nature of activities, such regular updates were essential to keep everyone informed and elicit feedback. The newsletters also gave the project cover if government officials complained that they were not informed. The photo competition amongst staff was highly popular and allowed the project to build an attractive photo library.
Support public education and outreach through traditional and	PRADD II invited local newspapers to major national and local workshops. The Ivorian press agency AIP was the most important outlet as articles	Local news coverage on key events was important especially for events at which government officials attended. However, the quality of

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
social media	were picked up by papers and highly read Web site likes Abidjan.net. Government officials also followed AIP newsfeeds. The project also participated in a training for journalists by the nonprofit Studio Mozaik on issues in mining transparency. The project opened its Facebook page ³ in 2016 and by the end of the project had 859 followers. Finally, the project maintained a YouTube Channel ⁴ (PRADD II Côte d'Ivoire) which serves as a repository of more than 75 videos.	reporting was weak, and the project had to work with reporters to avoid factual errors. The project's Facebook page proved to be popular among young people in Abidjan originally from PRADD II zones. They were the most active users and allowed the project to remain visible and accountable to this key constituency who are key influencers in their home villages. The YouTube channel also served as an audiovisual archive of project workshops and activities.
Produce weekly updates and quarterly reports	PRADD II Côte d'Ivoire contributed 2 pages each week for the over 250 updates produced between 2013 and 2018. The reports offered an unvarnished view of the project's advances and setbacks for more than a dozen donor and diplomatic stakeholders. PRADD II also contributed to the quarterly progress reports every three months.	The weekly updates rather than being a reporting burden were useful management tools. To produce them the field teams compiled weekly activity reports that were helpful in getting regular information from the field. The reports helped senior management keep track of progress and pass along key messages to donors.
Participate in international conferences	Despite being busy with activity implementation, PRADD II managed to participate in the following international conferences: KP semi-annual meetings (6 times), World Bank Land and Poverty Conference (twice), OECD Responsible Minerals Forum, European Development Days, African Minerals Development Center conference, International Conference on Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining and Quarrying, among others.	PRADD II participation in these conferences was often of mixed utility, like all conferences. On the one hand they afforded key venues to contribute to awareness of the project and contribute based on considerable knowledge and experiences. On the other hand, they took much effort and expense, which had to be measured against time lost in field implementation for senior management.

Partial List of PRADD II Reports and Publications Posted on DEC

Document Title	Publication Date
Land and conflict assessment in diamond mining communities of Séguéla and Tortiya Côte d'Ivoire	May 2014

³ <https://www.facebook.com/dpddacotedivoire/>

⁴ <https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCm0rtUj2UjdmZ-MM68zlx-w/playlists>

Document Title	Publication Date
Responsible Sourcing Models Relevant to Artisanal and Small-scale Diamond Mining: A Brief Review	August 2014
Diagnostic of the artisanal and small-scale diamond mining sector in Côte d'Ivoire using the Kimberley Process Washington Declaration	October 2014
Summary of Land Cover Change Analysis in Former SAREMCI Mining Concession in Tortiya	October 2014
Workshop report on the validation of the Washington Declaration diagnostic for Côte d'Ivoire	October 2014
PRADD II Conflict management strategy	November 2014
Legal study on the status of the former SAREMCI mining concession in Tortiya	November 2014
Innovations in Artisanal Diamond Supply Chains in Côte d'Ivoire: A Workshop Discussion Paper	December 2014
Workshop report on the development of the diamond mining value chain in Côte d'Ivoire	January 2015
Practical training guide for Kimberley Process	March 2015
Facilitating Innovation in Artisanal Diamond Supply Chains in Côte d'Ivoire: A Final Report	March 2015
Report on simplified environmental impact assessment in diamond mining zones of Séguéla and Tortiya	March 2015
Training placards on village boundary demarcation in Côte d'Ivoire	June 2015
Economic and land tenure assessment in the Tortiya township of Côte d'Ivoire	July 2015
Training placards on Kimberley Process in Côte d'Ivoire	September 2015
Gender integration guide for PRADD II Côte d'Ivoire activity implementation	September 2015
Pitch Deck for eCommerce Marketplace for ASM Diamonds	December 2015
Roadmap for the Development of an eCommerce Marketplace for ASM Diamonds	December 2015
Baseline household and miner survey results from Séguéla and Tortiya (2015)	December 2015
Improved artisanal diamond mining techniques training manual	January 2016
Policy analysis and position paper on legal and regulatory framework for rural land tenure in Côte d'Ivoire	March 2016
Summary of key results of PRADD II project in 2014 and 2015	May 2016
Results of Survey of Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices (KAP) of Miners in Séguéla Côte d'Ivoire 2016	June 2016
Study on the organisational strengthening to miner cooperatives in Seguela	June 2016
PRADD II Environmental Performance and Monitoring Plan (EMMP) Report	July 2016
Trip report on the diagnostic on how to apply the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme to Tortiya	July 2016
Strategic Development Plan for the Township of Tortiya (2017-2021); Volume 1: Consolidated Assessment Report	November 2016
Strategic Development Plan for the Township of Tortiya (2017-2021); Volume 2: Vision and strategie for sustainable development	November 2016
Training workshop report on the collection and analysis of statistics in support of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in Côte d'Ivoire	January 2017
Final Report on Abidjan Regional Workshop on Best Practices for the Sustainable Development of Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining	March 2017
Ecological and socio-economic assessment of the Haut Bandaman Nature Reserve (synthesis report)	May 2017
Ecological and socio-economic assessment of the Haut Bandaman Nature Reserve	May 2017
Participatory assessment toward the sustainable development of diamond mining villages in the region of Worodougou	June 2017

Document Title	Publication Date
Ecological and socio-economic assessment of gallery forests in diamondiferous zones of Séguéla	July 2017
Ecological and socio-economic assessment of gallery forests in diamondiferous zones of Séguéla (synthesis report)	July 2017
Synthesis report for annual miner Knowledge Attitudes Practices (KAP) survey 2017	July 2017
The Effect of Integrating Honey Bees Colonies (<i>Apis Mellifera Adansonii</i>) into Cashew Orchards in Côte d'Ivoire	August 2017
Report on the use of GIS for the monitoring of mining activities in Séguéla - inventory and classification of diamond mining activity	October 2017
The role of GIS in mining monitoring: the partnership between PRADD II and GIS (presentation slides)	February 2018
The Global Economy and Adaptation of Customary Tenure Regimes: Capturing Global Market Opportunities through the Transformation of Surface and Sub-Surface Customary Tenure Regimes in Diamond Mining Areas of Northern Côte d'Ivoire (Paper)	March 2018
Managing Conflict and Fostering Cooperation Between the State and Customary Land Owners for the Effective Formalization of Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining in West Africa: The Case of Diamonds in Côte d'Ivoire (Paper)	March 2018
River Water Management for the Mitigation of Impacts from Artisanal Diamond Mining Practices	March 2018
The Water System in Tortiya: Current Issues and Potential Solutions	March 2018
Results and Lessons Learned from Five Years of Implementation in Côte d'Ivoire: Presentation by PRADD II at KP Intersession	June 2018
Results and lessons learned from PRADD II land activities 2013 to 2018	July 2018
Simplified strategic development plans for 10 villages	July 2018
Endline household survey in mining communities of Séguéla and Tortiya	July 2018
Synthesis report for annual miner Knowledge Attitudes Practices (KAP) survey 2018	August 2018
Scoping study on using imaging for traceability and alternative supply chains	September 2018

List of PRADD II Videos with Links on YouTube

Video series description	Number of videos
Panels from PRADD II Land Activities Lessons Learned Workshop in July 2018 (French)	3
Educational videos dubbed into dioula (malinke / bambara)	19
Documentaries and short discussion films on diamond sector	8
Documentaries and short discussion films on land tenure	9
Educational videos on geology and SMARTER mining techniques	5
Educational videos on rough diamond valuation	7
Educational videos on the Kimberley Process and mining code	6
Panel discussions from March 2017 regional workshop on ASM best practices (English/French)	16
Documentary on the PRADD II project results	2

2.4.2 SUB-ACTIVITY 2: CONDUCT MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Rationale for Approach and Activities: The PRADD II monitoring and evaluation approach began first and foremost with the requirements of the PMP and data quality control for all indicators. The M&E

Coordinator's primary duty was the compilation of data and associated Means of Verification (MOVs), and conducting spot checks and analyses to ensure data quality. PRADD II also went beyond PMP indicators to collect and analyze additional quantitative information, especially from livelihoods activities, but also through the household and miner KAP surveys, which went well beyond the data necessary for the PMP but which provided key quantitative information for adaptive management. Indeed, during staff retreats the M&E Coordinator would lead discussions based on the latest quarterly data that helped provide an objective basis of discussion with all staff.

Activities, Accomplishments, and Lessons Learned under Sub-Activity 2

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Collect data and provide quality control for PMP indicators and other statistics	PRADD II collected data and associated Means of Verification (MOVs) for PMP indicators. The M&E Coordinator carried out field trips at least once a quarter to verify the quality of data and offer advice to field agents.	The ePORT system had limited utility and had the unintended consequence of disempowering field staff. Tablet-based data collection systems are useful for major campaigns (like ODK used in PRADD II household surveys) or in large projects with many agents and lots of data. However, PRADD II found it better to have field teams be responsible for data entry and quality using simple tools like Excel. In addition, it is helpful for MOVs to have a paper trail which is less with tablets.
Conduct an internal evaluation and qualitative data collection	PRADD II completed a mid-term evaluation of EU-funded activities at the end of 2015. In addition, PRADD II conducted a number of internal assessments such as after the first phase of the KP miner sensitization and at the end of the project as part of wrap-up workshops. The project also collected qualitative performance data through the weekly reporting system from the field offices.	The weekly reporting mechanism was invaluable for senior management. The template required all field agents to report on what was done, what worked and what did not. This information was compiled by field office managers and sent to all staff, not just senior leadership. This allowed everyone to participate in decision-making based on qualitative information from the field.
Conduct annual miner Knowledge-Attitudes-Practices (KAP) Surveys	PRADD II completed four miner KAP surveys, with on average 120 respondents each. The regular surveys helped monitor progress in advancing KPCS and evaluation knowledge through its scoring system for respondents based on correct answers. Incorrect answers helped inform key messages for subsequent campaigns.	PRADD II used an outside firm for the first KAP survey but in subsequent years used project staff as enumerators. While not best practice in terms of neutrality, the approach reduced problems from miscomprehension of technical questions, and helped participating PRADD II staff maintain proximity to field realities.
Conduct baseline and endline household surveys	PRADD II completed baseline and end line household surveys with over 600 respondents. The primary	The initial questionnaire despite best intentions was too long and led to surveys taking well over an hour to

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
	<p>purpose was to collect data for the PMP indicator on the economic impact of PRADD II activities. However, the surveys offered a detailed portrait of the socio-economic but also land tenure trends and dynamics in the project's communities.</p>	<p>complete per household. The questionnaire was pared down in 2018 but still offered a rich level of detail on livelihoods activities, revenue, food security, and land tenure practices and perceptions.</p>

Key Results from KAP Surveys

Question	2015	2016	2017	2018
% of miners with basic KPCS knowledge	N/A	28	47	61
% of miners with basic evaluation knowledge ⁵	N/A	N/A	54	61
% Ivoirian	65	62	56	50
% financed by their buyers	71	97	85	82
Average size of largest stone found in past year	1.47	3	1.57	1.07
% who give diamonds to cooperatives until public sale	79	92	86	84
% who say diggers often sell diamonds secretly	30	30	21	14
% sensitized by a cooperative focal point	0	20	36	34
% who have participated in SMARTER mining site	0	0	21	22
% who say they have a miner card	N/A	66	65	73
% with a valid card on them	N/A	8	5	16
% who have heard of the Kimberley Process	17	15	35	71
% who say child labor is allowed	25	17	14	14
% who think they are getting a fair price for stones	41	24	46	68

Table 15: Key Results from Households Surveys

Question	2015	2018
Average household size	7.7	5.7
% non-Ivoirians	30.5	32.3
Average monthly income derived from activities	42,275 CFA	48,017 CFA
Average monthly income PRADD II beneficiaries	N/A	83,202 CFA
% of households that are PRADD II beneficiaries	0	9
Average monthly expenses	65,645 CFA	85,100 CFA
% of Séguéla households whose primary activity is mining	63	39
% of Séguéla households whose primary activity is cashews	29	61
% of households for whom cashews provides main income	25	37
% of households for whom mining provides main income	26	22

2.4.3 SUB-ACTIVITY 3: SUPPORT GENDER STRATEGY

Rationale for Approach and Activities: The project's gender strategy mirrored the PRADD II holistic approach to development in ASM communities. Just as mining as a key livelihood is inextricably linked to agriculture, women's economic activities and contributions are inextricably linked the community's well-being as a whole. In addition, the project saw an opportunity to focus on women's economic empowerment to sidestep socially thorny issues related to women's social status and instead allow changes in attitudes to occur naturally through changed economic circumstances. PRADD II also based its strategy on the hypothesis that women are key influencers of men's attitudes. The focus of

⁵ The score system was not used in early versions even though knowledge questions were asked. In the score system, basic knowledge is defined as having at least 50% of correct answers.

livelihoods activities on women also helped create a positive image for the project in the communities at large as, in the words of one male leader, “If you help our women you help us all.” Finally, PRADD II understood gender analysis not just taking into account differing needs and dynamics with respect to men and women, but also with respect to other marginalized groups like youth and outsiders. Gender analysis therefore became a way to constantly ensure that the project considered and reduced various group-based biases in activity design and implementation.

Table 16: Activities, Accomplishments, and Lessons Learned under Sub-Activity 3

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Develop and implement gender strategy and gender analysis framework	After dissatisfaction with several consultants, PRADD II authored its own strategy in 2015 based on donor guidelines, past experience, and best practices. The guide identified the parameters of effective gender mainstreaming, gender analysis and promotion of gender equity in all project activities. It also created a checklist for how to ask gender-sensitive analytical questions for each of the project’s activity components.	To go beyond a perfunctory or superficial inclusion of gender, in-depth and continuous analysis is needed. The PRADD II framework offered a good starting point, but a key success was naming among the project’s field agents someone who was the “gender focal point” in charge of reminding everyone from drivers to the country directors to use the gender analysis framework. This mitigated the risk that despite best intentions gender would not be treated as priority.
Build capacity and advocate for the PRADD II gender approach in national and international forums	PRADD II used its framework as a basis for several trainings conducted for local stakeholders such as for the Tortiya land use planning committee. In addition, PRADD II positive results from gender were highlighted internationally, such as during the European Development Days 2018 and as part of a case study by U.S. think tank Resource Equity.	Despite low participation by women in the diamond mining supply chain in Côte d’Ivoire, gender was central to the project’s approach and successes. By focusing on women’s livelihoods, the project built trust with men, indirectly addressed gender inequality in development decision making and helped mining households reduce income volatility from mining.

2.4.4 SUB-ACTIVITY 4: APPLY GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS (GIS)

Rationale for Approach and Activities: The key approach for GIS in PRADD II was to be creative and critical in applying spatial analysis wherever useful. In addition, the project placed a strong emphasis on building local capacity and sustainability in its innovations by involving and training local GIS specialists at universities and in government agencies. In these ways GIS was used for analysis and knowledge generation but was also used as a communication tool as part of social dialogue in communities and in communicating project dynamics to national and international stakeholders.

Table 17: Activities, Accomplishments, and Lessons Learned under Sub-Activity 4

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Utilize satellite imagery for social dialogue and conflict resolution	PRADD II projected offline images from Google Earth to assist conflict resolution as part of boundary demarcation. Stakeholders would	The use of satellite images was a successful and low-cost tool for boundary negotiation. Villagers quickly understood the logic of

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
	<p>identify key landmarks and points of dissension. This would help PRADD II and government agents understand the disputes, and made negotiation less risky and unpleasant compared with having to visit disputed sites under the hot sun. PRADD II also projected results from land cover change analysis from 1986, 2002 and 2017 as part of social dialogue on land use planning.</p>	<p>satellite images and the Google Earth images were recent and of high enough quality. The approach also facilitated the participation of elders who would have otherwise been unable to walk to remote areas. The land cover change maps were also powerful discussion tools with communities as they could see in a vivid and visual way the magnitude of changes like cashew and cacao expansion.</p>
<p>Use land cover change analysis, image interpretation, and GeoODK for project activities</p>	<p>Land cover change analysis was used not just in dialogue but also for zoning decisions. The project also applied the USGS image interpretation techniques for identifying active ASM sites in the Séguéla zone for three consecutive years. Finally, the project piloted the use of GeoODK as part of the participatory mapping exercise for cashew plantations in Tortiya.</p>	<p>As noted elsewhere, the USGS image interpretation methodology is cost-prohibitive for recent high-resolution images. However, land cover change uses free Landsat images and is hence more accessible. GeoODK proved of limited use in the mapping exercise in Tortiya due to the slow and imprecise GPS in the tablets. As technology improves tablet-based mapping will make sense.</p>
<p>Use satellite imagery for collaborative geological research</p>	<p>USGS produced the alluvial deposit model, and unfortunately due to funding constraints they were unable to participate in knowledge transfer of the methodology to local GIS specialists. However, the project printed out the resulting maps and used them for collaborative identification of potential ASM sites, building trust between SODEMI and the mining cooperatives, and collecting data to improve the models in the future.</p>	<p>GeoODK was particularly useful for the participatory research as it allowed the loading of base maps showing the classification of high potential alluvial zones. The tablets' GPS then allowed the field teams to easily navigate themselves to the high potential areas for pit sampling and field observation. While a GPS would also work for such navigation, the satellite images made it more user-friendly for cooperatives.</p>

Figure 11: Example of USGS Diamond Prospection Map




Figure 12: Example of Land Cover Change Analysis





Figure 13: Example of Land Use Plan Zoning Map



2.4.5 SUB-ACTIVITY 5: SUPPORT WORK PLANNING, DONOR COORDINATION, AND STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS

Rationale for Approach and Activities: The project organized staff retreats three to four times a year depending on the activity schedule and budget. The retreats were vital in maintaining morale and team spirit among the three field teams, offering well-needed respite from the high pressures of implementation and building effective working relationships. The project also used the retreats to reflect and recalibrate work plans, which was necessary due to the many moving parts and the various institutional challenges that threw off planning with delays or other issues. In terms of national stakeholder consultations, the project benefitted greatly from a Ministerial Communiqué 2013 adopted in the Council of Ministers. This provided legitimacy and cover for the overall work plan when challenged from time to time by partners. The project also endeavored to build synergies with other donors and projects to avoid duplication of effort and maximize results.

Activities, Accomplishments, and Lessons Learned under Sub-Activity 5

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Support work planning and government relations	The project organized staff retreats three to four times a year that included a combination of team-building, capacity-building and week-by-week work planning. The project obtained validation of the work plan by the government's technical partners and endorsement of the overall framework by the Council of Ministers. The project maintained productive relationships with over a dozen technical services in five separate ministries, a time-intensive but essential part of activity implementation.	The project found that it was important to differentiate work plan form and frequency between those produced for donors each year and for the government. The donor work plans were too long and detailed for busy government stakeholders. Instead the project obtained validation of two two-year simplified work plans. The project also benefitted greatly from a strong working relationship with the KP Permanent Secretary who shielded the project from micro-management by the Mining Ministry cabinet.
Coordinate with Friends of Côte d'Ivoire Group (FOCDI)	PRADD II regularly briefed local diplomats on the KPCS, the post-embargo transition strategy and mining/land governance issues. Sometimes these briefings were directly project donors or were directed at the full FOCDI group. PRADD II was instrumental in convincing FOCDI to expand its mandate to gold and to include other projects like GIZ in the briefings.	The relationship between PRADD II and FOCDI exemplified best practice in coordinating diplomatic and technical interventions. At least a half dozen times PRADD II requested FOCDI intervention through letters or diplomatic demarches on key challenges and priorities, from establishing buying houses to organizing the regional conference.
Leverage partnerships and co-funding	The PRADD II budget did not allow the implementation of all priorities and hence the team had to be creative in leveraging partnerships with others. The project leveraged over \$150,000 in joint activities over the course of the project thanks to	While fostering partnerships with others carries hidden transaction costs linked to coordination, they are worth the trouble as they foster donor coordination and in the case of PRADD II created the conditions for sustainability of actions as other

Activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
	Engineers Without Borders (Netherlands), GIZ, the UK government, the OECD and EITI.	donors took on key work, such as GIZ and the EU on ASM policy.

2.5 OPERATIONS AND STAFFING

2.5.1 PERSONNEL AND STAFFING

Accomplishments and Lessons Learned: As a project is only as good as its personnel, the project's management put human resources front and center. PRADD II was fortunate to have a strong team with




Figure 13: PRADD II staff during a planning retreat in Korhogo in January 2018. The retreats were essential in maintaining morale and technical direction across the three offices and partners.

two expatriates and 20 local staff. The project's field presence was further expanded by subcontractors and consultants who brought the de facto personnel to over 30 people at any given time. The project devoted much time to human resources management. Every single candidate for every position was interviewed by senior management, and the project organized detailed performance reviews and plans for everyone at least once a year. PRADD II took advantage of Ivorian facilities for staff training by funding staff capacity-building, which was tax-deductible. The project sought to create a positive and passionate work environment by choosing people who brought such qualities to their work. The project leadership led by example in working long hours and traveling to the field at least once every 6 weeks, and often much more frequently. PRADD II also banned the use of the French honorific *vous* formulation, opting

instead for the informal *tu* among everyone from cleaners to country directors. This helped foster a less hierarchical working environment.

Despite more flexibility and less hierarchy, the project maintained discipline and had to fire 6 staff during the course of the project for ethical or performance reasons. In addition, the project had a difficult few months in 2015 when a troublesome staff representative attempted to change the project's working environment to the antagonistic style often fostered by francophone labor laws and practices. The project's leadership ended the episode through negotiation and strategic communication with staff and other influencers. PRADD II also had an unusual but successful final layoff during closeout. Instead of firing everyone, PRADD II negotiated voluntary departure agreements more than three months before closeout. Tetra Tech agreed to a bonus incentive payment to help encourage staff to sign on, and the resulting agreements prevented the lawsuits and tensions that often mark closeouts. As a result PRADD II continued activity implementation with high morale through its final day.

A particular challenge and frustration, however, was USAID rate requirements based on salary history. This created inequalities among staff members with similar experiences and backgrounds, and fostered gender pay inequity. PRADD II management was often forced to make hiring decisions based not on the most qualified candidates but on if their rate history would allow swift approval and minimum negotiation. Because Contracting Officer approval for rate hikes during most of the project took months to obtain, and had to be based on specific arguments, the project lost three to four highly qualified candidates due to rate considerations. The negative impacts of well-intentioned compensation policies

on project implementation is perhaps not fully appreciated, but it was a significant problem for PRADD II.

2.5.2 SUBCONTRACTORS

Accomplishments and Lessons Learned: PRADD II had 15 local subcontractors over its five years. This formed part of the project's commitment to USAID Forward principles of supporting local actors. As a result, 55% percent of the project activities budget was channeled through local organizations. The relationships with subcontractors varied. In the case of some like Club Union Africaine or ARK, the project staff and subcontractor staff shared office space and collaborated on a day-to-day basis. While this was positive in creating seamless integration of subcontractor teams for as part of long-term collaboration, they also created challenges in terms of lines of authority, as the PRADD II office managers did not directly supervise subcontractor employees. This contributed to the PRADD II decision to discontinue its collaboration with CUA in 2015.

Other subcontractors were engaged for short-term and specific tasks, like the household surveys and the production of films. The only major issue encountered with subcontractors was with Qelasy, the Ivorian firm that developed educational apps on its proprietary tablets. Unfortunately, Qelasy underwent extreme financial difficulties due to unpaid government bills and poor management, leading to layoffs and an inability to complete the PRADD II app. The project spent over six months working with Qelasy to find a solution to complete the work, but in the end had to terminate the contract for cause. Fortunately, PRADD II was able to engage some former Qelasy employees for a fixed-price service agreement to finish the videos and app, but the delay prevented PRADD II from testing the app in the field before closeout, a follow-on recommendation as noted above. The following table presents a list of all PRADD II subcontractors:

List of Subcontractors and Values of Subcontracts

Year	Subcontractor	Name	Approximate USD Value
2013	Club Union Africaine	Strategic planning for PRADD II land and conflict activities	\$ 17,984
2014	Groupeement de recherche et d'action pour les industries extractives (GRPIE)	Support to the implementation for the Washington declaration diagnostic framework in Côte d'Ivoire	\$ 19,865
2014	ANADER	Feasibility study for fish farming in former diamond mining sites	\$ 23,274
2014	Research International	Baseline household survey in mining communities and KAP survey of artisanal miners	\$ 29,805
2014	Club Union Africaine	Assistance for boundary demarcation and sensitization on 1998 land law	\$ 224,635
2015	Jeunes volontaires pour l'environnement (JVE)	Diagnostic study for environmental activities of PRADD II	\$ 3,882
2015	ANADER	Assistance to women's groups for agricultural activities	\$ 29,420
2015	Research International	Development of a KP statistics database	\$ 14,990
2015	Université des Collectivités	Assistance to produce strategic development plan for the township of Tortiya	\$ 43,010
2016	ARK	Technical and organizational assistance to agricultural groups	\$ 59,460

Year	Subcontractor	Name	Approximate USD Value
2016	Spark Foundation	Pilot entrepreneurial support program to benefit diamond-mining communities in CDI	\$ 117,919
2016	Apinome	Beekeeping program in cashew orchards in Séguéla and Tortiya	\$ 39,209
2016	Qelasy	Mobile educational app for diamond miners	\$ 58,922
2016	ANADER	Technical and organizational assistance to agricultural groups in Tortiya (extension)	\$ 10,601
2016	CETIF	Technical operation for land demarcation in Séguéla	\$ 107,943
2016	CETIF	Technical operation for land demarcation in Tortiya	\$ 44,157
2017	Indigo	Technical support for social dialogue for land tenure security and sustainable development of land resources	\$ 101,821
2017	Akor Concept	Film production for documentaries on diamond mining	\$ 26,473
2018	CEDSS	End line household survey in Séguéla and Tortiya	\$ 26,625

2.5.3 GENERAL ADMINISTRATION

Accomplishments and Lessons Learned: PRADD II took great pride in running a tight ship which was necessary to respect donor regulations but also be a good steward of limited resources. The project always negotiated hard for all contracts and strictly avoided unnecessary costs. Thanks to this rigor, the project maximized resources available for activities. Indeed, as a percentage of field expenses, activities accounted for 47% as opposed to 53% for salaries and operations, which was a good ratio given the high operational costs to run 3 offices and maintain 20 local employees.

To streamline management PRADD II designed an internal staff procedures guide based on templates but adapted to Ivorian realities. The project also adapted standard Tetra Tech templates for various forms and management tools for the project's use. In procurement the project also placed emphasis on justification and analysis, and not just blindly following thresholds. To speed up the process but facilitate analysis, all forms were circulated and discussed by e-mail before being printed and physically signed for the archives. This helped streamline purchases and coordination between technical staff, procurement specialists and the project's senior management. Indeed, as noted above PRADD II sought to break the typical wall that exists between technical and operational staff members, helping increase the effectiveness of all.

In terms of transportation, the decision to transfer the two pick-up trucks from PRADD I Liberia to Côte d'Ivoire may not have been the best move in retrospect. It took over a year to clear customs for the used cars and the project had to spend tens of thousands of dollars in upkeep and maintenance. Fortunately the cars remained in workable condition for the entire five years due to rigorous maintenance. PRADD II was lucky in acquiring a third car from another USAID project thanks to coordination with Tetra Tech's other project ProJustice. This third car was a lifesaver and enabled the project to function with minimal costs while the pick-ups were in maintenance, which sometimes lasted several weeks.

As for security, PRADD II was fortunate to not have suffered major incidents, despite two military mutinies in the country and several periods of sustained and sometimes fatal road banditry incidents on routes traveled by project cars. The project designed an internal security plan to assess the situation and

take measures depending on the security level. The project maintained emergency food stocks and had satellite phones and GPS trackers in all cars in case of emergency.

2.5.4 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Accomplishments and Lessons Learned: PRADD II kept tight tabs on finances. As per Tetra Tech policy, senior leadership had to sign off on all expenses and approve all accounting documents. This level of involvement was a burden but necessary and helpful in monitoring and understanding all expenses and identifying problems early. Field and national accounting staff learned and applied accounting procedures and the project was fortunate to not have had any incidents of financial mismanagement. To manage two donor budgets, PRADD II field teams developed a special budget tracker and analysis tool. This allowed the field teams to satisfy home office budgetary management requirements while also allowing sufficient information needed for effective field management of all line items.

A particular challenge was uncertain funding levels from donors. On the EU side, there was less uncertainty except for the period toward the end of 2015 when it was not guaranteed if and how much the second contract would bring in co-funding. The persistent reduction year-by-year in USAID funding, which led to the closure of the Guinea program and nearly led to the closure of the whole project in 2017, also affected Côte d'Ivoire even though the program was ultimately spared the worst. While the senior field management shielded the uncertainties from staff to avoid panic, this was a high-stress period of six months when PRADD II had to manage in two parallel universes: one in which the project was set to close and another when it was set to ramp up activities for a final year. Fortunately, USAID identified enough funding for a final year and avoided what could have been a negative ending for the project. Nevertheless, a key lesson remains the need for consistent and especially predictable funding levels.


Table 20: PRADD II Côte d'Ivoire Activity Expense Summary (2013-2018, including EU)

Sub-activity	Expenses
1.1 Property rights clarification and formalization	\$ 396,434.55
1.2 Land use planning in diamond communities	\$ 236,539.85
1.3 Support to a national rural land policy	\$ 16,102.00
2.1 Capacity building for KPCS compliance	\$ 151,199.96
2.2 Support for ASM governance policy and practice	\$ 48,911.60
3.1 Development of sustainable ASDM supply chain	\$ 179,748.66
3.2 Livelihoods diversification	\$ 452,324.33
3.3 Environment and biodiversity	\$ 123,160.22
4.1 Institutional communication	\$ 24,375.55
4.2 Monitoring & evaluation	\$ 65,707.57
4.3 Gender	\$ 6,250.68
4.4 GIS	\$ 2,406.18
4.5 Work planning and stakeholder consultations	\$ 120,851.91
TOTAL	\$ 1,824,013.06
Total field operation costs including local salaries and wages	\$ 2,295,484.73

2.5.5 EU-USAID PARTNERSHIP

Accomplishments and Lessons Learned: PRADD II was the first project with co-funding from the European Commission and USAID. The unique arrangement was particularly beneficial for PRADD II Côte d'Ivoire where the FOCDI is coordinated by the EU and the EU is a major actor in both land tenure and increasingly in mining governance in the country. Being co-funded by the EU helped streamline the relationship with FOCDI via the EU Delegation. The monthly US-EU phone calls were also useful exercises in coordination especially on issues where EU support was needed, such as when the EU presided the KP Working Group on Monitoring. The multiple contracts created an administrative and accounting burden in terms of cost management and separation, but the PRADD II field team found this manageable. Compared to USAID, the EU had less of an active role in technical management of the project, and the team in charge of the contract never visited the project sites. However, the EU Delegation did visit Séguéla along with several ambassadors in 2017, and provided local support and oversight. All in all, in a field where there are an increasing number of donors working on the same issues, the PRADD II model of complete integration of funds and technical management into one project could be appropriate for other circumstances, especially when one donor is willing to let the other take the technical lead. In instances where both donors have distinct priorities and need to maintain management autonomy, it may make more sense to have separate projects that then coordinate closely on work-planning, such as what PRADD II did with the GIZ-implemented EU-funded MRU regional harmonization project.

Figure 14: Map of Guinea with Forécariah Site



3.0 GUINEA

3.1 ACTIVITY I: CLARIFICATION OF LAND AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

Summary of Technical Approach

At the outset of the PRADD II Guinea project, USAID accepted the project's proposition to carry out in-depth participatory diagnostics in Banankoro and Forécariah before deciding on a definitive project site. The participatory diagnostics revealed that long-established customary land tenure regimes, especially in Forécariah, were surprisingly robust. Contrary to initial expectations, all the alluvial plains in Forécariah were at the time held under customary regimes that appeared strong and dynamic. Initially, PRADD II feared that speculative land pressures linked to the expected construction of a port in Forécariah might lead to large-scale land acquisitions. The studies instead showed that the Ministry of Mines and Geology (MMG) was a source of major tensions in the diamond mining communities because of its insistence that diamond mining claims be allocated, for a fee, without evidence that diamond deposits were under the ground. Indeed, the ministry had introduced the parceling system to fulfill the conditions of the KPCS, but without considering the surface rights of customary landowners.

At the start of the PRADD II Guinea project, the MMG showed more interest in receiving donor assistance for preparation of projections of diamond production yields, issuance of mining licenses, and reporting production statistics than in strengthening surface rights of customary landowners. Most officials from the ministry were reluctant to discuss clarification and security of surface rights, even though both the Mining Code and the Land Code protect customary surface rights holders. Therefore, the alternate option for PRADD II was to address the tenure issues through the new National Service for Rural Land Resources (RLRS) of the Ministry of Agriculture to support securing surface rights for customary landowners. At the time, the national service was preparing to launch a series of activities to promote land tenure formalization and security in the rural area and to improve the legal and policy framework of rural land tenure. The project worked to design most of its sub-activities for this component to strengthen the RLRS and support clarifying and securing customary land tenure rights.

Conclusions and Lessons Learned

The PRADD II project made it possible to measure the Government of Guinea's (GOG) commitment to support a process of land tenure security in rural areas. To the surprise of the PRADD II team and USAID, many ministerial entities were interested in starting a land tenure reform dialogue yet lacked the knowledge base to develop a policy reform roadmap. Through a series of mini-training programs, PRADD II Guinea built up considerable momentum toward building support for new policy measures to support landowners' rights in rural areas. Putting in place the foundations of good governance was expected to generate internal reforms of the legal and institutional framework of the land sector, especially in ASDM areas.

The premature closing of PRADD II Guinea dashed these promising initiatives. Tetra Tech received a "Notice of Partial Termination for Convenience" from USAID Washington on April 22, 2016 requesting that the PRADD II Guinea program stop all project activities immediately and prepare for full closure of the program by May 31, 2016. The reason for the premature closure was a reduction in funding for PRADD II and was not linked with project performance. USAID decided to concentrate remaining resources on maintaining PRADD Côte d'Ivoire (which is co-funded by the EU) at sufficient levels of funding.

Sustainability and Follow-up Recommendations

The land administration entities of Guinea have tremendous shortcomings, especially because of the lack of skilled and energetic staff to address the short and medium policy reforms much needed to avert a major national land tenure crisis. Building the capacity of these entities through various formats of training sessions, coordination and communication, and creation of an enabling environment to foster policy reforms was seen as a key contribution of USAID technical assistance before the project closed in Guinea prematurely.

If USAID or other donors ever enter into this land tenure domain again, the PRADD II team encourages the GOG to review relevant mandates to reduce overlaps in ministerial roles; rejuvenate the ministerial units in charge of the land sector with better trained staff; implement existing provisions of the existing Land Code and Mining Code, but draft supporting regulatory decrees; and at the same time draft a new Rural Land Code and supporting regulations. These are no small tasks. Perhaps the most important recommendation is to work with universities in Guinea to design new curricula in land tenure and resource governance, for without a new generation of young, dynamic, and engaged leaders, land tenure policy reforms will be stymied and rest upon a legacy of early Guinean socialist regimes.

3.1.1 SUB-ACTIVITY 1: BUILD CAPACITY ON LAND TENURE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

Rationale for Approach and Activity: when PRADD II reached out to different partners to gather their view to develop the project, it turned out that the importance of capacity building could not be overstated. Building from past experience, PRADD II launched a capacity-building program through a training workshop covering land tenure and property rights concepts and case studies, similar to short courses carried out in Liberia and elsewhere through the previous Property Rights and Resource Governance Program (PRRGP) by Tetra Tech for the USAID Land Tenure Division.

The original plan for was that the PRADD II Senior Technical Advisor/Manager, Dr. Mark Freudenberger, would work with the national consultant to design and carry out the training program. But due to the Ebola outbreak, Dr. Freudenberger was not able to travel to Guinea to lead this process. The PRADD II Land Tenure and Governance Specialist worked with the national consultant to design the training program and facilitate its implementation.

3.1.2 SUB-ACTIVITY 2: FORMALIZE CUSTOMARY SURFACE RIGHTS

Rationale for Approach and Activity: Although Guinea promulgated a Land Code in 1992, the implementing decrees for this code have yet to be completed (particularly those related to procedures for recognizing and formalizing customary rights in rural areas). Under this Code, the only way that landowners can formalize their property is through registering rights through the land registry (Article 9 of the Code)—a process that is complex, cumbersome, and expensive for rural communities. Recognizing that the Land Code is extremely technical, with a strong urban bias, the state issued a land policy directive for rural areas in May 2001. At the launch of the



Figure 15: LTPR Workshop, Conakry, March 2016.



Figure 16: Members of Camara Family in Khoboto which received their papers for their land security engaging in the process

PRADD II project, the RLRS unit was trying to design and field test some mechanisms for formalizing customary tenure holdings in rural areas. In view of this government initiative, PRADD II decided to work through the Ministry of Agriculture Land Reform Program to set up a policy dialog platform (including stakeholders from various GOG entities) to launch and promote national discussions on ways to improve rural land tenure security. Through this platform, PRADD II aimed to work with stakeholders to facilitate the design of appropriate steps and mechanisms to formalize customary rights.

3.1.3 SUB-ACTIVITY 3: IDENTIFY RESOURCE-BASED CONFLICTS AND PROMOTE ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Photo by S. Diello



Figure 17: A Judge from Forécariah is handing over conflict management tool kits to Peace Committee members

Rationale for Approach and Activity: The PRADD II Guinea project carried out in-depth participatory research using PRA/RRA in two case study sites. Since the Forécariah and Banankoro areas were not well documented in the development literature, the applied research was needed to learn about local realities. The case studies revealed that the existing and potential resource conflicts were linked to the multiple uses of natural resources, or failure to respect customary property boundaries. Conflicts over natural resources did not seem to be particularly intense as customary landowners managed them amicably. In Forécariah, it appeared that the social organization in this area was still based on respect for the traditional

authorities, despite the potential for conflict caused by shifting populations and the proximity of diamond mining to agricultural activities. Based on the preliminary results, PRADD II then conducted an in-depth diagnostic in the pilot sites to cover types of conflicts, their origins, their intensity, existing mechanisms for their resolution, the institutions that resolve conflicts, as well as the strength and weaknesses of the existing mechanisms and institutions for conflict resolution. This research was also linked to the USAID Evaluation, Research, and Communication (ERC) project, which designed and partially carried out an impact evaluation with PRADD II's assistance that came to roughly the same conclusion, but through quantitative research methods and in-depth empirical analysis.

Summary of Accomplishments and Lessons Learned for Activity I

Sub-Activities	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Build capacity on land tenure and property rights	The PRADD II Guinea project designed and carried out a series of mini-land tenure courses on land concepts: Legal and Institutional Framework of Land in Guinea; Technical Tools for Land Management; Customary Land Rights in Guinea; Land Conflicts; Rural Land and Agro-Sylvo-Pastoral Activities in Guinea; Rural Land and Mining in Guinea; Initiation to the PRA/RRA research methodology, and presentation of the USAID Matrix on the identification of possible actions to clarify and recognize land rights. Over the course of the two-and-a-half-year project, 42 people from the national (various ministries in Conakry) and regional public administration (Kindia, Forécariah, Banankoro, and Macenta) and CSOs were trained. At Woula, 28 family representatives received a simplified pilot	The land administration institutions at all levels in Guinea lack capacity to deal with the increasingly severe land conflicts emerging throughout the country. For this reason, USAID asked PRADD II to begin training key decision makers in land tenure realities and policy options. Unfortunately, the lack of clear mandates between line ministries made it difficult to bring about

Sub-Activities	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
	<p>course in rural land issues. This course sparked interest in tenure security in Forécariah. Communities reached out to the project for technical support to secure their various territories, especially where artisanal diamond mining was occurring. Land disputes and the steps to secure land rights were discussed extensively.</p>	<p>significant changes in policy, legal, and regulatory framework of the land sector.</p>
<p>Formalize customary surface rights</p>	<p>Due to the lack of coordination and communication among line ministries on land tenure issues and because of the complexity of the issues, the project found it important to design and implant a national dialogue to promote communication among various stakeholders, harmonize opinions on land tenure security, explore steps to formalize customary rights, and strengthen the capacity of the public administration. Three fora were held, and a series of topics were developed and discussed:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>Forum 1</u>: a) knowledge of the fundamentals of rural land tenure in Guinea: history and lessons learned; b) rural land ownership in the decentralization policy in Guinea; and c) customary land rights in Guinea and differences by natural region. - <u>Forum 2</u>: a) rural land security tools; b) rural land security constraints: Forécariah case study; c) mapping of the six Forécariah sites; and d) land security tools in urban areas. - <u>Forum 3</u>: a) the issue of women's rights and access to land resources in rural areas, and b) forestry and exploitation of mineral resources in Guinea. <p>In the Forécariah District of Khoboto, support was provided to the Camara clan to obtain official documents to secure an old diamond mining site. The project facilitated public consultation to confirm ownership, a signing ceremony by the beneficiaries and local authorities, and issuance of the certificate of property and the Prefecture Decision of Award. Thanks to the success of this process, the Prefect and his staff agreed to support the project's land tenure security process, and became familiar with all the stages, and helped lighten the load of the land court in the communities.</p>	<p>Fostering communication, coordination, and dialogue among line ministries is a key in improving the policy, legal, and regulatory framework of land sector.</p> <p>Land security in Forécariah is highly sensitive. Communities have little to no information on rural land rights. Steps to securing rights are complex, even though the process resides with the communities. All levels of government are very slow to process claims.</p> <p>Developing simplified steps to address tenure insecurity is fundamental to take into consideration cost, time and complexity of the process.</p> <p>Diversity of customary rights systems requires diversity of mechanisms to address the issues.</p>
<p>Identify resource-based conflicts and promote alternative</p>	<p>The PRA/RRA conducted at the start of the project in both Banankoro and Forécariah provided baseline information on existing conflicts and resolution mechanisms as well as recommendations to strengthen the institutions in charge of conflict</p>	<p>Land conflicts are very sensitive and not always easy to resolve with the Peace Committees.</p> <p>It takes time to build</p>

Sub-Activities	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
mechanisms of conflict resolution	resolutions. The project developed a conflict management strategy, as well as training to field agents, community liaisons, and young experts of the MMG. It worked with communities to set up four Peace Committees and trained these Peace Committees on the following modules: conflict management, customary conflict resolution mechanisms, socio-professional conflict resolution mechanisms, conflict prevention, and the management of conflict prevention tools. The project provided conflict management tools kits to the peace committees. Each kit included notebooks, stamps, inks, pens, rulers and conflict resolution sheets. Peace Committees solved two conflicts following the training they received.	trust with the communities, especially when it comes to land matter, given the history of changes in the land tenure system in Guinea. Some communities still have an in-built mistrust of the central government. In Kouria and Khoboto for example, communities avoided reaching out to the Peace Committees because they considered the use of a record keeping book and a stamp as symbol of the state justice system.

3.2 ACTIVITY 2: STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE AND INTERNAL CONTROLS

Summary of Technical Approach

At the outset of the PRADD II Guinea program, the team recognized from previous experience under PRADD I that the MMG lacked the capacity and resources to ensure the control and monitoring of diamonds from the mining site to the export point via the *Bureau National d'Expertise* (BNE). When diamonds were discovered in the region around 2011 and 2012, ministry staff were posted to monitor diamond production, but this team left soon after due to lack of support from the central government. At the start of PRADD II, the ministry had no field staff deployed to Forécariah to monitor artisanal diamond mining per KP Certification requirements. In light of these realities, USAID directed PRADD II to launch the project to pilot test new approaches and methodologies for tracking diamond production and diversifying the local economies, and then to scale up the approach to other parts of the country. The activities described below were to strengthen the governance of the sub-surface resources.

Conclusions and Lessons Learned

PRADD II supported the MMG with an ambitious project over two years, which included testing approaches to demarcate an area dedicated exclusively for artisanal diamond mining; increasing the presence of the state mining services in Forécariah; mapping out diamond deposits with the technical support of the USGS; generating geological data; and providing training, equipment, and materials to the regional office. Despite this support, the working relationships with the ministry, especially the National Directorate of Mines, remained contentious throughout. The Directorate staff never fully learned how to work with donor-funded programs. Staff long experienced with working with mining companies assumed that the same types of protocol agreements, payment schemes, and other support would be offered by USAID to the ministry. Without a fully engaged USAID mission to provide countervailing institutional support, PRADD II Guinea fended off aggressive attacks, often quite personal, on the Chief of Party and Project Manager. Senior staff simply expected pay-offs and personal gifts as given habitually by the private mining sector seeking contracts in Guinea.

Sustainability and Follow-up Recommendations

The premature closure of the PRADD II project in Guinea deeply affected what was otherwise a promising project. Even though the relations at the national level were at times quite contentious, the MMG was receiving enough technical assistance to largely leave the field activities alone. The reconstruction of the Forécariah office was greatly appreciated and seen as a “bijou” or a jewel in the hat of the ministry. Despite the successful implementation of village-level economic diversification activities, tensions nevertheless remained over the deployment of three young professional geological specialists needed to carry out field activities with and by the ministry. As is often the case, the ministry did not have the financial means to hire a new generation of young and dynamic staff, and thus, the burden of covering the recurrent costs of this new cadre fell on the PRADD II project. This pointed out the painful reality that the KPCS recurrent costs are high for tracing and recording the flow of diamonds, and unless an improved cost recovery mechanism is put in place by the BNE, there will never be sufficient labor to monitor diamond production. In the end, the early closing of PRADD II Guinea left enormous gaps in resource governance and internal controls.




Photo by A. Sow

Figure 18: Training of Young Professionals in Diamond Valuation

3.2.1 SUB-ACTIVITY 1: CONFIRM THE SIX SELECTED SITES FOR PRADD II INTERVENTION IN FORÉCARIAH

Rationale for Approach and Activity: At the start of the PRADD II project in Forécariah, it was known that diamond mining was taking place on alluvial plains throughout the district. But, the details of

Box 1: PRADD II Intervention Sites in Guinea - Forécariah District around Lowland “Basfonds” sites

1. Gberedabon
2. Safoulén
3. Kansixoure
4. Siratoumany
5. Khoboto
6. Woula (Khaliya)

how the extractive economy worked were not known. Initial diagnostics showed that artisanal miners move from one site to another depending on their good luck in locating diamond deposits. Without access to accurate geological surveys, artisanal diamond miners were facing a hit-or-miss situation for they could not predict with any degree of certainty the location of future finds. In coordination with the MMG, six sites (Box 1) were selected as pilot to implement, with the USGS, test methodologies in diamond exploration using unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flyovers and pit sampling with handheld augers.

3.2.2 SUB-ACTIVITY 2: DEMARCATÉ RESERVED ZONES FOR ARTISANAL AND SMALL-SCALE DIAMOND MINING




Figure 19: The high mountain of Dakhayire--Kofio Guyabounyi. Photo on left, demarcation team resting on the edge of mountain; Photo on right, quadcopter taking pictures over diamond mining areas.

Rationale for Approach and Activities: After diamonds were discovered in Forécariah by artisanal miners by using indigenous knowledge in 2011-2012, the GOG decided, at the launch of the PRADD II project, to demarcate the entire watershed of Forécariah as a reserved zone for artisanal and small-scale diamond mining (ASDM) to better control the access to and management of the mining sites. At the macro level, the government planned to protect sub-surface rights to the entire zone uniquely for artisanal miners, and then, within the zone, distribute mining plots inside the demarcated area. Based on this need, PRADD II worked with the MMG to design and provide appropriate technical and logistical assistance to MMG through the ASM Division to demarcate and geo-reference the entire proposed zone of Forécariah that the GOG planned to classify as having ASDM potential. Plans were also made to gather the socioeconomic data of the site to allow the Director of Mines to draft and submit a Ministerial Arrêté to the minister for signature to set up the “Artisanal Mining Zone.”


3.2.3 SUB-ACTIVITY 3: SUPPORT USGS MAPPING, SURVEY, AND MODELING ACTIVITIES

Rationale for Approach and Activities: At the launch of the PRADD II project, the GOG requested support from the project to conduct research to map out the diamond potential in Forécariah to orient future parceling of ASM operations on sites bearing diamond deposits. The MMG confirmed that there was no up-to-date geological data on diamond deposits. During various PRADD field diagnostics, miners repeatedly expressed their frustrations about investing labor for digging in assigned plots with no evidence that diamond deposits were to be found. Without knowing the diamond mining potential of these sites, miners had become deeply frustrated with the intransigence of the MMG. To respond to this request, PRADD II and the USGS agreed to support the MMG in conducting mapping and geological surveys to gather information on diamond production potential in the Forécariah ASDM zone. To do this, USGS used a UAV mini-helicopter with a digital camera to conduct an aerial photographic survey of key diamond mining sites in Forécariah. This activity was supplemented by very high-resolution satellite imagery provided by USGS. The data was analyzed by USGS to produce high quality topographical maps and estimation of the locations of diamond deposits generated from sample plots. Parallel to the aerial photography activity, USGS, PRADD II, and MMG designed a geological survey methodology that was fully implemented. The methodology was later used in Côte d'Ivoire following the closure of the PRADD II project in Guinea.



3.2.4 SUB-ACTIVITY 4: ESTABLISH A DATABASE FOR THE SIX SELECTED PRADD II SITES

Rationale for Approach and Activities: When PRADD II was launched, the MMG did not have any baseline data on mining in the Forécariah artisanal mining zone. During the PRADD II field diagnostic in March 2014, the research team could not find any background socioeconomic information on diamond mining in the Forécariah area. Following the site selection, the project agreed with the MMG to carry out participatory mapping of the six sites to document land cover, customary tenure regimes, and socioeconomic activities of each mining site. The participatory map would serve as basis to geo-reference the six mining sites and



collect baseline information. This information would be analyzed to produce a profile of each of the six ASDM sites.

3.2.5 SUB-ACTIVITY 5: BUILD CAPACITY OF MINISTRY OF MINES AND GEOLOGY TO ADMINISTER AND MONITOR DIAMOND PRODUCTION

Rationale for Approach and Activities: The initial PRA/RRA conducted by the project revealed that the MMG lacks the human resource capacity in Forécariah to administer the parceling process it undertook, and to control and monitor diamond production. In late 2013, the ASM Division demarcated 103 parcels, using a Conakry-based technical team. In Forécariah, only the Prefecture Director of Mines and two volunteers monitor ASM activities. During the PRADD II first annual work planning session in February 2014, it was recommended that PRADD provide support to MMG with equipment and to strengthen its presence in the artisanal mining sites to control and monitor production.



3.2.6 SUB-ACTIVITY 6: IMPROVE ASM INFORMATION MANAGEMENT WITH THE MINISTRY OF MINES AND GEOLOGY

Rationale for Approach and Activities: Following a thorough assessment of the artisanal mining data collection and management system at the MMG, it became obvious that there was an urgent need to address issues related to the security and transparency of the ASM license data, including how it is physically stored and managed. Production data had long been transmitted from up-country to Conakry through the taxi-brousse drivers. Paper copies of the data were piled at a corner outside of the building; and there were no systematic record keeping in place. Based on this diagnostic,

Box 2: Steps for Improving Information Management Systems for ASM

1. Improve archiving system of ASM licenses and records
2. Set up a digital repository for ASM authorization
3. Set up a ASM portal
4. Promote mobile technology use

four steps (Box 2) were designed and implemented to improve the ASM information management system.

3.2.7 SUB-ACTIVITY 7: SUPPORT REINVIGORATION OF THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS PERMANENT SECRETARIAT

Rationale for Approach and Activities: The Kimberley Process Permanent Secretariat (KPPS) is a weak institution with no budget and insufficient human resources. There are several National Directorates (i.e., Mines, BNE, Anti-Fraud, Customs) created by presidential decrees to work with the Permanent Secretariat to ensure compliance with the KPCS. Each directorate operates independently, with little coordination with other agencies involved in monitoring the chain of custody. The KP review committee of March 2014 concluded during the mission that the KPPS did not have oversight over any of the other directorates' members of the KP National Committee. Indeed, there are no regular communications or meetings taking place between stakeholders working with the KPPS. The team also noted that KP Focal Points were not knowledgeable of certification procedures. To address these issues, PRADD II agreed with the MMG to design activities to foster collaboration and communication among KP entities and strengthen the capacity of the officials.

Summary of Accomplishments and Lessons Learned for Activity 2

Sub-activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Confirm the six selected sites for PRADD II intervention in Forécariah	Based on the initial PRA/RRA conducted at the start of the project, the MMG and the project confirmed six ASM sites (Gberedabon, Kansixouré, Khoboto, Safoulen, Siratoumany, and Woula) in Forécariah for project intervention. Based on this confirmation, the communities' representatives of Bassia (for the Gberedabon and Safoulen sites), Kourouya (for the Kansixouré site), Khoboto (for the Khoboto site), Feindoumodia (for Safoulén and Gbomilo sites), and Woula (Woula site) signed agreements with PRADD II for implementation of the project.	Working with the government officials, the diamond sector and the CSO to involve representatives of the communities in the site selection process was very beneficial to the success of the project.
Demarcate reserved zones for artisanal and small-scale diamond mining	Supported the MMG to complete the demarcation of the boundaries of the 983-km ² area dedicated to artisanal diamond mining in Forécariah. This task was conducted based on the background maps and information provided by the MMG. The joint team (MMG, PRADD II) located geographic coordinates of 22 specific points, and set up physical markers made of cement blocks to delineate the boundaries of the site. The project then developed a map based on GPS coordinates taken during the demarcation process. Supported the Directorate of Mines to draft and submit an Arrêté to the Minister for signature to set up the "Artisanal Mining Zone."	The "Artisanal Mining Zone" was created after signature by the MMG. This concept was replicated later as a policy recommendation for PRADD II in the Central African Republic.
Support USGS mapping, survey, and modeling activities	A team from USGS with the support of PRADD II conducted aerial photography of seven mine sites in Forécariah by a mini helicopter called "UAV2-DJI Phantom" and trained the PRADD Guinea GIS Specialist on use of this device. This step was the first phase of developing the resource model expected end result of	The main challenge encountered with the geological modeling of diamonds is the publication of the results. The early

Sub-activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
	<p>this activity. Under USGS guidance, a joint PRADD II and MMG team completed the drilling of ninety-four (94) holes covering 13 transects to collect geological data. All of the data was summarized in a series of reports and sent to the USGS team in the USA. Because of the Ebola outbreak in Guinea, the USGS team was not able to travel to Guinea to supervise implementation of this activity. USGS used the aerial information and geological survey data collected to produce a digital elevation model, topographic map, and UAV imagery site map.</p>	<p>closure of the project did not allow PRADD II to fully train people in use of the collected data. In addition, USGS found that the UAV technology is a great tool, but it takes an enormous amount of data processing to use the technology adequately. On the other hand, the simple handheld augers were very popular and saved miners considerable work in test pit digging and the associated environmental impacts.</p>
<p>Establish a database for the six selected PRADD II sites</p>	<p>The PRADD II team completed data collection (socioeconomic, demographic and tenure data) for each of the six sites but could not complete the process. Given the sensitivity surrounding land tenure rights issues, the MMG advised that this activity be put on hold until the modeling of diamond deposits was completed.</p>	<p>Recognizing and securing customary surface land rights by government officials used to central state command and control takes time and requires arduous negotiation despite the recommendations of the legal framework protecting these rights.</p>
<p>Build capacity of Ministry of Mines and Geology to administer and monitor diamond production and marketing</p>	<p>The project entirely refurbished and equipped an old building in Forécariah for the regional Director of the MMG to use as office space. Twenty-four (24) regional staff of the MMG based in Forécariah and Banankoro received both theoretical and practical training on geo-referencing of ASM parcels. The project provided office supplies (i.e., printers, scanners, GPS units, Samsung Galaxy e-tablets and computers) to the MMG regional offices in Banankoro and Forécariah; as well as diamond valuations tools (i.e., scales, loop, tweezers, flashlights, boxing papers, and wax) to the BNE. Three young professionals (mine engineer, geologist, and chemical engineer) designated by the MMG received a series of trainings and deployed to Forécariah with support from PRADD II to work with the project on various aspects and to monitor diamond production. The project provided monthly stipends to these young professionals as pilot experience to cover additional expenses in the</p>	<p>The inability of the MMG to hire and deploy young staff and provide necessary materials and financial support to monitor production in the field is a major concern for the future of the KP in Guinea.</p>

Sub-activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
	field. One hundred and sixty-one (161) parcels were geo-referenced in Forécariah and Banankoro. In agreement with the MMG, a community liaison was designated for each of the sites and provided with necessary skills to provide support to the young professional of the MMG in monitoring diamond production.	
Improve ASM information management with the Ministry of Mines and Geology	Completed an assessment of the existing diamond production information management system at the DNM of the MMG. Developed a roadmap to improve the physical archive system of the DNM and set up an electronic database for the ASM division to collect and manage production data, licenses and statistics. Refurbished and equipped a room (with shelves, drawers, archive boxes, computers, scanners, a server and its accessories, and a software for electronic data management) within the DNM to host the physical archive and the database system. Provided training to staff in charge of the database and equipped them with Samsung Galaxy e-tablets containing the ePORT program to collect production data in the field and to transmit the data through the internet in Conakry. Set up, tested, and readjusted the database, provided secured internet system. Designed and conducted a proper physical archiving system of all of the paper copies of the existing files. Scanned all of the existing documents and those that were coming in on licenses and production. Developed a backup data system to make sure that data is being backed up simultaneously to prevent unfortunate situations. Developed an app to allow the ministry to transfer data directly from the field to the database. Furthermore, the app ensures the migration of the data from the ePORT system to the VDoc system, and the expansion of the use of the database to BNE, the KP, and the <i>Brigade Anti-Fraude</i> (BAF).	Promotion of a transparent information management system for diamonds requires political will and appropriate institutional capacity. The database was up and running very well until the ministry decided to conduct a major refurbishment of the entire building of the National Directorate of Mines. During the office renovation, the wiring of the database room was improperly pulled out, computers and other equipment were either damaged or stolen, and the remaining equipment was improperly stored. Following the completion of the renovation, PRADD II offered to re-install the entire database. Despite all of the email exchanges and communication that took place between Tetra Tech and the Director of Mines, no room was set aside to host the remaining equipment and allow the consultant to re-install the equipment. Funds from the PRADD II regional account were

Sub-activity	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
		used to hire a consultant to do this work. A sustainability plan is important to cover recurrent costs such as internet access.
Support the re-invigoration of the Kimberley Process Secretariat	<p>Initiated a dialogue among KP members (i.e., Directorate of Mines, BNE, Anti-fraud Brigade, KP Secretariat, Customs, the Central Bank, the <i>Centre du commerce international pour le développement</i> (CECIDE), the <i>Union nationale des diamantaires et orpailleurs</i> (UNADOR), and the <i>Confédération nationale des diamantaires et orpailleurs de Guinée</i> (CONADOG). Detailed discussions were held around the issues that characterize the current internal control system, such as lack of geological research; limited presence of the government in the mining zones; lack of appropriate information gathering and management systems from the pit to the evaluation table; roles and responsibilities of each institution (limited coordination between the actors of the chain); and preliminary suggestions and recommendations to address issues of the current system. The discussions were rich and participatory, though a bit tense at some points between the production and the marketing teams.</p> <p>A KP review mission team was sent to Guinea to review the performance of the KPPS. A lot of sensitive comments were made to detail the underperformance of the KP and its Secretariat. The Guinea KP institutional members reviewed the report, sent back comments and responses to the KP review team. Because of the time it took to receive the KP review report, the reshuffling of the Guinea government, and the decision by USAID to halt the project, this activity like many others was not completed.</p>	Working with different high-level officials of the government who do not report to each other is challenging. Vested interest of high-level officials is an impediment to promoting transparency and accountability to monitor the production and marketing of diamonds.


Statistics of Diamond Production and Marketing

Since the start of the production registration system using tablets in March 2014, the project has recorded the following data: 6135 stones were registered for a total weight of 4378.31 carats. The following tables describe the statistics by production area:

Total Diamond Production Recorded Through E-Port

Type of Stones	Number of stones		Weight in Carats		Total	
	Banankoro	Forécariah	Banankoro	Forécariah	Stones	Weight
Jewelry	540	2011	1263,68	547,51	2551	1811,19
Industrial	3079	461	1556,31	207,69	3540	1764
Boart	25	19	795,33	8,4	44	803,73
Total	3644	2491	3615,32	763,6	6135	4378,92

Diamond Production Recorded Through E-Port



Distribution of Diamond Production per Site in Forécariah Prefecture

Sites	Jewlery		Industrial		Boart		Total	
	Number of stones	Weight in carats	Number of stones	Weight in carats	Number of stones	Weight in carats	Number of stones	Weight in carats
Other 1	182	54,55	23	5,88	0	0	205	60,43
Bokariah	12	2,82	3	1,42	0	0	15	4,24
Gbérédabon	218	68,95	14	9,37	0	0	232	78,32
Kansixoure	19	4,48	0	0	0	0	19	4,48
Khoboto	128	29,2	3	0,71	3	0	134	29,91
Moussayah	4	2,14	1	0,32	0	0	5	2,46
Safoulen	91	23,99	9	1,59	1	0,8	101	26,38
Woula	430	144,2	21	13,2	1	1,03	452	158,43
Other 2	927	217,18	387	175,2	14	6,57	1328	398,95
Total	2011	547,51	461	207,69	19	8,4	2491	763,6

Distribution of Production at PRADD II Intervention Sites

Sites	Jewelry		Industrial		Boart		Total	
	Number of stones	Weight in carats	Number of stones	Weight in carats	Number of stones	Weight in carats	Number of stones	Weight in carats
Gbérédabon	218	68,95	14	9,37	0	0	232	78,32
Kansixoure	19	4,48	0	0	0	0	19	4,48
Khoboto	128	29,2	3	0,71	3	0	134	29,91
Moussayah	4	2,14	1	0,32	0	0	5	2,46
Safoulen	91	23,99	9	1,59	1	0,8	101	26,38
Woula	430	144,2	21	13,2	1	1,03	452	158,43
Total	890	272,96	48	25,19	5	1,83	943	299,98

Global Production of Artisanal Diamond in Guinea Recorded by the DNM

Years	Jan	Feb	March	April	May	June	July	August	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
2005	49111,51	52123,1	56617,05	43625,15	55970,2	60863,48	65426,17	42521,75	35783,9	30402,12	31206,94	24870,15	548521,52
2006	63847,29	29147,11	46034,12	25967,98	61898,97	68123,13	12219,11	23132,1	37986,64	27132,19	15961,84	62411,77	473862,25
2007	6811,12	46122,17	46863,6	260113,11	127312,24	44127,24	35368,78	45255,73	35063,87	33565,09	76237,37	261882,18	1018722,5
2008	248933,07	228551	424860,4	280930,9	247291	285013,3	277987,5	76011,18	226492,01	525107,09	274110,99	3201,65	3098490,09
2009	53721,04	112000,14	68731,41	78921,74	70524,46	98787,91	67134,61	76964,86	27333,46	10883,01	12652,15	19076,98	696731,77
2010	22180,18	29289,28	36914,99	12230,33	14899,85	44047,15	13610,69	27077,46	9262,95	136434,88	5107,69	23040,81	374096,26
2011	29123,09	82976,57	25009,12	21177,62	29360,46	25671,55	22010,05	29450,13	5017,57	5375,5	12637,21	15976,6	303785,47
2012	25208,38	4503,31	31370,17	38494,96	17474,93	39691,9	8339,42	17043,72	6775,06	40696,53	23044,74	14156,89	266800,01
2013	28017,47	31111,14	12887,96	27000,01	18413,13	17821,61	7000,45	20972,63	7120,13	8017,51	9013,97	14988,99	202365
2014	24001,12	12713,19	21800,13	11380,79	14324,41	10846,48	10614,13	7221,44	6854,11	13360,06	13794,86	17148,72	164059,44
2015	14214,22	17110,6	5167,96	-	-	-	36492,78	77461,8	17045,41	-	-	-	167492,77
Total	565168,49	645647,61	776256,91	799842,59	657469,65	694993,75	556203,69	443112,8	414735,11	830973,98	473767,76	456754,74	7314927,08

Guinea Diamond Marketing Data Collected from the BNE during PRADD

All of Guinea													
Years	Jan	Feb	March	April	May	June	July	August	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
2014	-	-	-	10788,53	13830,99	10446,81	10095,92	7665,11	6554,11	-	-	-	59381,47
2015	13377,22	16769,49	4533,96				8393,25	5124,26	5113,38	18009,67	13214,53	4239,2	88774,96
2016	13613,72	16579,13	16063,46	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	46256,31

From July 2015, the BNE started providing diamond marketing statistics specific to the area of intervention of PRADD II. The statistics obtained for this purpose are as follows:

Diamond Marketing Data for PRADD Sites Provided by BNE

Forécariah													
Years	Jan	Feb	March	April	May	June	July	August	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
2015	-	-	-	-	-	-	1233,58	2119,84	1979,8	826,63	474,06	1521,88	
2016	53,4	36,5	2126,86	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

3.3 ACTIVITY 3: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ASM COMMUNITIES

Summary of Technical Approach

To support economic development, PRADD II planned to support miners to increase the profitability of the ASDM sector and to diversify local livelihoods. In building on its experience in the Central African Republic and Liberia, the project supported miners and their communities in promoting improved mining techniques to maximize productivity and reduce environmental damages, rehabilitate land, and increase the benefits from marketing of diamonds. PRADD II also provided technical and logistical assistance to miners and their communities for organizational development, financial management, diamond valuation, livelihood diversification, and access to microfinance opportunities.

Conclusions and Lessons Learned

PRADD II support for the organizational development and the promotion of alternative livelihood activities (especially for women) was highly appreciated and well embraced. The success of these activities, the engagement of members of the community-based organizations (CBOs) that were put in place, and the revenues generated by these organizations opened up the door to the project to advocate for the promotion of other complementary initiatives, such as improved mining techniques and land rehabilitation. Providing technical and material support and making sure that communities have an interest in the activities that are being implemented are key to promoting economic development.

Sustainability and Follow-up Recommendations

To limit the straying of artisanal miners into artisanal diamond mining, donors and other partners must support the GOG to carry out in-depth scientific research for the identification of sites potentially rich in diamonds. To facilitate the process of scaling up the improved artisanal diamond mining technique, the GOG should make it a requirement in issuing the mining license to use SMARTER mining techniques to the greatest extent possible while also carrying out information campaigns on the benefit of these techniques.



Photos by M.A. Diallo & A. Conté

Figure 221: Watermelon and peanuts harvested by farmers' organizations.

3.3.1 SUB-ACTIVITY 1: SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN MINING COMMUNITIES

Rationale for Approach and Activities: The PRADD II project learned during the inception phase tenure and artisanal mining diagnostic in Forécariah that artisanal mining is not the first priority for miners in these communities. For example, 80% of the population of Bassia relies primarily on farming. Revenue comes from petty trading, charcoal production, and logging. Diamond mining is a speculative and uncertain economic activity for men as well as women. Most women are involved in small-scale trading and farming. For women, the two highest income-generating activities include petty trading (80% of household revenue) and charcoal production. Diamond mining generates only 30% of household income. During the field diagnostic, local communities placed a priority on requesting support to promote farming and other income-generating activities.

3.3.2 SUB-ACTIVITY 2: PROMOTE IMPROVED MINING TECHNIQUES AND LAND REHABILITATION

Rationale for Approach and Activities: The PRADD II field diagnostics in both Kérouané and Forécariah revealed that open pit mining is the common mining technique practiced by artisanal miners.

Photo by S. Diallo



Figure 22: SMARTER Mining demonstration in Bouramayah

This technique has proven to be inefficient and ineffective in terms of gravel recovery and land rehabilitation. Miners dig random pits and leave big crevasses behind, which then serve as breeding grounds for mosquitoes. In Kérouané, semi-mechanized mining with bulldozers and backhoes has surpassed artisanal mining in almost all of the parceled plots. Local communities complain that land rehabilitation is not taking place, which is affecting the availability of land for agriculture and other activities. It is generally agreed that the amount budgeted (100,000 GNF) by the MMG to conduct rehabilitation is not enough to restore the land. Customary landowners who allocate mining plots to miners do not charge rehabilitation fees or require rehabilitation activities.

They claim that the land will regenerate naturally. PRADD II agreed with the MMG to build upon PRADD I experience in both the Central African Republic and Liberia to work with MMG and provide technical support necessary to design, train local staff, and field test the sustainable mining technique for artisanal miners known as SMARTER bench terracing mining techniques and land rehabilitation in Forécariah.

3.3.3 SUB-ACTIVITY 3: SUPPORT TRAINING IN DIAMOND VALUATION

Rationale for Approach and Activities: Artisanal miners (especially diamond diggers) lack the most basic knowledge about the value of diamonds they dig up and sell. Masters, brokers, collectors, and diamond dealers are making most of the profit from diamond marketing because of their privileged knowledge of the value of the diamonds. Yet, at the national level, most government stakeholders involved in strengthening the internal chain of custody, such as the Anti-Fraud Brigade, ASM Division, and Customs, lack the appropriate background on diamond valuation. To address this weakness, the BNE expressed its availability and interest to use its expertise to work with PRADD II to deliver this training. Secondly, the Gemological Institute of America (GIA) planned to offer high-quality training to diamond valuation specialists in Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire. But because of the Ebola crisis, the GIA training did not take place in Guinea. Only the BNE provided training to junior professionals.

3.3.4 SUB-ACTIVITY 4: EXPLORE ALTERNATIVE FINANCING OPPORTUNITIES

Rationale for Approach and Activities: Artisanal diamond mining is well known in Guinea as an unreliable and speculative livelihood activity that goes through boom and bust cycles. Due to the highly variable nature of the artisanal mining sector, most micro-finance institutions were not willing to provide credit to finance small-scale mining operations. For this reason, most miners rely on self-financing and on personal relationships with other actors within the chain of custody. The government in Guinea had no mechanism in place to provide support to these miners either. The lack of alternative financing constitutes a trap for many actors in the chain who rely on masters and diamond dealers. Thus, PRADD II planned to explore various opportunities and channels for providing loans to artisanal miners and other community micro-level projects.

Table 21: Summary of Accomplishments and Lessons Learned for Activity 3

Sub-activities	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Support the development of internal organizations within mining communities	PRADD II supported the formation of 24 CBOs at the six sites (total members: 719, men: 321, women: 398). It provided training to all on roles and responsibilities; the structuring process; identification, prioritization, and planning of activities to be carried out; process of assembling financing files or carrying out feasibility studies; training of administrative and economic affairs managers; training on the realization of market studies; and cooperative principles and membership services training. In addition, the project provided tools and equipment to undertake various activities. CBOs invested in a variety of activities including farming (i.e., rice, peanut, corn, cassava), harvesting, and marketing of palm oil. These activities generated cash for the CBOs that was then used to meet some organizational needs and to scale up production. Through technical and material support, communities were able to increase their income from the realization and diversification of income-generating activities.	When community members find interest in the support provided by a project, they engage and actively participate in the implementation of activities even in times of major threats. Local products are a potential source of goods and services for community members. In view of the results obtained in the realization of economic activities, the creation of CBOs was a form of competition between the communities
Promote improved mining techniques and land rehabilitation	PRADD II supported the creation of two community-based mining organizations (Limania of Gbérédabon and Kissi Kissi of Kouriah) while procuring and setting up tool banks for these organizations. The project hired an expert from the Central African Republic (Hervé Pounou) to develop a training manual on improved mining techniques known as SMARTER mining, and deliver both a classroom and field demonstration for 35 artisanal miners at one site in Gberedabon. Forty-five other miners were trained to scale up the technique at four sites at Safoulen, Bouramaya, Yenguiakhory and Kourouya. Forty square meters of mined out space were systematically refilled by using the technique. Ninety-five new artisanal miners applied the techniques in diamond mining sites: 15 miners from Kourouyah, 20 from Safoulen, and 60 in Bouroumayah and	Scaling up the bench terracing SMARTER mining techniques will depend on support provided by the project. MMG was not able to carry out this technique on its own accord. The MMG has not yet enforced the requirement of using SMARTER mining on all allocated plots. An administrative decree would be required, but the ministry hesitates to write this until further pilot testing is carried out.

Sub-activities	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
	<p>Yenguiakhry. Additionally, PRADD II supported the village of Fodeyah through the young volunteers, to systematically refill mined out hole on an area of about two (2) hectares. A local agreement was drafted up and signed by the stakeholders, then authenticated and certified by a notary before being distributed to the rights holders.</p>	<p>Men with mining skills are dispersing to other potentially rich areas. This makes it difficult to follow up on their work.</p> <p>The tardiness of the authorities to issue licenses has delayed the parceling by the professionals and thus limited any potential progress on SMARTER mining.</p> <p>Land owners who sell small parcels with few constraints to artisanal miners limits the uptake of SMARTER mining.</p>
<p>Support training in diamond valuation</p>	<p>A plan was developed with the GIA to design a training course, and to send a team with training materials to Guinea to train staff from the MMG, representatives of the diamond industry, and CSOs. But due to the Ebola crisis, this training was cancelled. PRADD II worked with the BNE to design a course and train three young professionals from the Directorate of Mines who were deployed to Forécariah to control and monitor diamond production. These professionals continued registering diamonds in the field and sending information to feed the database in Conakry.</p>	
<p>Leverage alternative financing opportunities</p>	<p>The PRADD Guinea strategy was to strengthen the capacity of local organizations to identify economically profitable activities, conduct feasibility studies of these activities, improve capacity in record keeping and management, and prepare a complete package of administrative dossiers—a pre-requisite for the local organization to be eligible to appear before lending institutions. Following various training programs with these local organizations and feasibility studies supported by the project, some of the organizations started self-financing their own activities (such as the association Limaniya of Khoboto that purchased a dehuller) even before seeking funds from micro-credit institutions. The project also identified some micro-lending institutions in Conakry to introduce to farmers' organizations for the potential collaboration.</p>	<p>A lot of efforts were required to strengthen the organizational and financial management capacity of the CBOs.</p> <p>Assistance included helping each organization obtain official recognition and identify other institutions of financial support. These efforts built a strong foundation for excellent collaboration with the communities in the project intervention sites.</p>

3.4 ACTIVITY 4: PUBLIC AWARENESS AND OUTREACH

Summary of Technical Approach

PRADD II developed and implemented a sophisticated public outreach and communication strategy for both local (proximity communication) and national-level (institutional communication) audiences. The proximity communication was aimed at raising awareness and reaching out to miners and their communities on project activities designed to engage local communities and lead to behavioral changes, such as the use of policies, laws, and regulations to protect and enhance security of tenure to surface and sub-surface resources or adopt improved mining practices. Institutional communication was aimed at not only providing information to the public, government, lawmakers, and CSOs on PRADD II activities in particular, and the ASM sector in general, but also engaging the public to support PRADD II activities.

Conclusions and Lessons Learned

PRADD II developed a comprehensive communication strategy thanks to the expertise of a Burkinabe specialist who travelled to Guinea to work with the team and other stakeholders to develop the strategy. Public awareness and outreach was the backbone of the PRADD II project. Designing and developing a comprehensive outreach and communication strategy was fundamental for project success.

Sustainability and Follow-up Recommendations

The investment of considerable project resources to develop a communications strategy contributed greatly to reducing frustrations in the Forécariah area between the MMG and local communities. Without this strategy, and the subsequent outreach, the community would have resisted the project considerably. Thanks to the communication initiative, PRADD II was able to work in the area throughout the Ebola crisis and with no opposition from the local communities in contrast to international and national public health actors who were deeply mistrusted.

3.4.1 SUB-ACTIVITY 1: DEVELOP A COMMUNICATION AND OUTREACH STRATEGY

Rationale for Approach and Activities: PRADD II carried out diagnostics at the outset of work in Forécariah. This revealed that miners were ill-informed about the Mining Law, Land Law, and KPCS. Several miners expressed their anger at having been ignored by the government during the development of the new Mining Code. At the same time, it turned out that the ministry did not have a communication strategy enabling it to get information out to the mining sector and receive appropriate feedback. In view of this situation, the PRADD II project engaged the services of the Burkinabe communications expert to create a communications strategy for the project.

3.4.2 SUB-ACTIVITY 2: DEVELOP LOCAL COMMUNICATION AND OUTREACH CAMPAIGNS

Rationale for Approach and Activities: As noted above, the MMG had no mechanism for proximity communication on artisanal and small-scale diamond mining. Outreach by the ministry to the diamond sector was abysmally poor. The parceling process in Forécariah, for example, was not preceded or followed by any awareness-raising activity. Possibly as a result, technicians from MMG were confronted with refusal by some local landowners to allow the parceling of their sites. To address this weakness, based on the communication strategy, the project first



Figure 22: Training Session on the KP

developed a set of messages and tools to present the project to the rural communities and other stakeholders in the Forécariah Prefecture; and second, it developed messages and tools around thematic activities of the project, roles, and responsibilities of MMG junior professionals as well as various tools in conflict resolution.

3.4.3 SUB-ACTIVITY 3: SUPPORT NATIONAL COMMUNICATION ON ARTISANAL AND SMALL-SCALE MINING SECTOR

Rationale for Approach and Activities: To ensure effective communication between the PRADD II project and its partners and to make its information resources available to the public, the project developed an institutional communication mechanism, integrated into the overall communication strategy and implemented through different channels (i.e., written press, TV/radio, and website). The aim was to promote greater reporting and information sharing on PRADD II. Support was provided to the MMG communication's unit for the improvement of its environmental magazine, in which information on relevant ASM-related topics was published.

Table 30: Summary of Accomplishments and Lessons Learned for Activity 4

Sub-activities	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Develop a communication and outreach strategy	PRADD II hired a regional expert to design a participatory process and develop a communication strategy. Sixty-two actors at different levels took part in three meetings (held in Conakry and Forécariah), to identify and prioritize the communication problems observed at the national and local levels to design the tools, approaches, and media programs relevant to better convey messages around parceling, diamond production, diamond registration, diamond marketing, land security, and conflict management. Tools and messages were developed based on the activities of the project at both local and national levels. Communication channels used included radio discussions, TV spots, roundtable discussions, community meetings, newspaper articles, and trainings.	The success of the implementation of the project's communication strategy remained highly dependent on the Ebola crisis, particularly in Forécariah. The persistence of cases of contamination of the disease in the project intervention area had negative impacts on the deployment of the communication strategy in some localities.
Develop local communication and outreach campaigns	Communication campaigns (through town hall meetings, focus group discussions, media programs, and field visits) were conducted on the following themes for different stakeholders. Topics included: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Aerial mapping of the ASM sites by the USGS team; - Awareness on the delimitation of the large zone dedicated to ASM; - Awareness campaign for 35 miners on smarter mining and land rehabilitation; - Awareness campaign on conflict resolution and land tenure security; - Awareness campaign on geological survey; and - Sensitization meetings with 150 miners on the KP. 	The prevailing illiteracy in the small-scale diamond sector is very high. This increases project challenges in training, communication and outreach activities.
Support national	Several activities were carried out at the national level including high-level meeting with state actors, media	Personal vested interest by national civil servants

Sub-activities	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
communication on artisanal and small-scale mining sector	<p>coverage (radio and TV), workshops and training sessions, press publication, production and dissemination of a quarterly newsletter. The project specifically facilitated the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Preparation of three news articles on ASM and publication in the magazine MININFO of the MMG; - Technical support to the MMG for the development of its communication strategy; - Production of a video documentary on SMARTER mining techniques; - Establishment of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for collaboration with the Mines Commission of the National Assembly but due to the premature closure of the project, none of the planned activities were undertaken with members of the parliament. 	<p>can prevent the successful implementation of a communication strategy, no matter the participatory approach it was designed upon. Despite their significant involvement in the development of the project's communication strategy, the staff of the MMG did not regularly translate in action their willingness to improve their relationships with communities and miners, as recommended by the strategy.</p>

3.5 ACTIVITY 5: ECOLOGICAL REGENERATION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION – BIODIVERSITY EARMARK FUNDS

Summary of Technical Approach

The PRADD II project received a small supplemental add-on of biodiversity earmark funds. Since the USAID/E3 Office of Forestry and Biodiversity conducts an annual compliance review for all programs to ensure that each activity proposed meets the requirements of the USAID Biodiversity Code, PRADD II designed and reported separately on this important initiative. For the use of this special fund, PRADD selected the Kounounkan forest reserve within the Forécariah watershed. This watershed includes a chain of mountains dominating the upper reaches of the watershed and riparian gallery forests below the escarpment. This mountainous massif is dissected into several steep-sided plateaus. The communities in these sites rely heavily on the resources of this area for subsistence farming, livestock grazing, and alluvial mining. The USGS reported that the alluvial diamond deposits underneath the lower reaches of this landscape are derived from volcanic erosion from this high chain of mountains. According to Birdlife International, in the village of Moussaya, the Kounounkan Forest Reserve sits on the Devonian sandstone, rising to 1,094 meters above the coastal plain. Local informants indicate that the president designated the forest in 1994 as classified natural reserve. Since the landscape appeared to be biologically interesting as an island of high biodiversity, PRADD II planned to undertake biodiversity conservation activities following a community derived roadmap divided into three phases: 1) assessment of the threats to biodiversity in diamond mining areas of Forécariah, 2) development of a strategy for biodiversity conservation, and 3) implementation of the strategy.

Conclusions and Lessons Learned

Of the three steps planned to complete this activity, PRADD was able to fully complete only the first two as the project was prematurely closed. A Biodiversity Specialist was hired to lead implementation of the strategy, but his support was limited to the demarcation of the boundaries of the forest and the

drafting of a final report, given the early project close-out. The two PRA/RRAs sessions carried out documented well the threats to biodiversity conservation and clearly showed that the regional authorities in Forécariah were heavily involved in the depletion of the forest resources. Therefore, it was very difficult and challenging at the startup of the project to gain full cooperation from these authorities and develop a strategy to address the threat. With limited funding and no certainty of new tranches for the following years to come, promoting environmental protection and biological conservation was seen as especially complex in an area where communities are very poor and rely on slash-and-burn farming, logging, hunting, charcoal production, and artisanal diamond mining.

Sustainability and Follow-up Recommendations

The Kounounkan forest reserve is part of the upper Guinea Forest reserve that stretches all the way to Central Africa. Its vegetation is mainly old-growth (more than 150 years), secondary, closed canopy, semi-evergreen rainforest, mostly confined to the ravines. The area covers 5,032 hectares and is considered an important bird area (134 species identified). Non-bird species include the primates *Cecopithecus diana* (monkeys) and *Pan troglodytes* (common chimpanzees). Experience has proven that it is difficult to promote biodiversity conservation in areas of extreme poverty. Should there be any donor interested in addressing biodiversity threats in the area, PRADD II recommends strongly that this could be done only through developing an integrated approach that considers not only the conservation of biological species but also promotes sustainable use and management of forest resources by communities in and around the forest reserve.

Table 2: Summary of Accomplishments and Lessons Learned for Activity 5

Sub-activities	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Assess threat to biological diversity conservation	<p>PRADD II collaboration with the Regional Director of the Environment in Forécariah led to two PRA/RRAs to assess the threat to biodiversity in and around the Kounounkan Forest Reserve and suggest recommendations to address the threat.</p> <p>At the close of PRADD II Guinea, the Director of the Environment of Forécariah and some of his staff members were imprisoned for a short time for their nefarious activities threatening the future of the forest. The decision came from the President's office when the Minister of Environment personally briefed the President on the illegal logging that was taking place in Kounounkan based on the findings of the PRA/RRAs while a Presidential moratorium on commercial logging was in effect nationwide.</p>	<p>The assessments confirmed the lack of institutional support to allow the conservationist and his team to do their jobs. Field research showed that the Director of Environment of Forécariah and some of his staff were deeply involved in activities leading to the depletion of this forest.</p>
Develop strategy to implement recommendations from PRA/RRA sessions	<p>PRADD II worked in close collaboration with the Regional Director and his staff to develop a theory of change related to the evolution of biodiversity in the Kounounkan Forest Reserve, identified strategic actions, developed an annual work plan, and indicators for this activity. The project hired a biodiversity specialist who took over the leadership for this component. A final report including the work plan was drafted and shared with the Minister of Environment and Forest. A</p>	<p>PRADD II was the first project ever to support conservation of the Kounounkan Forest. Any future work to support the conservation of this forest will need to be well thought out and</p>

Sub-activities	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
	MOU of collaboration was established with the Ministry of Environment to implement the work plan.	started on a small scale.
Implement the work plan	The premature closure of the project did not allow full implementation of the work plan. However, given the high interest attached to the activity, PRADD II decided with the concurrence of USAID to complete the physical boundary demarcation and notation of GPS references. The Biodiversity Specialist carried out this work into June after closeout of the project, generated a report, and provided an overview to the Ministry of Environment and Forests.	PRADD II was not able to follow up on this important activity following the unfortunate closing of the project.

3.6 ACTIVITY 6: CROSSCUTTING ACTIVITIES

3.6.1 SUB-ACTIVITY 1: SUPPORT ADD-ONS AND COLLABORATION

Rationale for Approach and Activities: One of the reasons PRADD II selected Forécariah as a project intervention site was due to the previous mapping and geological work carried out by the USGS intended to evaluate diamond deposits and production potential. With the arrival of the PRADD II project, USGS continued the mapping and geological research to generate needed data needed to identify future diamond claim plots. The methodology developed by the USGS team led by Pete Chirico was replicated with success by PRADD II in Côte d'Ivoire.




Photo by PRADD II

Figure 23: Mapping Artisanal Diamond Mining sites with the UAV in Forécariah

3.6.2 SUB-ACTIVITY 2: SUPPORT GENDER STRATEGY

Rationale for Approach and Activities: The notion of gender was little known in general by people in charge of implementing development projects and programs in Guinea. Stakeholders at every level needed to be trained in gender awareness for project implementation. To meet this training need, PRADD II hired a regional Gender Specialist to design and mainstream gender into the planning and implementation of field activities. The Gender Specialist was scheduled to travel to Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea in 2014, but was unable to reach Guinea due to the Ebola outbreak. She worked remotely with the PRADD II M&E Coordinator to outline and develop the first draft of the gender strategy for Guinea. Progress was made in preparing this document, but it was never fully completed. In the end, the female M&E Coordinator ensured gender considerations were integrated in all field activities.

3.6.3 SUB-ACTIVITY 3: CONDUCT MONITORING, EVALUATION, AND LEARNING

Rationale for Approach and Activities: The PRADD II project hired a part-time regional M&E Specialist for both Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire to work with national M&E Coordinators in each of the two countries, helping to develop the project PMP. The PRADD II project introduced the ePORT technology for data collection and management. During the first year, the home office trained the

regional M&E Specialist. She, in turn, trained the M&E Coordinators of Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire. PRADD II procured e-tablets and appropriate software (ePORT) for the field agents and the MMG junior professionals deployed in the field to collect production data. All were trained the technology. The ePORT technology was used across the board to collect data on licenses, mining claims, and diamond production. During the second year, refresher training was held in the field for both field agents and the young professionals to better use the technology to collect data.

Summary of Accomplishments for Activity 6, Crosscutting Activities

Sub-activities	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Support add-ons and collaboration	Working with the USGS, PRADD II requested and obtained authorization from the GOG to import a UAV for mapping. This led to mapping seven mining sites with a UAV. Then 95 holes were drilled using handheld augers. All data were collated, geo-referenced, and sent to USGS for processing. USGS prepared a digital elevation model, topographic maps, and a UAV imagery site map.	The technical assistance from USGS was invaluable. The methodology developed in Guinea was replicated in Côte d'Ivoire.
	Collaborated with Cloudburst on the USAID ERC project to design and implement an in-depth baseline assessment for impact evaluation of the project at the startup of the project in Forécariah.	Good coordination and communication between PRADD II and Cloudburst made this activity a successful case study.
Support gender strategy	For many of the economic development programs, the project emphasized the role women play in communities. At the field meetings and other activities women were well represented. Women outnumbered men as members of CBOs supported by the project to undertake farming and other activities. Women's organizations benefited funds to help buy rice-milling machines and produce palm oil. No comprehensive training for project staff on gender issues or the development of a manual was completed. During the first PRA/RRA training, a PowerPoint presentation prepared remotely by the consultant gender specialist was delivered as an introduction to the technical team.	Despite the absence of a gender strategy document, mainstreaming gender across most of PRADD activities during the work planning sessions contributed to a great level to the engagement of members of the communities.
Conduct monitoring, evaluation, and learning	The project used the ePORT technology with handheld e-tablets to collect all data that needed to be collected by the team. All project technical staff and three young professionals were trained in the use of the technology.	The Focal Point model was replicated in the PRADD II Central African Republic project.

3.7 OPERATIONS AND STAFFING

3.7.1 PERSONNEL AND STAFFING

Accomplishments and Lessons Learned: The PRADD II Guinea team comprised 17 staff including both technical and administrative personnel. The Country Director was responsible for the overall management of both technical experts and administrative support staff. He represented Tetra Tech and served as liaison to USAID Guinea and to the GOG.

Following the approval of the staffing plan by USAID and Tetra Tech, the project enjoyed staff stability during its two-and-a-half-year presence. Only two staff left the project for personal reasons. The Land Tenure and Governance Specialist left the project to pursue graduate studies in Europe. A replacement was quickly sought and brought on board, first as consultant, then as an employee. Country Director, Bocar Thiam, left the project in early 2016 to join his family in Europe. His replacement, Andrew Thriscutt, was brought on board for the remainder of the project after a short period of overlap with Bocar Thiam.

MMG designated a Liaison to join the project team as their representative. The National Directorate of Mines requested that this Liaison be hired by the project as regular employee with monthly salary and other benefits provided by Tetra Tech. This demand was not accepted by the project to the displeasure of the ministry. This impacted the working relationships between the project and the ministry negatively throughout the entire life of the project. In the end, PRADD II provided a monthly allowance for transportation and per diem for field travel. Despite this middle ground solution, the ministry continued to insist on its original request. As a result of this tension, a MOU between the project and the ministry was never signed.

When USAID made the surprise decision to prematurely close the project for convenience, Tetra Tech and the project management team worked together to notify the staff and develop the close-out plan in conformity with USAID, Tetra Tech, and the GOG policies and procedures. The close-out plan included the payment of the severance packages to local personnel, demobilization of the Country Director, drafting and submission of all of the remaining deliverables, and disposition of all of the furniture and equipment. This plan was then approved by USAID and implemented by Tetra Tech.

Although recruitment of top candidates to fill both technical and administration/finance took time, the PRADD II Guinea management team was fortunate to identify and select good candidates to fill all the positions. The team (both technical and administrative support) was divided into two—one team based at the project main office in Conakry, and the second based at the project field office in Forécariah. At the field office, the team was composed of one field site coordinator, three field agents (based in the villages), and a driver. Having a permanent presence in the villages contributed greatly to the quick acceptance of the project by local communities and to the continuous collaboration with the project, even during the Ebola crisis. The following table include the names and positions of all staff hired during the project lifetime.

Guinea Staffing List

No.	Names	Position
1	Bocar Thiam	Country Director (Oct 2013—Jan 2016)
2	Andrew Thriscutt	Country Director (Feb 2016—Mar 2016)
3	Keletigui S. Camara	Director of Administration
4	Marlyatou Bah	Monitoring and Evaluation Coordinator
5	Aissatou Bobo Bah	Director of Finances
6	Saa Pascal Tenguiano	LTPR Coordinator
7	Abdourahamane Sow	GIS Coordinator
8	Souleymane Diallo	Communication Coordinator

No.	Names	Position
9	Mata Kann	Operational Assistant
10	Abdoulaye Conté	Livelihood Coordinator
11	Boubacar Sow	Biodiversity Specialist
12	Djeinabou K. Barry	Field Site Coordinator
13	Mamadou Adama Mara	Field agent based in Bassiah
14	Fatoumata Mansaré	Field agent based in Forécariah
15	Mamadou Aliou Diallo	Field agent based in Feindoumodia
16	Elhadj Mahmoudou Sano	Liaison Ministry of Mining and Geology
17	Telly Sock	Driver
18	Oumar Cissoko	Driver—Forécariah


3.7.2 GENERAL ADMINISTRATION

Accomplishments and Lessons Learned: Under the leadership of the Country Director and support from the home office, the Director of Administration prepared and implemented all the administrative policies and procedures described in the Manual of Procedures. PRADD II Guinea was audited internally and evaluated by Tetra Tech’s senior auditor as one of the top ten well-run projects in the company.

3.7.3 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Accomplishments and Lessons Learned: Because of the professionalism of the Director of Finance, PRADD II’s financial management was very smooth. The Director of Finance quickly learned how to use QuickBooks, the financial management system set up by Tetra Tech. No financial irregularities occurred during the project, due to the strong management team.

Map of Central African Republic



4.0 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

4.1 ACTIVITY I: PROVIDE INSTITUTIONAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE CENTRAL AFRICAN AUTHORITIES INVOLVED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS

Summary of Technical Approach

The PRADD II program in the Central African Republic was designed to reestablish the functionality of the KPCS diamond traceability after the crisis of 2013-2015 and the special conditions of the Kimberley Process Operational (OP) Framework. The PRADD II Country Director from Côte d'Ivoire played a key role in the negotiation of the Operational Framework, a set of conditionalities structuring the lifting of diamond exports from compliant zones in the southwestern part of the country.

The Operational Framework defined compliant zones as under “appropriate and sufficient CAR Government control, in particular by the territorial administration, mining administration, USAF, gendarmerie and police.” In addition, the compliant zone should show “no evidence of systematic rebel-based or armed group activity impacting internal controls in the diamond production or trade” and that, “the overall security situation enables free movement of goods and Persons.” The OP spelled out many other requirements which structured the type of technical assistance proffered by the PRADD II project. For instance, every six months, reports generated by the Kimberley Process Secretariat Focal Point would need to report out on the geographical coordinates of mining areas within compliant zones, compile statistics in digital files to include the following: number of authorized supply chain actors, production levels in mining sites in compliant zones, sales in compliant zones, transfers of diamonds from compliant zones, purchase of diamonds by buying houses from all zones and buying house stockpiles. Of particular importance to PRADD II, the OP required that the “transfer of diamonds to Bangui out of compliant zones occurs after regional mining authorities register and verify special sales slips for compliant zones. Digital photographs are taken of all diamonds in parcels. Diamonds are transferred to Bangui in tamper-resistant bags along with original documentation under USAF escort.”⁶

The PRADD II team was asked to carry out an assessment of opportunities to contribute to the implementation of the Operational Framework while also promoting social cohesion in the war torn southwestern part of the country. A mission was carried out to identify ways to help the Ministry of Mines and Geology rebuild the Division of Mines and the Kimberley Process Permanent Secretariat (KPPS). Following this initial diagnostic, the PRADD II team convened a work planning conclave in Kribi, Cameroon in January, 2016 with the principle ministerial actors to plan out the details of a two-



Figure 23: State Department and USAID delegation visit to a Berberati area artisanal diamond mining site. Looking for diamonds.

Photo by Mark Freudenberger

⁶ The Kimberley Operational Framework: https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/system/files/documents/administrative_decision_annex_on_operational_framework_for_resumption_of_car_diamond_exports.pdf ; The Administrative Decision on Resumption of Exports of Rough Diamonds from the Central African Republic: https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/system/files/documents/administrative_decision_and_annex_on_resumption_of_exports_from_the_central_african_republic.pdf

component program focused on reestablishing the legal chain of custody but also put in place a program of social cohesion designed to restore peace and stability in diamond mining areas. The week-long planning session included the Cabinet Director and the Director General of the Ministry of Mines and Geology, the head of the Kimberley Process Permanent Secretary, three PRADD II consultants engaged for the project, and the Project Manager.

From the outset, PRADD II was conceived as a very limited set of interventions designed to reestablish the functions of the Kimberley Process Secretariat and assist the Ministry of Mines to become more functional in the compliant zones. Since so little was known about how the civil strife had affected the diamond mining economy, the project placed a priority on carrying out a series of diagnostics throughout the southwestern part of the country. From this, actions would be designed to address the structural issues, whatever they turned out to be, which appeared to undermine social cohesion and peace in the compliant zones.

Conclusions and Lessons Learned

The PRADD II CAR project carried out a series of diagnostics led by Component II coordinator Dr. Zéphirin Mogba. The studies showed that the artisanal diamond economy of southwestern Central African Republic remains largely the same structure as previous to the crisis of 2013-2015 but with some significant exceptions. The pyramid of extraction and exploitation remains largely the same as reported 30 years ago (Freudenberger, Mogba) but with the exception that the principle Muslim traders (collecteurs) fled the country during the crisis, though some have cautiously returned. Others have remained in Cameroon along the borders and are involved in a flourishing diamond smuggling trade. The PRADD II diagnostics describe in considerable detail the changes in the economy and the impacts of the crisis.



Figure 24: Focal Point trainer of artisanal diamond miners in Berberati area.

Photo by Prosper Yaka Maïdè

By the time of the end of the PRADD II project in September, 2018 the legal exports through the Kimberley Process requirements had dropped off precipitously despite significant improvements in the speed and accuracy of diamond exports through the last point of control, the BECDOR. Reasons for this drop-off are not yet clear. The official view is that Buying Houses are confronting major delays, up to two months, in transferring significant sums to their banks in Bangui due to increasingly stiff money laundering investigations. An alternative version holds that artisanal diamond producers and collectors prefer to sell diamonds outside of the KPCS framework because of ease in selling diamonds to collectors who take them across the porous border to sell in the neighboring countries of Cameroon and Chad. In effect, artisanal miners and collectors prefer to sell through the parallel illegal market chain because bribes to government officials (regional mining officials, USAF mining police, locally elected officials) are much higher than if sold to shopkeepers and traders who pay cash on the spot and quickly evacuate the product through neighboring countries and on to hidden buyers in the Middle East and southeast Asia. These fraudulent trade networks and the principle actors are well known and are the subject of the UN Group of Experts investigations.

The artisanal diamond production sphere of production continues to operate in a highly segmented way. Four categories of actors now exist in the sector;

- 1) Informal and intermittent Diamond Diggers: Family operations whereby the resident of a village may decide to dig intermittently on his or her own land. A diamond might have been found by chance, and, trying their luck, the family may dig, perhaps find something of value, and sell as fast as possible through collectors or shopkeepers.

- 2) **Pseudo-Commercial Diggers:** Artisanal diamond miners (artisan miners) register themselves with the regional mining authorities, obtain the necessary *patent* and purchase a Production Notebook. The diggers may hire workers, who themselves, are to purchase a Workers Card with photo. All production is to be noted in a Production Notebook and sales slips are to be obtained from the Ministry of Mines regional or prefectorial representatives. These pit owners obtain financing from a variety of sources, but generally, the “collecteurs” who themselves are either linked with legitimate sources of funding from international actors or various nefarious ones.
- 3) **Cooperatives:** The diamond cooperatives registered with the Ministry of Mines and Geology carry out extensive diamond mining operations. Cooperatives are legally positioned to obtain financing directly from international sources and may export as well through BECDOR. Over the course of the past two years, the cooperatives have become a front for international investors, primarily Chinese companies, to obtain access to diamond mining areas. From these footholds, some companies have brought in heavy equipment and even workers, to carry out operations, actions which are illegal under the law. Cooperatives have also been set up by politicians and government functionaries to carry out operations as well.

The structural problems that have long haunted the diamond mining sector continue unabated and indeed are reinforced thanks to the uncertain institutional climate in the southwest. While state presence has returned to much of the southwest through the reestablishment of regional diamond mining offices, these offices are severely understaffed and underequipped. The renewed presence of the state has only deepened the extractive tendencies of government officials who use the law and regulations to extract personal benefits from various elements of the value chain. Predation by government agents undermines trust by community members in the state. Racketeering is well documented, yet there are no mechanisms for illegal extraction to be addressed in any systematic way.

By the end of PRADD II, the team had become discouraged with the enormity of the challenges confronting the Kimberley Process traceability system. The primary challenge continues to be the collection of diamond production data at the point of extraction. Diamond pit owners are hesitant to record high value diamonds in their production notebooks because this information is used by the authorities to exact pay offs and kickbacks. PRADD II introduced various measures to improve the collection, recording, and transmission of data but ultimately, each of these measures were largely undermined by decision makers.

Political Will for Diamond Traceability System: The PRADD II team found that generally the Ministry of Mines cadre, ranging from the Bangui offices to the regional directorates, are not interested nor able to apply the KPCS diamond traceability system.

Racketeering of Diamond Production: Thanks to the PRADD II project, the dynamics of fraud and illegal exports of diamonds across the fluid borders with surrounding countries are very well known, and in some ways, now talked about very openly.

Evolution of the Diamond Economy in the Southwest: The artisanal diamond economy of southwestern Central African Republic maintains largely the same structure as previous to the crisis of 2013-2015 but with some significant exceptions. The pyramid of extraction and exploitation remains largely the same as reported 30 years ago (Freudenberger, Mogba) but with the exception that the principle Muslim traders (collecteurs) fled the country during the crisis, though some have cautiously returned. Others have remained in Cameroon along the borders and are involved in a flourishing diamond smuggling trade. The PRADD II diagnostics describe in considerable detail the changes in the economy and the impacts of the crisis.

By mid-2018 at the time of the PRADD II project, the legal exports through the Kimberley Process requirements had dropped off precipitously despite significant improvements in the speed and accuracy

of diamond exports through the last point of control, the BECDOR. Reasons for this drop-off are not yet clear. The official view is that Buying Houses are confronting major delays, up to two months, in transferring significant sums to their banks in Bangui due to increasingly stiff money laundering investigations. An alternative version holds that artisanal diamond producers and collectors prefer to sell diamonds outside of the KPCS framework because of ease in selling diamonds to collectors who take them across the porous border to sell in the neighboring countries of Cameroon and Chad. In effect, artisanal miners and collectors prefer to sell through the parallel illegal market chain because bribes to government officials (regional mining officials, USAF mining police, locally elected officials) are much higher than if sold to shopkeepers and traders who pay cash on the spot and quickly evacuate the product through neighboring countries and on to hidden buyers in the Middle East and southeast Asia. These fraudulent trade networks and the principle actors are well known and are the subject of the UN Group of Experts investigations.

Buying Houses Moved out of Carnot and Boda: Right after the crisis in 2015 when the embargo on diamond mining was lifted, several Buying Houses returned to set up operations not only in Bangui but also the provincial towns like Carnot and Berberati. Exporting diamonds during the first two years was a slow and difficult process because the Buying Houses and collectors failed to adhere to the various reporting requirements required of the Kimberley Process Monitoring Team. Thanks in large part to PRADD II's involvement, the KPSS and BECDOR improved dramatically export procedures so that now review and approvals through the Monitoring Team only take about 1 week. Despite this, the Buying Houses have stopped for now operations in Berberati and Carnot. Reasons are many, but many argue that international banking restrictions block the ready flow of funds needed to finance diamond extraction.

Costs of KPCS Traceability System High: The PRADD II team introduced revisions to the Production Notebook used to collect data at the mine pit level around gold and diamonds. The structure for the notebooks were also put into an ODK software platform so that data could be collected and transmitted by cell phone. While the platform appropriate, the central constraint turns around the high cost of collecting the data at the diamond mining pits. Costs of travel and transport to thousands of remote diamond mining areas are extremely high. While PRADD II subsidized for two seasons the collection of field data through Kimberley Process Focal Point field agents, these agents are not viewed with favor by the regional mining directorates because even if they are students with geology degrees, they are young and represent threats to the interests of the old guard.

Statistical System for Diamond Monitoring Not yet Effective: The compilation, recording, and analysis of diamond production data, is not yet effective. Diamond Production Notebooks held by the artisanal diamond miners (pit owners) are not filled out correctly, nor completely. Only small diamonds are registered; large diamonds are probably sold illegally.

Data Variables Inappropriate: The Kimberley Monitoring Team needs to focus on the tracing of diamonds from the collectors to the Buying Houses and out of the country through BECDOR. Tracking the officially registered collectors would be much more effective than trying to visit each and every artisanal miner. Collecting and verifying Production Notebooks is an impossible task for a Ministry and KPSS woefully under-resourced.

Kimberley Process Secretariat not Legally Recognized: Despite the efforts by the PRADD II project to help the Ministry of Mines and Geology establish an independent and institutionally strong organization, the fundamental fear from the current minister is over who should have the authority to select staff for this important position. The Minister of Mines and Geology hopes to keep that prerogative in his hands, yet by doing so, the KPSS is not recognized as an entity mandated to receive annual budgetary allocations from the national Treasury. The secretariat receives a small allocation of export taxes from the BECDOR and the net amount is declining due to the dramatic decline in exports.

Artisanal Gold Mining: The PRADD II project built many strong linkages in rural areas. From this experience, it concludes that artisanal gold mining is probably far more lucrative than diamond mining and gold is much easier to smuggle out of the country, use as a currency, and probably to mine. Gold mining seems to play a very key role in the household economy for women appear to do much gold panning. While mining with mercury and cyanide does not yet seem to be prevalent, this needs to be verified. For this reason, in-depth diagnostics are needed to uncover the true realities of the economy. This will be a major focus of the new USAID AMPR project.

Sustainability and Follow-on Recommendations

The PRADD II program was continuously concerned about the long-term sustainability of the US government investments in the country. In light of nearly 10 years of support for the Kimberley Process in the country, an end-of-project internal lessons learned workshop was held which led to the following conclusions.

KPCS Traceability System in Central African Republic not Sustainable: Over the past 10 years of PRADD presence, no system has yet been put in place to cover the recurrent costs of the Kimberley Process traceability system. Tax payments placed on diamond exports at the point of export through BECDOR do not pay for the operating costs of the Kimberley Process Secretariat. The problem only becomes worse as exports fall. Trust in the KPCS monitoring system is very low within the diamond mining sector. The basic problem is that the KPCS monitoring regime implies an administratively functional and honest state, but in CAR, that is largely non-existent. When the bureaucracy is not honest, and in fact, predatory, rural communities resist what they find are shake-downs by government by going around the KPCS system to engage in fraudulent exports through the largely informal, but well-organized marketing systems in neighboring countries. The knee-jerk reaction of ministry officials is to apply the law, strengthen the administrative system by providing more resources (transportation, arms, per diem, and stamp out corrupt officials). Creating an honest state bureaucracy will take time and much depends on political will. Conditions are ripe for corruption to flourish within government. Salaries are low and often unpaid. In a situation at the local level where millions of dollars circulates from the diamond and gold trade, this opens up the door for opportunistic and short-term corrupt behaviors by officials struggling to meet family survival needs.

Institutional Reforms Required in Ministry of Mines and Geology: The transmission of production and commercialization data from the regional directors to the Kimberley Process is still not functional due to internal inefficiencies within the Ministry of Mines and Geology. While PRADD II worked with the ministry to streamline the transmission of data to the secretariat, the central problem is that the data is not housed in any central location and thus made available for statistical analysis. Despite strong advocacy by USAID, the US Embassy, and PRADD II the Geographical Information Management Unit of the ministry lacks a director. While the nomination was made a director, this person ended up being assigned to another part of the country. No action has been taken for months to resolve this problem. Institutional tensions and confusions continue to exist between the role of the regional mining authorities in collecting and compiling production and commercialization data and the role of the Kimberley Process Focal Points.

World Bank Ministry of Mines Sector Reforms Promising: The World Bank Natural Resources Governance Project for the Central African Republic is designed to address many of the structural issues affecting the Ministry of Mines and Geology. Component 3 is designed to improve mining sector policies and institutional governance through a wide range of activities ranging from reforms like: internal structural review, revisions of the Mining Code, support to the Kimberley Process Secretariat, mining data base management, mining cadastre reforms, various training programs, and a Small Grants to support mining cooperatives. This program should go a long way toward addressing concerns raised through the PRADD II program.

European Commission Support Key: The European Union is committed to investing Peace and Stability funds in the artisanal diamond and gold sector. The project documents are being prepared at the time of submission of this final report. PRADD II participated actively in providing background documentation to a design mission.

Chinese Government Contributions: The Chinese government and commercial interests are very active in the mining and petroleum sector in the Central Africa Republic. Following a study tour to China in mid-2018, the outlines of support to the Ministry of Mines and Geology is emerging. Apparently, the Chinese government will invest heavily in developing a detailed mining map for all of CAR. Currently, a Chinese company is building a 4-story office in the compound of the Ministry of Mines. This will resolve a major problem of overcrowding.

Coordination between Projects Key: In light of the many new projects intended to support the Ministry of Mines and Geology, coordination between projects will be essential. The ministry is putting in place a project coordination unit. A draft arrêté is being drawn up at this time. This unit will also be supported by the World Bank project.

The following section spells out in detail the accomplishments and lessons learned around each PRADD II Task associated with Component I in the Central African Republic.

SUB-ACTIVITY 1.1: INSTITUTIONAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS OPERATIONAL

Tasks	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Task 1.1.1: Development and strengthening of institutional and technical capacity of the Geographical Information System Unit of the Ministry of Mines and Geology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Rehabilitated office (painting, ceiling, electricity, air conditioning) Purchased 8 computers and software; Repaired A-O printer purchased under PRADD I Training series on data base management, QGIS and MapSource, Excel, Access, GPS, addressed to KPPS staff and Focal Points (5, 10, 3, 14), Director General technical staff, and trainees Advocated for nomination of Director of GIS Lab, but ministry never seconded. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Despite promises by ministry and pressure from USAID and Embassy, a director never nominated. The Minister of Mines and Geology is well aware of the problem linked to the nominated person seconded to two postes, but through a presidential decree. Issue not resolved yet. After consultation and approval of DG and KPPS, PRADD II gave some GIS lab computers given to direction heads (2 to BECOR; 2 to KPSS; others remain under supervision of the Direction des Données, de la Régulation, et du Suivi de la Commercialisation).
Task 1.1.2: Digitization of historical data on diamond marketing for the period 2006 to 2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Paper records all typed into electronic data base in the computer reserved for the Direction des Données, de la Régulation, et du Suivi de la Commercialisation. Original files now organized and stored in the GIS lab. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Files are not yet placed in watertight filing boxes and cabinets because of extraordinarily high costs. An archive room exists within the Ministry of Mines, but it needs major rehabilitation that could cost thousands of dollars.

Tasks	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Back-up files on hard disks are with the KPPS and the heads of departments (BECDOR, Direction des Données). • PRADD II gave 2 computers to KPPS and downloaded this data onto those computers. • PRADD II trained “stagiaires” or interns in data base management and analysis. • PRADD II installed anti-virus, but updating very difficult because of no ministry access to internet for regular updating. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PRADD II continues to be worried about backups and data security. Backups tend to be personal and not institutionally. Departing staff often erase or keep data. • KPPS now beginning to centralize all data because they need it for KPCS compliance and reporting purposes. • PRADD II hopes that the new World Bank project will implement mandate to set up a centralized and protected data base. An international consultant will be engaged to set up ministry data bases and train staff.
Task 1.1.3: Support the institutionalization of the CAR Permanent Secretariat of the Kimberley Process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PRADD covered costs of a mission by KPPS to Kinshasa KPPS to look at measures to combat illegal diamond trade across borders. • International consultancy with Maurice Miema to put in a process to prepare decrees institutionalizing the KPPS. • Draft decrees prepared and require validation by Conseil de Ministres. Submission not yet carried out by Ministry. • Supported and trained two of KPPS “Focal Points” seconded to Regional Direction of Mines in compliant zones. (5 + 10+3) • PRADD II provided high speed internet services to KPPS to allow for more rapid transmission of data to KPCS Monitoring Team. • 15 GPS, 15 etablets transmitted to KPPS at end of PRADD II with ODKCollect software designed and installed for production and commercialization data collection. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Officially, ministry notes that the slow administrative process of approbation and transmission of a decree to the Conseil de Ministres. But, Ministry is concerned that if a decree issued, the presidency will impose staff not of the ministry liking. Hence, Ministry prefers an Arrêté signed by Ministry, but this has not happened yet. For KPPS to receive annual subsidies from government, it must obtain a Décrêt. But, for now, KPPS only receives tax revenues placed on diamond exports through BECDOR. • During the first year, the KPPS was understaffed and lacked efficacious leadership. The situation has changed considerably with new staff and a new and dynamic general secretary. • World Bank in theory will provide VSAT internet service to the KPPS at PRADD II departure. • PRADD II had long noted that the KPCS designated through the Operational Framework a “Focal Point.” In the end, institutional

Tasks	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
		<p>confusion was created because the Point Focal assumed also the head of the KPPS. The KP Monitoring Team took time to direct all communications with the KPPS and this was not resolved informally until the Antwerp KPCS intersessional in June 2017.</p>
<p>Task 1.1.4: Define a strategy to expand the Compliance Zone in the Eastern part of the Central African Republic</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PRADD II was under high pressure to develop a strategy in collaboration with MINUSCA and the Ministry. The security situation deteriorated greatly as of November, 2017. MINUSCA was to provide helicopter, security, and other assistance, but situation now too unstable. Biria, Bangassou, Dimbi, Sam-Ouandja. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The deteriorating security situation constrained greatly this initiative. USAID asked that PRADD II not invest resources for this activity.
<p>Task 1.1.5: Design and set up a pilot database with new technologies (Smart Phone, e-tablet)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PRADD II CAR traveled to Côte d'Ivoire with Ministry staff Saint-Cyr Nganadora to observe system set up there. PRADD II CAR hired a consultant to help design ODKCollect templates for installation on etablets provided with SIM cards. Files set up to collect data on production, commercialization, collectors. Server set up with electronic address to receive data from the ODK software. (https://stats-mines-appspot.com) Functional at end of PRADD II. Training provided to Focal Points to use software as well as 3 trainees under supervision of the KPPS. Both paper and digital records are needed by the KPCS. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cell phone coverage degraded throughout the two years of PRADD II rather than improve. Some Focal Points and Regional Directors preferred paper trails and not electronic. Even these staff prefer not to use computers even when provided with them. The ODK data system works and the linked paper trail, but no one in the GIS lab mandated by the Ministry to receive, compile, and use this data despite initial interest of the Ministry. Highly trained data base specialist literate in digital technologies needs to be seconded to the GIS center. The central problem remains – without a director of the GIS lab, and no paid staff skilled in using the data base, the system is not yet operational. The KPPS trainees have learned out to use this, but they are not officially mandated to utilize the software. Bit by bit, Orange is expanding

Tasks	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
		<p>cell phone coverage and speed from 2G to 3G in Boda, Carnot, Gazi, and Berberati. Over time, it may be possible to expand the use of ODK based data collection.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> World Bank plans to provide internet service to the 5 Prefectorial Mining Services with solar panels, computers, and internet access. Berberati has already been supported by MINUSCA and now has internet service. .
Task 1.1.6: Define strategies to support Local Monitoring Committees (sub-prefecture level)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PRADD II with the KPPS assistance set up “Comité Locaux and Antennes Locales du SPPK” Mandates defined of promote the Operational Framework of the KPCS at the local levels and to furnish information to the National Monitoring Committee and the Regional Mining Authorities. Identification, nominations and training in roles and responsibilities of 3 Antennes Locales created in sous-prefectures of Berberati (Yamalé, Balego, Nandobo). 16 Comité Locaux created in compliant zones. Comités Locaux resolved very successfully several major conflicts in the diamond sector, such as in Boda a major conflict between a Chinese mining firm, the deputy, and the local community. Same positive outcomes emerging in Yawa (Boganda) between communities and a Russian mining company. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Antennes Locales and Comité Locaux have been very successful in helping the mining authorities and the KPPS to inform all of the Operational Framework and to resolve local level conflicts. Much valuable information provided to the ministry of fraud and corruption at the very local level. These committees represent the civil society interests and provide much important advocacy that national NGO's do not. Pressure from these committees led to the organization of the local dialogues emerging around the Ministry of National Reconciliation Bangui Forum. The high recurrent costs for maintaining the institutional arrangements are high. Committee members need to cover communication costs, meeting costs (transport and per diem), and periodic training. The central problem turns around how to generate the funds needed to cover local costs of committee operations. While these committees are extremely useful, and the regional mining authorities appreciate and

Tasks	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
		respect this structure, the recurrent costs are not budgeted.
Task 1.1.7: Sensitization and Training of Collectors and Artisanal Miners on Procedures and Filling out the required Books (vouchers and production notebook)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PRADD II developed with the ministry a new Production Notebook. Now Production notebooks for Cooperatives, Mining companies, artisans miners • Director General of Mines now responsible for managing notebooks. PRADD II financed the first lot of notebooks to generate funds for re-printing. • PRADD II encouraged ministry to set up official price of notebooks and mandated DG office to manage system. Arrête now in place. Prices now fixed and DG responsible for collecting notebook purchase fees and re-printing. • Government printing office mandated to print off notebooks, which they do well when paid for their services. Numerical codes now in place to monitor each notebook and thus avoid fraud. • PRADD II provided training to regional directions, Focal Points, public posters, radio programs, and training missions by ministry officials. • Production notebooks greatly appreciate new format of notebooks and are prepared to pay. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DG encounters problems in collecting the notebook purchased funds from the regional directions. Funds disappear because cash is used often to pay recurrent office needs. No electronic system yet in place to send funds via cell phones. "Orange Money" could become an effective cash transfer system for the ministry, but not yet in place in all parts of the country. Only Carnot and Berbarati has Orange Money, but improvements will most likely occur very rapidly given public interest. • Collectors and licensed miners often fail to fill out sales slips and record large stones because of fears that USAF will as for "primes". • PRADD II was long frustrated because regional directors illegally sell notebooks at double the price, but pocket the funds. Prices are often doubled and tripled in price. Even though PRADD II prepared posters announcing the official price, this is not followed. Even though the arrêté notes that 20% of sale price is kept by the regional directions and 80% goes back to the DG to print new notebooks, this system is not respected. Even though PRADD II informed DG's office of this practice, the ministry lacks the will to sanction fellow colleagues. In addition no legal text allows the DG to sanction his staff; staff supervision falls under the Ministry Cabinet. The Cabinet lacks the staff capacity to deal with this

Tasks	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
		<p>problem.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Miners hesitate to register and purchase licenses because regional directors often don't provide receipts and thus pocket funds personally. PRADD II hopes that the new World Bank will address this issue as part of the internal institutional reforms needed. The World Bank learned of these issues through intense discussions with the PRADD II team which had neither the mandate nor the funds to look into this difficult issue.
<p>Task 1.1.8: Set up Units within the Directorates and Offices of Mines at the Prefectures to issue ID cards to Artisanal Miners and Diggers</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PRADD II introduced and tested a system to print off miner workers card. The system consists of a small portable printer linked to a digital camera that allows for print off of pictures and an identification card. 5 kits given to the compliant zones Services Prefectoriaux des Mines. Kits are easily made with hardware available in Bangui. This resolved a major problem because regional towns and villages do not have photo printing facilities. Rapid issuance of photo ID cards was perceived as very positive. No arêtee was prepared for the use of these kits, but a policy defined by the DG during a workshop with all regional directors and DG and KPPS and Cabinet. The worker cards are required by the Operational Framework (requirement for photo) for all miner workers and also the Mining Code. Miner workers appreciate the system and demand is very high. Even artisan miners interested in even paying the 2000 CFA for the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regional directors never sent reports about how many mining cards were produced and sold. PRADD II suspects that cards are being printed off, but funds are not being sent back to the Ministry of mines (20% for the DG to buy new kits); 80% would stay in the regions to buy new ink, photo, and pay for small regional office costs. Regional directors are making good money, but the DG has no capacity to collect funds or apply punitive sanctions because of the internal structural inefficiencies. KPPS wishes that these 5 kits be recuperated and given to the Focal Points. The idea is now that the KPPS Focal Points circulating in diamond mining areas sell miner cards, and that the 80% revenue gained goes to finance the internal functioning of the KPPS. This recommendation will require a ministerial arreté. An arreté could originate from the KPPS and thus be signed quite quickly by the present minister.

Tasks	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
	cards. Collectors also willing to purchase on behalf of the workers.	

PRADD II Central African Republic Statistics on Rough Diamond Production and Exports

Period	Diamonds Produced (Carats)	Price per Carat (USD) ^[1]	Diamonds Exported (Carats)
2013		157	125 872.08
2014		0	0
2015		0	0
2016		187	12 641.05
2017		159	59 885.44
2018 Q1		88.5	68 087.71
2018 Q2		110	2 219.84

PRADD II submits these statistics because it is not yet convinced that the production statistics are viable in light of the internal issues raised in this report.

SUB-ACTIVITY 2: DEVELOP DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY AND A SYSTEM FOR MANAGING PRODUCTION AND MARKETING DATA FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS

Tasks	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Task I.2.1: Improve the management of production and marketing data for the Compliant Zones	The Director General of Mines requested that the DPDDA II project could support them by printing at least 500 copies of the new booklet so that it could send them to all compliance areas.	It is important for the Ministry of Mines to find an arrangement with the printing company so that there is no fraud in the making of the documents. It has been found in the past that production books and parallel purchase slips were printed outside the official circuit. The proposals for the improvement of the new booklet is to add the number of the notebook, the observation column, the place of residence, delete the identity column of the site owner and leave the identity of the mining craftsman.


Tasks	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Task 1.2.3: Geo-reference the ASM sites at the Proposed Compliant Zones	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Launched pilot georeferencing in 2016 250 mine chantiers in Berberati geo-referenced with 5 persons over 3 months. • Launched a second georeferencing campaign over six month documenting 2048 chantiers with 10 persons • Carried out a third campaign of 1531 over 25 days with 20 persons. • A total of 3829 chantier have now been visited, georeferenced, and education campaign carried out with the mine workers and pit owners. It is still difficult to estimate accurately how many active diamond mining sites exist I southwest CAR. • USGS furnished maps of the location of their perception of artisanal mining sites. PRADD II found that some “active sites” were simply lateritic plates or abandoned sites. (See Hervé final report) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Co-financing promised by the Minister of Mines for the georeferencing never emerged. The Minister was not informed early enough by his staff to insert a budget request into the Prime Minister’s annual budgeting process. • Local communities turned out to be the most effective mechanism to gather information using participatory mapping and other RRA/PRA techniques. • Local community members could be trained to use GPS and etablets to gather information. • Local Monitoring Committees could play a more important role in managing the georeferencing campaign. • Artisanal miners advocate the issuance of “Certificats de Propriété” for those who are georeferenced. If certificates were issued at the time of georeferencing, the process would become much faster. Diamond miners want these certificates to demonstrate ownership of the mining sites, and for the ministry, this could clarify who owns the sites. • Definitional issues continue to exist between nomenclature of what is measured. The KPPS records the “chantier” (pit or contiguous pits belonging to one owner) at specific geographical point but the USGS monitors a “site” that is a 1 km2 size.

Tasks	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Final costs estimated for the last campaign of georeferencing is about \$35/"chantiers" pits (transport, per diem Focal Points, motorcycle rentals, housing, etc). Since 2016, the average cost is \$26/chantier. Regional and prefectorial mining authorities are mandated to keep monitoring and georeferencing. But, without the financial means and transport (motorcycles), limited numbers of staff confront difficulties in maintaining this foundation. Yet, self-reporting by miners is limited because they fear the arrival of the mining authorities who will fleece them. Ultimately, PRADD II recommends that a system like SODEMI is put in place. Incentives for monitoring and recording these sites will never work unless mining communities benefit from data collection and transmission (ie: receive taxes from first point of sale such as in CDI) for local development needs. Ministerial management of the data collection process will not work because of endemic corruption and lack of staff and finances.
Task 1.2.4: Update the mining cadaster of the Proposed Compliant zones to clarify their impacts on the dynamics of the current artisanal mining	The DG of Mines intended to develop the terms of reference for the creation of mining cadastre. The intention of PRADD II was NOT do carry out a mining cadastre, but to	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PRADD II found that the mining cadastre has long been poorly managed by the ministry. Much conflict exists around the issuance of mining permits which

Tasks	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
	<p>encourage through technical advice the creation of such a system.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID asked that PRADD II not go too far in this area. • PRADD II encouraged the World Bank to take on this dossier, one politically charged and very delicate. 	<p>sometimes are not inserted into the cadastre.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In the end, interests within the Ministry did not want PRADD II to enter into this domain because a true cadastre would have identified a wide range of fraudulent permits. • PRADD II proposes that the mining cadastre include the georeferenced ASM sites of both the present and the precursor project and also in relation to large-scale mining permits that might be superimposed. • PRADD II recommends that provisions in the Mining Code be utilized to create Artisanal Mining Zones. (Zones de Maintien Artisanal). Mining geologists support this view, but the national policy makers want to allocate these areas to semi and industrial operators/investors. • The World Bank is planning to invest \$400,000 to reform the mining cadastre.
<p>Task 1.2.5: Assess the feasibility of establishing decentralized property rights and diamond production registries in Carnot</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intention was to reestablish the PRADD I component of claims registration as was carried out in Boda, Nola, Berberati. The idea was to set up the Certificats de Propriété once again, but link this, as in Côte d'Ivoire, to the incentive of recording diamond production data. • USAID asked that this activity not be carried out because of the high costs and security issues related to visiting these sites and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Despite inserting this idea into the PRADD II work plan in Year I based on discussions in Kribi, the DG at the time and KPPS raised concerns about the community registry. There are concerns about the cost of instituting a decentralized registry and the capacity of the Ministry of Mines and its Regional Directors to maintain. This activity was postponed and then abandoned until a later date. Perhaps the new USAID APMR will pick up this idea.

Tasks	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
	establishing the system.	
Task 1.2.6: Develop a communication strategy on diamonds for peace and for development as advocated by the CAR KP Permanent Secretariat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communication strategy designed during second semester of Year I and implemented throughout the course of the project. • Communication activities occurred in two domains: Institutional communication (directed to ministry and ngo's national and international). Second around outreach and communications with local communities. 	While pieces of the outreach campaign have been developed, they have not been integrated into an overall communication and outreach strategy. PRADD's Communication Specialist was not able to complete the communications strategy due to budget and time constraints.
Task 1.2.7: Organize Information, Education, and Communication campaigns for behavior change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Posters developed and validated for the 2017 communications campaign. These documents encourage artisanal miners to pay their <i>patentes</i> this year, which is a key component of Kimberley Process compliance. Also posters on importance of using production notebooks. • Boite d'Outils developed for training (ie: georeferencing, conflict management, peaceful cohabitation, working in legal conditions, publicity on PRADD II...) • "Radio Nabata" shows (9 months of weekly emissions in Songho through local radios (2 radios local in Berberati and Nola and 1 in Bangui covering Boda as well). • A guide for local animators developed for Focal Points for communication and training in the field. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KAP surveys never carried out because lack of funding and allocation to other activities deemed more critical. Baseline and end line KAP surveys would have been very useful to judge whether the target groups are indeed learning desired information. • Reports from Focal Points described how many miners were trained in the KPCS. Artisanal miners increased purchase of "patentes". In 2017, 1213 patentes were purchased; in 2018 during the first six months, 1968 were purchased, an increase of 30% during the first months alone. • Other evidence of the effectiveness of outreach is that local communities are now reporting on fraudulent mining activities to the Ministry of Mines, and this indeed, is forcing them to intervene in rural areas to investigate cases. • Thanks to the

Tasks	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weekly Updates sent out to key government partners Assistance to the KPPS to communicate their missions and work. Guide developed on the Operational Framework; Guide developed on responsible mining for mining companies (RSE) 	<p>georeferencing, communication campaigns and activities, and the creation of Local Monitoring Committees, PRADD II as well as ministry authorities now know that many diamond mining sites are owned and financed by ministry staff, deputies, and others, clearly illegal as defined by the Mining Code.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Often, the Ministry of Mines and the KPPS did not meet with the PRADD II team to plan and execute communication activities. Until now, it has been difficult to demonstrate the benefits of outreach campaigns.



N.B.: The squares are the locations monitored by USGS and many sites within noted in green as well. The red stars are those places georeferenced by PRADD II with the KPPS Focal Points. The location # 6 could not be visited by PRADD II because of insecurity around Gamboula. The sites near Boda could not be visited because of lack of PRADD funding and the ones south of Carnot are inaccessible even by moto during the early rainy season.

SUB-ACTIVITY 3: TRAIN AND SUPPORT MONITORING COMMITTEES AT THE NATIONAL AND LOCAL LEVELS FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE IN COMPLIANT ZONES

Tasks	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
Task 1.3.1: Identify civil society organizations (national and international) in the compliant zones	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identified national and international NGO's working in Berberati and presented diagnostics Established formal protocol agreement with CDH to support creation of social dialogues in southwestern CAR Established working relations with Mercy Corps, Norwegian Refugee Council, Search for Common Grounds and others to encourage work in diamond mining communities. Assisted CIONGCA to develop a strategy to monitor and report out on governance of mining resources. Assisted some NGOs, like ERRAD, to prepare dossiers for funding of REDD+ initiatives for rehabilitation in diamond mining 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> International NGO's afraid of working in diamond mining zones for reputational and security reasons. National NGO's not familiar with the artisanal diamond sector, but more with the forestry sector. CIONGCA imploded internally with severe leadership issues. Elections held to establish new leadership, but internal divisions remain. EITI not functional at this moment because organizational sanctions against them have not been lifted yet. PRADD II invested considerable in building synergies with the French Agence de Développement to work in diamond mining areas. For political reasons, the French pulled back after much enthusiasm.
Task 1.3.2: Assess progress made by the local and national Monitoring Committees	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assessed the first rendition of the National Monitoring Committee and identified structural ineffectiveness. This led to an arête creating a new National Monitoring committee that became more effective. National Monitoring Committee was mandated to carry out an evaluation of local monitoring committees and antannes local. Not carried out because of project budgetary 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Monitoring Committee structure was imposed on CAR by the KPCS as part of Operational Framework. No budgetary support was ever provided for this structure (ie: missions to the field, secretariat, communications). Private sector not prepared to subsidze the costs of committee operations. Local committees and local antannea are effective, but

Tasks	Accomplishments	Lessons Learned
	constraints. PRADD II received many informal comments and complaints nevertheless.	recurrent costs for training, motivation, and functions are high and require budgetary support.
Task. 1.3.3: In collaboration with civil society organizations, design and deliver training sessions for the diamond industry and the Kimberley Process representatives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Trained CIONGCA members in the KPCS and the Operational Framework • CIONGCA members supported to carry out diamond diagnostics • Established Comités de Paix Locales and Antennes Locales to train in Operational Framework and KPCS exigencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • See above regarding recurrent costs of KP Monitoring Team at national and local levels. • IPIS was encouraged by PRADD II to carry out trainings through CIONGCA

4.2 ACTIVITY II: IDENTIFY AND SUPPORT THE ONGOING EVOLUTION OF THE MINING SECTOR IN COMPLIANT ZONES IN ORDER TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE RESTORATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY

Summary of Technical Approach

At outset of the PRADD II project in the Central African Republic, the team was not certain how to move forward in the social cohesion space. The Ministry of Mines and Geology participants turned reluctantly during the Kribi work planning sessions to this issue because none of them were trained in participatory engagement with rural communities. Unsure of how to move forward, the PRADD II program could do no more at the outset but to learn about the rural realities of the times. During the start-up phase, the country was very much in a humanitarian and immediate post-conflict mode. Security within the country was uncertain. State presence in the southwest was weak to non-existent.

The initial diagnostics of the diamond mining economy in the southwest part of the country focused on the structural changes within the economy. Carried out by the PRADD II consultant Dr. Zéphirin Mogba, these case studies in all the proposed compliant zones highlighted the impacts of the crisis on the artisanal diamond mining economy. Through a mission to the border towns of Cameroon, it became clear that the artisanal diamond mining economy operated throughout the crisis, but that new actors have come into the sector. The major Muslim collectors had moved to Cameroon for safety, but they maintained commercial relations with the diamond pit owners and continued to try to trade with them. By bringing diamonds into Cameroon, these trades would then smuggle them out of the country. Faced with fierce competition from other collectors, often diamond pit owners who “graduated” to



Figure 23: Peace and Reconciliation training session in conflict management facilitated by Component II Coordinator Zéphirin Mogba. June, 2018.

Photo by Régis Ndaket

become collectors, some of the major Muslim operators suffered considerable losses. But, others profited handsomely by the crisis, built up the structure for extensive smuggling out of the country, and continue in this manner to the present. During the diagnostic phase, Dr. Mogba was also seconded to the French INRAM research institute and the Centre pour le Développement Humainitaire to carry out a study on the interface between pastoralism and the diamond sector. This study led to new insights of the complex interactions of different pastoralist groups with the diamond economy. Results were presented to the 2018 World Bank Land and Poverty Conference.

The major achievement for Component II was the creation of an institutional linkage with the Ministry of Humanitarian Action and National Reconciliation. With little interest expressed initially by the Ministry of Mines and Geology, PRADD II found an institutional home for its work on peacebuilding and social cohesion. Thanks to the role that the PRADD II component II coordinator played in the Bangui Forum, inroads with the ministry were created with the intent to help address the 600 or so recommendations for how to address the root causes of the crisis in the Central African Republic.

Through the field work carried out by the PRADD II project, the staff came to view the root causes of the conflict in the Central African Republic as a resource crisis catalyzed by competing interests struggling to gain access to surface and sub-surface resources. The PRADD II technical team concluded that new resource tenure rules, both in the statutory and customary tenure realm, need to be devised to regulate access to these resources by also define new inter-ethnic and religious relations. In effect, the clarification of resource tenure rules is one that requires institutions to define new rules of access, use, and enforcement of natural resources.

Over the two years of PRADD II, a two-phased approach emerged to support one of the key ideals of the Bangui Forum – the creation of “Pacts Locales” or local conventions designed to address the causes of conflicts at the local level. PRADD II worked hand in hand with the chief of staff of the Ministry of Humanitarian Action and National Reconciliation to develop the concept of Local Pacts – a strategy that meshed well with the ministry’s strategy to address conflict in urban and rural areas. The Tetra Tech specialist in conflict management, Jennifer Graham, worked closely with the PRADD II field team and the ministry staff to design conflict management training modules based on successful experiences that had unfolded in Bangui neighborhoods. PRADD II supported the ministry to set up Peace and Reconciliation Committees comprised of highly respected elected members of the local communities. Six communes were selected in the sub-prefecture of Berberati.

First Phase: The first round of communes consisted of Bania, Yamalé and Balégo. The Peace and Reconciliation committee members were trained in conflict management techniques introduced by the project and written up in a training manual. Afterwards, in each of the three communes, a total of four full days was spent at the commune level to thrash out the conventions. The Ministry of Humanitarian Action and National Reconciliation staff were actively involved in this, though initially, PRADD’s component leader Zéphirin Mogba took the lead.

Second phase: The second round of communes consisted of Nandobo, Wapo and Nassolé. This second phase was carried out in mid-September, 2018 just a week before the end of the PRADD II project due to a last minute scramble to find funds after promised financial support from the Centre pour le Développement Humainitaire failed to materialize. The search to reduce costs did lead to innovations by grouping the dialogues of three communes in Berberati town at the same time, but in different locales around the city. In the end, this reduced transport and staff time considerably but also enabled villagers throughout the Berberati prefecture to meet each other and compare notes. The four-day series of meetings



Figure 24: Peace and Reconciliation members at Belego Local Pact dialogue. Belego, Central African Republic on June, 2017.

Photo by Régis Ndjaket

mobilized 218 participants of which 210 came from different social categories and ethnic groups from the three communes and 8 representatives from the communes of Bania, Yamalé and Balégo.

The three community dialogues leading to the signature of Local Conventions expressed many of the same issues as those encountered elsewhere in the Berberati sub-prefecture. Themes focused on the poor governance of natural resources and forestry royalties, the theft of cattle by armed non-conventional forces (Anti-Balaka have apparently stolen 168 cattle but also military and local authorities), the need to return to consensual agreements to encourage the return of refugees and livestock raisers... Community leaders all signed conventions to try to put into place arrangements to live in peace and harmony and respect of social, cultural, and religious differences. As for the mayors of the communes where forest concessions are generating revenue for local development but none is being distributed as in the past, the mayors will organize joint missions to Bangui to meet with the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Water and Forests to review the forestry concession agreements and the receipts destined for local development, but not used for this purpose.

Conclusions and Lessons Learned

Building Institutional Structure for Social Dialogue: The PRADD II project invested considerable resources to assist the Ministry of Humanitarian Action and National Reconciliation develop the capacity to carry out social dialogues outside of Bangui. The creation of Local Peace and Reconciliation Committees outside of Bangui became a flagship initiative of the minister and greatly assisted her staff to become conversant with rural issues. This has served well the ministry as it embarks on a national program to set up truth and reconciliation committees in both urban and rural areas.

Social Cohesion and Peace Building Dialogues Essential: The six social cohesion dialogues leading to signed Local Conventions brought together a mix of state administrative actors and local communities to confront the root causes of the crisis in their communities and to find solutions together. The Ministry of Humanitarian Action and National Reconciliation possessed the authority to bring together these actors, something that projects cannot do. The dialogues exposed deep seated anger of rural communities against the exactions and racketeering of the bureaucratic state.

Concepts of Central African Restorative Justice: The PRADD II team came across many examples throughout the past two years of concrete proposals, but also actions, of communities who, given the authority and mandate through the Peace and Reconciliation, resolved conflicts at the local level. This positive illustration suggests that if local communities are mandated by the state to resolve as much as possible local conflicts, they will design restorative justice approaches based on long-standing traditional African concepts of justice.

Returning Peace and Security, but also State Racketeering: The social cohesion dialogues exposed deep and complex fissures in the relations between rural communities and government officials. The six dialogues all pointed examples of racketeering, theft by government officials of diamonds, cattle, and other rural assets.

Joint Engagement of Ministry of Mines and Geology and Minister of Humanitarian Action and National Reconciliation: The PRADD II project team struggled with creating two-way flows of communication and engagement between the two ministries. Each ministry was caught up with its own institutional priorities. Creating learning opportunities across the ministries was very difficult. Often, discussions were more focused around the size of field missions, the per diem rates, and logistical arrangements. Especially toward the end of the project when finances were tight, the massive decent of teams from both ministries was not possible to support financially, especially when the Ministry of Mines and Geology staff in Bangui seemed to have no clear responsibilities in the local dialogues. This exclusion of the ministry staff caused considerable ruffles that remain to this day.

Sustainability and Follow-on Recommendations

The Component II focus on promoting peace and stability in the Kimberley Process compliant zones generated many lessons. PRADD II was the first, and until now, the only donor funded program to work in conflict ridden diamond mining areas. Thanks to the USAID support, several key observations emerged:

High costs of Promoting Social Dialogue: Promoting social dialogue through bringing the central and regional state institutions in contact with rural communities incurs high administrative and financial costs. PRADD II found that social dialogues cost about \$10 – \$15,000 per dialogue once staff time, conference rental facilities, transport, per diem for government officials from Bangui, and costs of food and lodging for the Peace and Reconciliation members coming into central meeting places from remote parts of a commune. Orchestrating the transfer of funds from the Tetra Tech home office to the field requires an inordinate amount of staff time to assure proper use of funds per standard due diligence precautions. Project administrators must go to the field to assure proper use of funds, monitor attendance sheets, reimburse fuel costs, and track other expenses. Since the economy is largely based on cash transfers, and very little electronic ones, the opportunities of fraud are ever present.

Follow-up after Berberati Dialogues: Thanks to the pioneering efforts by PRADD II with USAID support, other donors are now starting to support the Local Pacts. The French NGO, “Expertise France” proposes to support the scaling-up of the Peace and Reconciliation committees and negotiations of Local Pacts. The MINUSCA and other donors may invest further funding of truth and reconciliation commissions which pick up some of the approaches tested by the Ministry of Humanitarian Action and National Reconciliation with the PRADD II support.

Ministry of Humanitarian Action and National Reconciliation Decentralization: The ministry appears to be poised to send out to the interior of the country staff to set up and run Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commissions. The staff ministry staff introduced to rural complexities by PRADD II will likely use many of the approaches and techniques introduced by PRADD II. Yet, the verdict is out in whether this new donor funded initiative will complement or undermine the strategy to put in place the Peace and Reconciliation Committees and the associated Local Pacts.

International Profile for PRADD II work on Social Cohesion: A joint paper was presented by Mark Freudenberger and Zéphirin Mogba at the World Bank Land and Poverty Conference in 2018 on the field diagnostics and the work carried out in Berberati. Thanks to this publicity, PRADD II discussed with Dr. Leif Brottem of Grinnell College to assist him to carry out further research on pastoralism and the artisanal mining sector through a fellowship with the American Association for the Advancement of Sciences.

The following section spells out in detail the accomplishments and lessons learned around each PRADD II Task associated with Component II in the Central African Republic.

SUB-ACTIVITY I: IDENTIFY AND SUPPORT THE ONGOING EVOLUTION OF THE MINING SECTOR IN COMPLIANT ZONES TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE RESTORATION OF PEACE AND SECURITY

Tasks	Achievements	Lessons Learned
Task 2.1.1: Conduct a diagnostic of the ongoing mining dynamics in the compliant zones	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Initial diagnostics led by component II coordinator Zéphirin Mogba and with the assistance of Ministry of Mines and Geology Workshop held with civil society, ministry, and projects to described 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Diagnostics were vitally important to provide fresh information about impact of 2-year crisis on the diamond sector. Baseline qualitative information subsequently used

Tasks	Achievements	Lessons Learned
	<p>lessons learned and recommended follow-up</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IPIS training held on KPCS and Operational Framework • PRADD II successful shifted much of the dialogue at the US Embassy and USAID from focusing on the conflicts in CAR as a religious issue to a resource and resource tenure conflict. 	<p>in briefings, workshops, papers, etc.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Involvement of Ministry of Mines and Geology helped to open up eyes on realities • Diagnostics set the stage for defining program for Components I and II
Task 2.1.2: Define strategic actions to accompany the evolution of the diamond economy in proposed Compliant and priority zones	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diagnostics led to advocacy of inter-ministerial coordination for joint efforts in diamond mining areas. US Ambassador carried out joint mission with Minister of Mines and Geology and Environment and Minister of Humanitarian Action and National Reconciliation to Berberati. Ambassador strongly advocated collaborative efforts and formal protocol. • Strategy set up to support creation of KPCS required decentralized presence of National Monitoring Committee; strategy to put in place Peace and Reconciliation Committees (CLRP) • Choice of Berberati prefecture to launch initial actions with Ministry of National Reconciliation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PRADD II brought top level ministry officials together to negotiate a protocol. Protocol was long in effect before formal signature. Joint missions to the field of equal representation key concept. • Uneasy relationships of senior and mid-level staff between two ministries. PRADD II lacked mandate and authority to bring top leadership together.
Task 2.1.3: Develop a strategy to leverage support for strategic actions proposed by the PRADD II diagnostic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participated actively in MINUSCA coordination meetings with actors involved in peace and reconciliation • Briefings held with Mercy Corps, Catholic Relief Services, Search for Common Cause, Norwegian Refugee Council, and Centre pour le Développement Humainitaire (CDH). • Collaborated closely with the World Bank to design support to the mining sector. Major recommendations adopted and led to component 3 of World Bank project • Built synergies with the European Union leading to Euro 1.5 million for new programs. • Formal protocol of cooperation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MINUSCA coordination meetings led to no concrete actions but built rapport needed for carrying out missions to the field with USAID and Embassy • Difficult to develop strong synergies because many NGO's feared working in diamond mining communities, lacked a rural presence, and confronted funding constraints. • CDH backed off during final weeks of PRADD II to support financially 3 community dialogues.

Tasks	Achievements	Lessons Learned
	<p>established with CDH; interest with Norwegian Refugee Council but never formalized.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implementation of Bangui Forum principles and consultative practices established with the Ministry of Humanitarian Action and National Reconciliation. Protocol agreement negotiated with Ministry and especially Chief of Staff. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Leveraging paid off with additional funding in line now with World Bank to support reforms in the Ministry of Mines and Geology. But, coordination needed with new funding. Built a case for continued support by USAID to the artisanal mining sector leading to the USAID AMPR procurement.
Task 2.1.4: Train national and local Monitoring Committees in their roles in consolidating peace	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Encouraged Ministry of Mines and Geology to prepare an arrêté to put in place nominated National Monitoring Committee. First rendition did not work; a second nomination set up creating a more dynamic committee. National Monitoring Committee assisted in preparing documentation for 11 additional compliant zone propositions. Out of 11, only 9 deemed illegible. KPSS has not yet submitted to Kimberley Process Monitoring Team. Established in all 5 Compliant Zones Local Monitoring Committees at the sub-prefectural level and Antennae at the mining site level. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PRADD II often the organizational and financial impetus for training in KPCS requirements and Operational Framework meetings. Meetings don't happen unless coffee breaks covered by project or field mission per diem and travel similarly covered. Local Monitoring Committees and especially Local antennae turn out to be extremely valuable mechanism for transmission of data regarding local diamond mining situation. Recurrent costs to keep alive the institutional structure come from PRADD II at this time. No mechanism for KPSS to cover even the smallest operational costs for these committees.
Task 2.1.5: Strengthen social cohesion through Local Conflict Resolution Mechanisms and Community Dialogue	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Set up Peace and Reconciliation committees per the policy and instructions of Ministry of National Reconciliation in 6 communes of Bania, Yamalé, Balégo, Nandobo, Wapo and Nassolé. Training modules in conflict management and resolution designed and validated by Ministry inspired by Bangui experiences. Trainings carried out in 6 communes of Berberati prefecture with Ministry of National 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and National Reconciliation very sensitive about following national policy based on principles of Bangui Forum. PRADD II initiatives first outside of Bangui for the ministry. Staff not interested initially in working in rural areas and in diamond mining areas.

Tasks	Achievements	Lessons Learned
	Reconciliation staff. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 6 Community Dialogues leading to signatures of Local Pacts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Community Dialogues exposed deep seated corruption and racketeering by government officials as well as other predations.
Task 2.1.6: Provide technical support to facilitate the return of collectors to Berberati to stimulate the diamond economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Diagnostic carried out to Cameroonian border towns with Ministry of Mines and Geology. Consultative dialogues with Muslim communities spelled out concerns and conditionalities. Discussions with Ministry of Mines and Geology demonstrated opportunities for encouragement of return. Local Monitoring Committee and Local Antennae demonstrate clearly how Central African redistributive justice can resolve some conflicts between Muslim and Christian communities. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Diagnostics show vividly the differential impact of the recent crisis of on the Muslim community. Circuits of illegal cross-border trade clearly observed and documented for government authorities, civil society, and other national actors. Several conflicts around restitution of property and other reconciliation occurred thanks to the PRADD II approach.

4.1 OPERATIONS AND STAFFING

4.1.1 PERSONNEL AND STAFFING

Over the course of the two years of the project, five full-time consultants were hired to carry out the project. Tetra Tech did not register as a corporate entity in the country because the administrative structure was weakened to such an extent that registration was initially impossible. Following legal advice from a Central African lawyer, the project was advised to hire consultants for the duration of the short project. While a financial administrator was hired locally to run the accounts, Tetra Tech took a much more active home office role than normal.

No.	Names	Position
1	Prosper Yaka Maïde	Country Program Coordinator and Data Base Systems Specialist
2	Hervé Pounou	Institutional Specialist

3	Zéphirin Mogba	Peace Building Specialist
4	Regis Ndaket	Finance and Administration Specialist
5	Arnold Minang	Administrative Assistant
6	Jennifer Graham	Conflict Specialist and Monitoring and Evaluation Coordinator
7	Mark Freudenberg	Project Manager
8	Virginia Spell	Deputy Project Manager

5.0 GENERAL AND REGIONAL SUPPORT TO THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS

5.1 SUMMARY OF TECHNICAL APPROACH

The PRADD II contract foresaw a “regional” component that would consist of general support to the KP. The early PRADD II involvement in the MRU regional approach fit under this regional umbrella. In addition, support for further refining and implementing the Washington Declaration Diagnostic Framework (WDDF) as part of Kimberley Process gatherings was another activity. Finally, the Côte d'Ivoire Country Director participated in the 2015 diagnostic in the Central African Republic which led to the KP Operational Framework and partial suspension lifting. However, the reality was that the PRADD II budget was insufficient for significant investment in this area. Originally this line was meant to finance targeted technical assistance to other KP Participants. However, after the USAID core budget cuts led to the closure of the Guinea, the regional component's activities were for all practical purposes eliminated, especially when the EU funded GIZ to take the lead on the MRU regional approach.

5.2 CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

PRADD II was instrumental in the drafting and adoption of the MRU regional harmonization action plan in Grand Bassam in 2014. Unfortunately, this action plan has remained largely unimplemented. PRADD II conveyed to the regional approach team in 2015 its assessment that the plan required a budget but especially a project management team to bring it to fruition. The manager would need to leverage funding and build coordination among the four countries. PRADD II offered to play this role and drafted an MoU with the Regional Approach technical team to that effect. However, the technical team decided to fund a separate GIZ project that would complement the existing 4-country GRSE project and relationships with the Mano River Union Secretariat. PRADD II participated in the technical discussions about this contract in Sierra Leone in 2015, and expressed hesitation on the GIZ plan to organize the regional harmonization initiative under the auspices of the MRU Secretariat, widely acknowledged as an ineffectual institution. PRADD II also conveyed discontent expressed by the Guinean and Ivoirian KP focal points about the regional approach, mainly, that there was little by the way of concrete actions that

had come from the dozens of meetings held since 2008 on the subject. PRADD II also expressed skepticism when the KP urged the creation of a similar regional approach for the Central African Republic modeled off of the West African experience.

5.3 SUSTAINABILITY AND FOLLOW-ON RECOMMENDATIONS

Regional harmonization and a “regional approach” is excellent and necessary for KP compliance, but the concept must be unpacked and transformed into realistic and workable activities. As noted above in the Côte d’Ivoire section, speaking generally a “regional approach” consists broadly of three components: information exchange and cross-learning, coordination and joint activities, and tax and law harmonization. Within each component there are myriad opportunities for actions. There is value, for example, in joint workshops and trainings of diamond valuers across a region or customs officials. There is also value in adopting a comprehensive regional review of diamond exporters to cross-check names with Interpol and sanctions lists and identify who is operating in multiple countries. There would also be value in designing a harmonized policy and practice for diamond valuation in terms of which price lists are used and how diamonds are classified. In short, the limited impact of the regional approach in West Africa should not be reason to abandon it in principle. The key is to identify practical actions, prioritize them, and create a project management and coordination mechanism to identify who will implement and fund the activities and how. This step has not yet taken place in the West African case.

In Central Africa, one must similarly unpack what is meant by a “regional approach” and importantly what need it would address. In the case of the Central African Republic, it may be a waste of precious resources to fund multiple meetings of DRC, Cameroon, etc. to discuss problems that everyone already knows. However, it could be useful to organize technical and political discussion between Cameroon and the Central African Republic, mediated by the KP, on the very real issues with cross-border smuggling. In that case a “regional approach” is a cross-cutting lens, like gender or conflict mitigation, used to analyze and propose activities for a very specific problem, in this case the ongoing export of conflict diamonds from the Central African Republic.

6.0 CROSS-CUTTING ACTIVITIES

6.1 PARTNERSHIPS

The PRADD II project built various partnerships with private sector and non-governmental actors throughout the course of the project. Some partnerships flourished, others did not. Most of the partnerships noted below were wholly supported by independent external funding. On some occasions, PRADD II provided in-country travel costs, but the partner supported personnel.

- **Gemology Institute of America (GIA):** PRADD II Côte d’Ivoire successfully organized a training conducted by the GIA for diamond valuers and other key actors in 2014. The training was a key part of building capacity but also momentum around the post-embargo transition strategy. Unfortunately, a leadership change at the GIA led to less interest to pursue this partnership.
- **Brilliant Earth:** Several initiatives were launched to promote conflict-free diamond exports to the jewelry sector through collaboration with Brilliant Earth. Despite good intentions by both PRADD II and Brilliant Earth, no exports occurred primarily because of cost considerations.

- **International Peace Information Service (IPIS):** The Belgian-based non-governmental research institute worked closely with PRADD II in the Central African Republic to provide training to civil society in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and other elements of the artisanal mining gold and diamond economy.
- **Engineers without Borders:** Support was provided to the PRADD II Côte d'Ivoire program to advise on how to create software to assess the quality of diamonds. The association also carried out a study of the water system in Tortiya – a key requirement to generate funds from the government of Côte d'Ivoire.
- **Spark:** The PRADD II Côte d'Ivoire developed a fruitful institutional affiliation with the Dutch Spark non-governmental organization to set up the youth entrepreneurship program.

6.2 GENDER STRATEGY DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

The PRADD II country teams developed their own draft strategies and checklists for gender integration and advanced on their own accord. Regular reporting was carried out for the Girls Count Act that addresses, “support programs and key ministries, including programs and ministries relating to interior, youth, and education, to help increase property rights, social security, home ownership, land tenure security, inheritance rights, access to education, and economic and entrepreneurial opportunities, particularly for women and girls” (HR 2100, April 29, 2015).

The PRADD II program integrated gender and social inclusion into all components of the project. A Gender Specialist was hired at the outset of the project to provide technical assistance to the Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire programs. In the end, PRADD II found it most useful to train up its own staff to provide the consistent in-country advocacy needed to ensure consideration of these issues in all project activities. The Côte d'Ivoire program designed and implemented a Gender Strategy document which was used to assess whether and how every project activity contributed to gender inclusion and empowerment. This manual was then used by the Guinea program.

6.3 MONITORING PRADD II PERFORMANCE

The PRADD II performance indicators are attached in the below annex. Over the five years of the project, indicators evolved so that tracking the same indicators became difficult. As noted in the sections below, generation of data for some indicators continued to be difficult, such as diamond production data, needed to compare diamond exports with diamond production.

Over the 5 years of the PRADD II program, the generation of viable data on diamond statistics at the pit site continued to be a weak link. Availability of data on carats production is still an issue in Côte d'Ivoire and the Central African Republic to inefficient data collection and reporting chains. Once the Focal Points in CAR become operational in the field, more field based information began to flow into the national data base as required by the Operational Framework and the Administrative Decision of the KPCS. PRADD II CAR began reporting production and export statistics but the viability of this data, especially at the production level, is severely question. The many endemic reasons for this are noted in the above sections.

6.4 IMPACT EVALUATION

The PRADD II program supported during the first years an Impact Evaluation process carried out by the USAID Evaluation, Research and Communication (ERC) project. The impact evaluation research and analysis was never completed because of the premature closing of PRADD II. Fortunately, enough initial baseline research was carried out to generate a paper for the World Bank Land and Poverty Conference. The paper described the prevalence and strength of the customary tenure systems and options for formalization of the diamond mining sector.

The PRADD II program in Côte d'Ivoire carried out its own modified impact evaluation in order to judge the efficacy of its various activities and adjust annual programming. This is reported out in the Côte d'Ivoire chapter.

7.0 PROJECT-SPECIFIC INDICATORS

Performance indicators	Base-line value	2013 Q4	2014 Q1-Q4	2015 Q1-Q4	2016 Q1-Q4	2017 Q1-Q4	2018 Q1-Q3	End-line value	End-line target	Comments
I. Proportion of carats entered legally into the chain of custody from the PRADD II production areas against national legal exports										
Guinea	0%	0%	0%	2.3%						
Côte d'Ivoire	0%	0%	0%	66%	64%	40%	N/A	66%	70%	Since the beginning of exports in 2015, the average has been relatively constant at around 66% of exports accounted for at the mine level. This result is better than most ASM producers and owes much of its success to the SODEMI model which incentivizes villagers to monitor and register production locally.
CAR	0%				0%	0%	0%	0%	22%	Initial baseline data for not available for the field because PRADD II CAR was not actively involved in the field. The quality of data generated by Production Notebooks bears no relation to reality. 2018 Q1 exports at 68 087.71 carats; 2018 Q 2 at 2 219.84 carats. With prices per carat increasing from \$88.50/carat to \$110/carat during this same time frame, this suggests either smuggling or lack of market presence of diamond Buying Houses.
2. Percentage of mine workers possessing valid card in areas of PRADD II implementation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	8%	8%	16%	16%	65%	PRADD II did not meet this target due to a number of reasons. First, the criteria used to count miners as having their cards was strict; only those who physically had an unexpired card on them during KAP surveys were counted. Many miners had cards, or had expired cards, that they left at home because they did not want them to get wet. The main reason for the low figure, however, was the lack of presence by SODEMI and the loss of trust with cooperatives. Cooperatives stopped facilitating card registration as an act of protest, showing how important trust is for a functioning chain of custody. By the end of the project the figure improved but was still much lower than hoped. In CAR, technology and training was provided for workers cards, but regional mining officers had neither the means or the inclination to support sale of mining cards. Revenues from sales of mining

Performance indicators	Base-line value	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	End-line value	End-line target	Comments
		Q4	Q1-Q4	Q1-Q4	Q1-Q4	Q1-Q4	Q1-Q3			
										cards there seems to have disappeared and hence recurrent costs were not covered.
4. Number of parcels with relevant parcel information corrected or newly incorporated into an official land administration system as a result of USG assistance - Guinea	0			0	161	161	161	161		
4. Number of parcels with relevant parcel information corrected or newly incorporated into an official land administration system as a result of USG assistance - CAR	0				34	34	34	2092		For CAR, the project georeferenced 571 sites in the 5 KPCS compliant zones; 1521 sites geo-referenced in 7 priority zones
5. Number of households or organizations with formalized land rights as a result of USG assistance	0			22	24	24	24	24	10	
Côte d'Ivoire	0			0	22	28	131	181	50	PRADD II counted land rental agreements signed with village chiefs and agricultural beneficiaries of the project as well as beneficiaries of the cashew mapping and farm certificates issued in Tortiya in 2018. Thanks to this last initiative the project surpassed its target.
Guinea	0			0	0	0	0	0		

Performance indicators	Base-line value	2013 Q4	2014 Q1-Q4	2015 Q1-Q4	2016 Q1-Q4	2017 Q1-Q4	2018 Q1-Q3	End-line value	End-line target	Comments
6. Number of disputed land and property rights cases that have been resolved by local authorities, contractors, mediators or courts as a result of USG assistance	0			0	19	19	19	19	15	
Côte d'Ivoire	0			0	18	2	0	20	15	PRADD II counted only major collective land disputes that were resolved thanks to the project. The majority were disputes resolved as part of the boundary demarcation process. The project met its target for this indicator.
Guinea	0			0	1	1	1	1		
7. Percentage of households with increased economic benefits derived from sustainable natural resource management as a result of USG assistance	0%									PRADD II took a conservative approach to measuring this indicator. The average monthly household income from the 2015 baseline household survey was compared with the average 2018 household income. The project then differentiated between project beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries who responded to the randomized household survey. The average household income of beneficiaries was 74% higher than non-beneficiaries. The percentage of project beneficiaries among respondents was 9%. Therefore PRADD II estimates that 9% of households have improved economic benefits thanks to USG assistance. However, the reality is likely higher given that households that may not have directly participated in a PRADD II livelihoods activity may have nevertheless benefitted through contact with a beneficiary or other factors. These cases were not captured in this indicator.
8. Number of hectares of mined-out sites rehabilitated and/or converted to other economic uses	0			0.15	14.46	14.46	14.46	14.46	25	
Côte d'Ivoire	0			0.15	12.20	12.20	16.58	16.58	25	PRADD II nearly met this indicator target which was revised downwards in the final annual work plan due to the fact that many livelihoods activities were conducted in non-mining areas. The success of the fish farming program, a major source of

Performance indicators	Base-line value	2013 Q4	2014 Q1-Q4	2015 Q1-Q4	2016 Q1-Q4	2017 Q1-Q4	2018 Q1-Q3	End-line value	End-line target	Comments
										rehabilitated land in CAR, was also less than expected in Côte d'Ivoire due to climactic problems. PRADD II expects that as land pressure mounts the land reclamation will continue especially if as in Tortiya marginalized groups are offered secure tenure in exchange for rehabilitating mined-out land.
Guinea	0			0	2.26	2.26	2.26	2.26		
9. Number of villages that have formalized collective land rights in the mining sites (Côte d'Ivoire)	0			0	9	9	9	11	15	PRADD II did not meet this target because of the two boundary disputes between Bobi and Forona, and Diarabana and Niongonon. Even though these disputes represent 2 out of 66 boundary segments, because they involve 4 village this means that the total number of villages that completed demarcation is only 11 as opposed to the target of 15.
10. Number of specific pieces of legislation or implementing regulations proposed, adopted, and/or implemented affecting property rights of the urban and rural poor as a result of USG assistance	0	0	1	4	2	2	2	2	2	
Côte d'Ivoire	0	2	6	0	2	2	0	12	2	The majority of specific pieces of legislation were the mining laws and regulations that implemented the KPCS system in 2014 and 2015. As mineral rights are a form of property rights in the PRADD II theory of change, these contributions count for this indicator. The remaining figures counted stem from the rural land policy and the creation of the rural land agency AFOR.
Guinea	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0		
11. Number of land administration and service entities, offices, or other related facilities that the project technically or physically	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0		

Performance indicators	Base-line value	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	End-line value	End-line target	Comments
		Q4	Q1-Q4	Q1-Q4	Q1-Q4	Q1-Q4	Q1-Q3			
establishes or upgrades with USAID support										
Guinea	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0		GN: No data reported due to project termination.
CAR	0				1	1	2	2		Boda office supported with materials complemented by other donors; fixed up two offices at the Direction General of Mines
12. Number of households adopting complementary livelihoods with USG assistance	0			334	2357	2357	2357	2357	500	
Côte d'Ivoire	0			0	774	925	949	949	500	PRADD II surpassed this target despite a conservative data collection methodology. Instead of counting individual participants, the project verified village by village that beneficiaries did not belong to the same household. Any duplicates were removed and the final figure reflects separate households that were direct beneficiaries of the project's income-generating activities.
Guinea	0			334	260	260	260	260		GN: No data reported due to project termination.
13. Proportion of female participants in USG-assisted programs designed to increase access to productive economic resources (assets, credit, income, or employment)	0%	0	0	52%	94%	94%	94%	94%	30%	
Côte d'Ivoire	0%	0	0	100%	94%	94%	91%	91%	40%	The project largely surpassed this target due to the decision to focus the bulk of its livelihoods portfolio on women's agricultural groups, which represented the vast majority of project beneficiaries.
Guinea	0%	0	0	56%	63%	63%	63%	63%		

Performance indicators	Base-line value	2013 Q4	2014 Q1-Q4	2015 Q1-Q4	2016 Q1-Q4	2017 Q1-Q4	2018 Q1-Q3	End-line value	End-line target	Comments
14. Percentage of artisanal miners demonstrating basic knowledge of diamond valuation techniques	0%			0%	0%	54%	61%	61%	60%	The project met its target thanks to the work of the focal points but also a relatively high baseline knowledge among miners, which was a surprise for PRADD II uncovered in the 2017 KAP survey. PRADD II believes that the figure would be much higher had the project had sufficient time to test and use the educational app completed at the end of the project.
15. Percentage of artisanal miners adopting improved mining techniques	0%			0%	49%	49%	49%	49%	40%	
Côte d'Ivoire	0%			0%	0%	0%	39%	39%	40%	PRADD II met its target as measured in the final miner KAP survey which included questions and observation by survey takers of the miners' sites. The definition of SMARTER mining techniques included any component of the training including the use of augers, terracing and back-filling.
Guinea	0%			0%	97%	97%	97%	97%		GN: No data reported due to project termination.
16. Percentage of artisanal miners in project area demonstrating knowledge of the KP provisions and associated national mining law	20%			92%	28%	28%	28%	28%	35%	
Côte d'Ivoire	27%			0%	28%	47%	61%	61%	75%	PRADD II was close but did not fully meet its target of 75% despite the year-on-year improvement. Importantly, the KAP survey showed that those who were sensitized by PRADD II had a statistically significant higher score than those who were not. However, the sensitization campaign touched only 34% of miners, meaning that to raise this figure the project would have needed not to change its techniques but increase the number of miners exposed to the campaign. Despite not meeting the target the improvement over time and the final figure are satisfactory.
Guinea	10%			92%	90%	90%	90%	90%		

Performance indicators	Base-line value	2013 Q4	2014 Q1-Q4	2015 Q1-Q4	2016 Q1-Q4	2017 Q1-Q4	2018 Q1-Q3	End-line value	End-line target	Comments
CAR	TBD				0%	0%	0%	0%	22%	KAP survey not carried out because of cost considerations. Funds invested in carrying out KPCS required GIS survey of mining sites during two seasons. No baseline possible at outset of project because of uncertain security situation.
17. Number of individuals trained in land tenure and property rights as a result of USG assistance	0	0	224	157	96	96	96	96	600	
Côte d'Ivoire	0	0	111	81	48	65	123	428	600	PRADD II did not meet its target but was not far off base. Only specific and formal trainings were counted towards this indicators, and not the myriad awareness-raising sessions.
Men	0	0	100	77	42	59	117	366		
Women	0	0	11	4	6	6	6	62		
Guinea	0	0	132	67	48	48	48	48		GN: no reported training data due to project termination.
Men	0	0	115	46	47	47	47	47		
Women	0	0	17	21	1	1	1	1		

8.0 PRADD II EXPENDITURES BY ACTIVITY AND COUNTRY

Cote d'Ivoire

Sub-activity	Expenses
1.1 Property rights clarification and formalization	\$396,434.55
1.2 Land use planning in diamond communities	\$236,539.85
1.3 Support to a national rural land policy	\$16,102.00
2.1 Capacity building for KPCS compliance	\$151,199.96
2.2 Support for ASM governance policy and practice	\$48,911.60
3.1 Development of sustainable ASDM supply chain	\$179,748.66
3.2 Livelihoods diversification	\$452,324.33
3.3 Environment and biodiversity	\$123,160.22
4.1 Institutional communication	\$24,375.55
4.2 Monitoring & evaluation	\$65,707.57
4.3 Gender	\$6,250.68
4.4 GIS	\$2,406.18
4.5 Work planning and stakeholder consultations	\$120,851.91
TOTAL	\$1,824,013.06
Total field operation costs including local salaries and wages	\$2,295,484.73

Guinea

Sub-activity	Expenses
1.1 Build Capacity on Land Tenure and Property Rights	\$6,343.17
1.2 Formalize Customary Surface Rights	\$16,179.33
1.3 Identify Conflicts and Promote Alternative Conflict Resolution	\$7,170.02
2.1 Confirm sites for PRADD II Intervention in Forecariah	\$22,932.86
2.2 Reserved Zone Demarcation	\$28,570.13
2.3 Support USGS Mapping, Survey and Modeling Activities	\$28,471.01
2.4 Establish Database for Six Selected Sites	\$23,520.79
2.5 Build Capacity of MoMG for Administration and Monitoring	\$6,480.47
2.6 Improve ASM Information Management with MMG	\$16,678.58
2.7 Support Reinvigoration of the KPPS	\$212.50
3.1 Support the Development of Internal Organizations within Mining Communities	\$29,576.99
3.2 Promote Improved Mining Techniques and Land Rehabilitation	\$36,737.50
3.3 Support Training in Diamond Valuation	\$4,074.29
3.4 Explore Alternative Financing Opportunities	\$947.89
4.1 Communication and Outreach Strategy	\$12,680.50
4.2 Local Communication and Outreach Campaigns	\$19,710.94
4.3 Support National Communication on Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining Sector	\$4,126.87
5.1 Ecological Regeneration and Biodiversity Conservation*	\$30,352.82
6.1 Support Add-ons and Collaboration	\$18,497.99
6.2 Gender	
6.3 Monitoring & Evaluation	\$3,626.70
TOTAL	\$316,891.35

CAR

Sub-activity	Expenses
Component 1: Restoration of Conflict Free Diamond Value Chain	\$332,845.15
Component 2: Strengthening Social Cohesion and Peace Building	\$272,327.85
TOTAL	\$605,173.00



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